Recent Judicial Decisions
| Author | John Wood |
| Published date | 01 January 1980 |
| Date | 01 January 1980 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0032258X8005300112 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
PROFESSOR SIR JOHN WOOD, C.B.E., LL.M.,
The University
of
Sheffield.
Legal Correspondent
of
the
POLICE
JOURNAL
RECENT
JUDICIAL
DECISIONS
FIRE, FIRE
The appellant had been found guilty on a count of arson and had
pleaded guilty to burglary. He appealed against the conviction for
arson. The facts are simple. Stephenson went to a large stack of
straw, in a field and tried to sleep ina hollow in the stack.
It
was too
cold so he made a fire of twigs and straw inside the hollow. Not
surprisingly the whole stack took fire causing damage valued at
about £5,500. On being interviewed by the police shortly afterwards,
Stephenson said that the fire had been caused by his smoking a
cigarette. Later he told about the fire he had made. He ran away
when the stack went up in flames.
It
was, he said, an accident.
At the trial the accused did not give evidence. The only witness
called for the defence was a psychiatrist who testified that the accused
had a long history of schizophrenia. That condition he said would
make it quite possible for the accused to act as he did without taking
into account the danger of the whole stack being burnt. His foresight
and appreciation of danger would be less than that of a person who
was mentally normal,
The crime of arson is defined in the Criminal Damage Act
1971.
S.l
provides that 'A person who without lawful excuse
...
damages
any property belonging to another
...
being reckless as to whether
any such property would be
...
damaged' and S.3 that 'an offence
committed under that section by
...
damaging property by fire shall
be charged as arson'. The crucial issue in this case is the required
element of recklessness. The appeal was based upon criticism of the
trial judge's direction to the jury on this point.
Two points were made. The first concerned the narrow issue
whether the trial judge had taken the formula he had used from the
wrong case. He had used a passage from R. v. Parker [1973] I
W.L.R. 600 which said
'A man is reckless in the sense required when he carries out a
deliberate act knowing or closing his
mind
to the obviousfact that
there is some risk of damage resulting from- the act but
nevertheless continuing in the performance of that act'.
This differed from the definition in R. v. Briggs (Note) [1977] I
W.L.R. 605 in so far as it contained, as an addition, the words in
italics. These words were said to cloud the definition set out in Briggs.
January 1980 Police Journal 73
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