R v Williams (Roy)
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | LORD JUSTICE SHAW |
| Judgment Date | 17 December 1976 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1976] EWCA Crim J1217-1 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) |
| Docket Number | No. 3265/B/76 |
| Date | 17 December 1976 |
[1976] EWCA Crim J1217-1
Lord Justice Scarman
Lord Justice Shaw
and
Mr. Justice Nield
No. 3265/B/76
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
MR. N. O'BRIEN appeared on behalf of the Appellant.
MR. K. WEDMORE appeared on behalf of the Crown.
On 24th March, the appellant appeared at tne Bristol Crown Court to stand his trial on an indictment charging him with the dishonest handling of stolen property.
When the case was called on, the defendant entered the dock, he was asked by the Clerk of the Court if he was Roy Brian Williams, and he duly acknowledged his identity, At that stage counsel, who then appeared for the prosecution, intervened to inform the Court that one of his witnesses, a detective sergeant, was too ill to attend. He said that "The Crown feels it would be able to proceed today, but my learned friend has indicated to me that there are certain vital matter which he wants to put to that officer. In those circumstances, I think the matter must be adjourned."
Counsel instructed on behalf of Mr. Williams thereupon told the Court that he endorsed what had been said by his opponent. There was thus a clear intimation that the defendant intended to contest the charge and that he therefore proposed to plead not guilty to the indictment.
In those circumstances the trial could not proceed on that day. No further step was taken other than to postpone the trial. The Clerk did not put the indictment to the defendant or call upon him to plead; but the Court record was endorsed "adjourned to date to be fixed Plea N.G.". Though such a plea was clearly in prospect, it had not actually been made or mentioned in terms.
The case was restored to the list at the Crown Court for the 25th May. It came before a different Judge and there was a different Clerk. Counsel on both sides were other than those who had been instructed in March. The only person who sustained the same role as when the case was first in the list was the defendant himself.
Once more Mr. Williams entered the dock and acknowledged his identity. To the Clerk it appeared from the record that a plea had been taken on the previous occasion. So he embarked without further ado on the process of empanelling the jury. First he informed the defendant of his right of challenge. When the jury had been duly sworn the Clerk, according to the shorthand note, addressed them in these terms: "Members of the Jury, the Defendant Roy Brian Williams, stands charged in this indictment with handling stolen goods, contrary to section 22 of the Theft Act, 1968. The particulars of the offence are on a day unknown between the 3rd day of November 1975 and the 30th day of December 1975, in the City of Bath dishonestly did assist in the retention, removal, disposal or realisation by or for the benefit of Elizabeth Ann Williams of stolen goods, namely a silver tea set, a silver kettle, five rings and a number of necklaces, the property of Kathleen Rosemary Barr, knowing or believing the same to have been stolen. To this indictment he has pleaded not guilty, and it is your charge to say, having heard the evidence, whether he is guilty or not guilty." Thus the defendant heard the indictment read out. He heard also the statement that he had pleaded Not Guilty to it.
No one present, other than the defendant himself, could have known that the assertion that he had pleaded Not Guilty out of his own mouth was not in accord with the facts.
However Mr. Williams made no demur. If any question had arisen to his mind, he would no doubt have dismissed it as being of no practical consequence. After all it was his intention and desire to enter a plea of Not Guilty to the charge and to be tried by the jury.
In practice, as is well known, the plea of an accused is often taken days or weeks before his trial actually begins; so no one was in any different position, to all intents and purposes, from that which would have obtained if Mr. Williams had been duly arraigned and had spoken the words "Not Guilty" on 24th March.
The proceedings continued as a normal trial. The outcome was that the jury returned a verdict of Guilty, and the appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment.
He applied for leave to appeal against the conviction and put forward a veriety of grounds of appeal which were of his own devising. Mr. O'Brien, who appeared for him at the Crown Court, and who has argued this appeal on his behalf, has not sought to pursue those grounds, but this Court has noted and considered them.
It is unnecessary to say more than that they are without substance or significance and that none of them could avail the appellant in seeking to impugn his conviction.
There is however the further ground which was referred to this Court by the single Judge as being a question of law, namely whether the proceedings which resulted in the appellant's conviction were not a mistrial and a nullity, in that he had never been called upon to plead.
This narrow and technical point is unaffected by the merits of the matter. If anything is plain beyond controversy, it is that the appellant has no merits. Nonetheless, it is incumbent on this Court to consider and to seek to resolve the legalities in the light of the defective procedure which was inadvertently followed.
Mr. O'Brien has submitted that the omission of any formal arraignment, with the consequence that no plea was taken, is fatal to the validity of the trial. He took his stand on a judgment of this Court in Ellis 57 Criminal Appeal Reports 571, where the Court of trial had accepted a plea of Guilty from counsel for the accused. In setting aside the conviction, Lord Justice Edmund Davies referred (at page 574) to "the rule that before a criminal trial by judge and jury can be properly launched there must generally be an arraignment of the accused of the offence charged and he must personally answer to it." he went on to say at page 575: "We think that the only safe and proper course accordingly is to say, as we now do, that (apart from a few very special cases) it is an invariable requirement that the initial arraignment must be conducted between the Clerk of the Court and the accused person himself or herself directly, whatever may be the decision in relation to cases where, as in Tasamulug, there is a change of plea in the course of it, though there also we express the strong view that it is highly desirable that the same rule of practice should be followed."
It has to be observed that this proposition stated in those wide terms went beyond what was necessary for the decision of that appeal. There the critical issue was whether a plea of Guilty tendered by counsel and not by the accused himself could be regarded as an effective and banding plea. It is of course plain to see why it cannot and should not be so regarded. It is a plea which is self-incriminatory and self-incrimination cannot be vicariously accomplished. Any contrary view would be fraught with manifest dangers. Injustice rather than justice would be the likely products of a principle which permitted indirect delegated confessions of guilt.
No qualification of or deviation from the rule that a plea of guilty must come from him who acknowledges guilt is thus permissible. A departure from the...
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