Recent Judicial Decisions
| Published date | 01 January 1997 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0032258X9707000113 |
| Date | 01 January 1997 |
| Author | Rob R. Jerrard |
| Subject Matter | Article |
ROB
R. JERRARD,
LLB,
LLM
Legal Correspondent for The Police Journal
RECENT JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Mortgage
Fraud:
Property Does Not Pass in Bank Transfer; Which
Sections of The Theft Act
are
Effective?
R. v. Preddy, Slade and Dhillon House of Lords
(1996) The Times, July 11
The law
"Section 15(2)... a person is to be treated as obtaining property if he
obtains ownership, possession or control of it, and 'obtain' includes
obtaining for another or enabling another to obtain or retain ..."
The facts
Lord Goff said that the cases concerned mortgage frauds. Preddy, Slade
and Dhillon had applied to building societies or other lending institutions
for advances to be secured by mortgages. In each case, the mortgage
application or accompanying documents had contained one or more
statements known by the appellant to be false. Some applications had
been refused, in which event the appellant had been charged with an
attempt. In the case of Preddy and Slade, the advances had totalled more
than £1m.
Section 15(1) of the 1968 Act replaced obtaining by false pretences
contrary to s.32(1) of the Larceny Act 1916. The question was whether
the debiting of a bank account and the corresponding crediting of another
brought about by dishonest misrepresentation amounted to the obtaining
of property within s.15. The sums had been paid sometimes by cheque,
sometimes by telegraphic transfer and sometimes by CHAPS (clearing
house automated payment system) involving electronic transfer as
between banks. No distinction needed to be drawn between telegraphic
and electronic transfer.
Section 4(1) 1968 provided that property included money and all
other property, real or personal, including things in action and other
intangible property. The Court of Appeal had held that an electronic
transfer was intangible property.
It had identified the sums the subject of the relevant charges as being
sums standing to the credit of the lending institution in its bank account.
Those credit entries would, in his Lordship's opinion, represent debts
owing by the bank to the lending institution constituting choices in action
belonging to the lending institution and, as such, falling within the
definition of "property" in s.4(l). His Lordship's belief was, however,
that identifying the sum as property did not advance the argument very
January 1997 The Police Journal 77
To continue reading
Request your trial