R v Coutts
| DOI | 10.1177/000486586900200306 |
| Published date | 01 September 1969 |
| Date | 01 September 1969 |
| Author | A.A.B. |
CASE~
REPORTS
RV
Coutts
Heard in
the
Supreme Court (Winneke, C.
J.)
at
Bendigo, Victoria,
June
1967. Unreported.
C was
tried
on
Indictment
for
the
murder
of his wife.
The
defence
raised
was
that
of
"automattsm"
(See Morris
and
Howard (1964) "Studies
in
Criminal
Law" pp.37-78) on
the
basis of
the
accused
having
suffered
from
acondition of toue a deux.
The
Crown,
apart
from
attempting
to
prove
the
facts beyend reasonable doubt, was placed in
the
position or
having,
by
cross-examination
alone, to
contend
for a verdict of
not
guilty
on
the
grounds of insanity.
In
the
event,
the
verdict
was
in
aceerd
with
the
contention
of
the
Crown,
the
jury
rejectlng
the
not
ion of
automatism.
Aß
the
condition of toue a äeux is
not
common,
and
even less common
as a condition being canvassed in a
murder
trial
(See R v Windle (1953)
36 Cr.Ap,p.R. 85)
it
is
worth
setting
out
the
facts
of
the
case.
The
accused was a
man
aged 61 years
and
of good
character.
For
some
years,
at
least, five or
slx,
his
wife
had
clearly been suffering from a
para-
noid psychosts,
Just
prior
to
her
death,
she
had
taken
her
husband
to a
psychiatrist,
who considered
the
wife a person
who
"could have been
certi-
fied
at
the
time
Isaw
her"
as a
result
of
"a
severe
paranoid
psychosis"
whilst
he
thought
the
husband
(the
accused)
presented
aclinical
"picture
of depression
and
conruston"
and
was developing stgns of toue a äeux.
The
husband
was seen by
the
same
psychtatrtst
seven days
later
(some
two days
after
the
death
of
the
wife). On
this
occasion
the
psychtatrtst
testified
"he
was a
changed
man
...
he was a good deal more self-confident,
what
delusions he
has
(sie)
shared
with
his wife
had
completely
disappeared
and
he seemed to
have
returned
to reality
again,
although
still expresslng
some symptoms of depression
as
one would expect",
The
psychiatrie evidence given to
the
court, on
behalf
of
the
derence,
endeavoured to
maintain
the
view
that
the
person
suffering from toue a
äeue was
not
suffering
from
amental
disease. However,
this
view was
sueeessfully ehallenged in cross-examination:
Q. Aperson
suffering
from
folie
a
äeux
could be deluded to
the
extent
that
he
may
weIl believe
that
somebody 1s abusing
him?
A. Yes
...
Q. And, of course, once
that
stage
had
been reached,
not
only would
the
person be a
party
to
toue a äeux,
but
he would also have a
paranoid
psychosls, would he
not?
A. Yes, exactly.
Th1s led to
the
psychiatrist
replying to a question by
the
trial
[udge
that
he would classify
toue
a
deux
as
amental
disease.
The
second
psychiatrie
witness answered aquestion by
the
trial
judge as foliows:
Q. Could you
regard
it
(toue
a
deux)
as a disorder or
disturbance
.of
the
mind
in
the
sense
that
it
will deprive you of your reasoning faculties?
A.
In
that
sense, yes, of course.
In
the
final analysis, counsel for
the
defence endeavoured to
define
a
disease of
the
mind
in
terms
of
"potentiality
for
recurrence"
(See
the
cases
of
Bratty
(1962) 46 Cr.App.R. 1;
Carter
[1959] V.R. 105; Meddings [1966] V.R.
175
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