R2P in the UN Security Council: Darfur, Libya and beyond
| Date | 01 June 2016 |
| Published date | 01 June 2016 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0010836715613365 |
| Author | Jess Gifkins |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Cooperation and Conflict
2016, Vol. 51(2) 148 –165
© The Author(s) 2015
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DOI: 10.1177/0010836715613365
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R2P in the UN Security
Council: Darfur, Libya and
beyond
Jess Gifkins
Abstract
It has been argued that consensus on the responsibility to protect (R2P) was lost in the United
Nations Security Council as a result of the NATO-led intervention in Libya in 2011. This
argument assumes that there was more agreement on R2P before the Libyan intervention than
there was afterwards. Yet, a close examination of the Security Council’s use of language on
R2P shows the opposite: R2P was highly contentious within the Security Council prior to the
Libyan intervention, and less so afterwards. Not only has the Council used R2P language more
frequently since 2011, but also negotiating this language has become quicker and easier. To
demonstrate this I compare negotiations on Darfur with deliberations during and after the Arab
Spring. Resolution 1706 on Darfur was the first time the Security Council referred to R2P in a
country-specific resolution – and indeed it was the only country-specific resolution to refer to
R2P before 2011 – making it an apt point of comparison. Via focused analysis on how the language
used in Security Council resolution evolves over time, this article demonstrates that the Council
has found ‘agreed language’ on R2P that is acceptable to members, both for thematic resolutions
and country-specific resolutions. Language on R2P in Security Council resolutions has shifted
from contentious to commonplace.
Keywords
Decision-making, language, resolutions, responsibility to protect, United Nations Security
Council
Introduction1
Within weeks of the conflict escalating in Libya in 2011 the United Nations (UN)
Security Council adopted Resolutions 1970 and 1973. These resolutions were unusually
quick and decisive. The two resolutions referred the situation in Libya to the International
Criminal Court, created an arms embargo and targeted sanctions, authorised the use of
Corresponding author:
Jess Gifkins, Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, University of Queensland, St Lucia,
Brisbane, 4072, Australia.
Email: jess.gifkins@gmail.com
613365CAC0010.1177/0010836715613365Cooperation and ConflictGifkins
research-article2015
Article
Gifkins 149
force, and created a no-fly zone over Libya. These two resolutions, and particularly
1973, which authorised the no-fly zone, have provoked intense debate in the years that
followed. Significantly, Resolution 1973 marked the first time the Security Council
authorised the non-consensual use of force for the protection of civilians against a func-
tioning state (Bellamy and Williams, 2011: 825; Glanville, 2013: 325). Given this, it
represents a decisive example of implementing the coercive aspects of the responsibility
to protect (R2P). The outcome of regime change in Libya has opened up debates over the
implementation of R2P.
Many have argued that there has been a backlash against R2P after the Libyan inter-
vention. For example, Gareth Evans argued that ‘consensus fell away’ after Libya (2012).
Likewise, Ramesh Thakur has said that the international consensus on R2P has been
damaged by the Libyan intervention (2013: 72). Graham Cronogue took this a step fur-
ther and argued ‘The legacy of NATO’s overreach in Libya will make Russia and China
extremely hesitant to approve the Responsibility to Protect in the future’ (2012: 151).
While NATO’s actions in Libya, particularly on regime change, have been contentious,
these arguments assume that there was more consensus on R2P in the Security Council
before the Arab Spring than there was afterwards. Some have challenged this argument
by showing that the Security Council used R2P in resolutions more often in the two years
after Libya than it had used it prior to 2011 (Bellamy, 2014: 26; Weiss, 2014: 10).
Frequent use of R2P language is part of the change, but the ease and speed with which
R2P language has been included in Council resolutions since Libya also represents a
significant shift.
To demonstrate the depth of this change, this article draws on the case of Darfur.
Libyan Resolution 1970 was the second country-specific resolution to include language
on R2P, while Darfur Resolution 1706 was the first. It took six months to negotiate
Resolution 1706 on Darfur in 2006, and language on R2P proved to be one of the most
difficult aspects. The following year, there was insufficient agreement to refer to R2P
again in a resolution on Darfur, and this language was removed from an early draft. This
contrasts strongly with the period from 2011 onwards, beginning with Libya, where the
Council has routinely included language on R2P in resolutions. These negotiations have
been quick and language on R2P has not been a major obstacle in the negotiations.
Language on R2P has become more acceptable to Security Council members over time,
and the Libyan resolutions in 2011 mark the turning point.
This article focuses on the way language on R2P has been used in Security Council
resolutions and how it has changed over time. Resolutions are the strongest form of deci-
sion the Security Council makes, and can be legally binding, but this article analyses the
politics of drafting resolutions rather than their legal effects.2 While there is literature
that discusses the language of specific Council resolutions, there have been few sus-
tained studies on the language in Security Council resolutions more broadly.3 To analyse
the politics of language in Security Council negotiations – and R2P language more spe-
cifically – this article proceeds in two parts. The first section discusses the significance
of language within the Security Council, which can be resistant to innovation, but new
language can become routinised over time. The second section takes a chronological
approach to the Security Council’s use of language on R2P in resolutions, divided into
three phases of the Council’s engagement with R2P: from the early stages of R2P in
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