Recent Judicial Decisions

DOI10.1177/0032258X6303600210
Date01 February 1963
Published date01 February 1963
AuthorW. H. D. Winder
Subject MatterArticle
W.
H.
D.
WINDER,
M.A.,
LL.M.
Legal Correspondent
O/THE
POLICE
JOURNAL
RECE:\'T JtJDICI
..
\L
DECISIO:\,S
THE
INTENDING MURDERER'S INTENT
R.
v. Grimwood
The question
of
what kind
of
intention on the part
of
the killer is
necessary or sufficient to support a charge of murder was examined
by the House
of
Lords in the case
of
D.P.P. v. Smith
[19611
A.C. 290.
Whatever the true limits
of
the doctrine there laid down it is clear
that it is dangerous to rely on that ruling to support a charge
of
attempted murder. The reason for the distinction is that attempted
murder, or at least the special statutory forms
of
attempted murder,
requires a specific intent to exist. The importance
of
the distinction
between murder and attempted murder in its statutory forms is
brought out in the judgment in R. v. Grimwood[1962] 3 All E.R. 285.
Under the Offences against the Person Act, 1861, s. 14, it is a
felony to .. attempt to suffocate or strangle any person, with intent
to commit
murder".
That
intent is the essence
of
the statutory
definition
of
the particular crime. In the substantive offence
of
murder it is the common law which prescribes, in not very specific
terms, what the intent may be. The appellant in R. v. Grimwood
pleaded not guilty to three counts charging him, under this section,
with,
(I)
attempting to strangle his wife with intent to murder, (2)
attempting to suffocate her with intent to murder, and (3)
of
assault
occasioning actual bodily harm. The jury found the appellant
guilty on the first count, and was discharged from giving verdicts on
the other two counts. On appeal it was held that the Judge's direction
to the jury was erroneous on the question
of
intent to murder. It
was quite clear that there had been an attempt to strangle and an
attempt to suffocate and, on the police evidence, that from the very
beginning the appellant intended to murder his wife.
It
was said
that he had stated that he wanted to finish her off and, .. to be truth-
ful I meant to kill
her".
There was ample evidence on which the
jury, if in receipt
of
aproper direction, could have convicted on the
charge as laid. Because
of
the judge's direction the Court
of
Criminal
Appeal substituted a verdict
of
guilty on the third count, that is,
occasioning actual bodily harm.
February
1963 93

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