Recent Possession, Larceny and Robbery
| Author | A. Laurence Polak |
| Published date | 01 May 1964 |
| Date | 01 May 1964 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0032258X6403700506 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
A.
LAU
RENeE
POLAK,
B.A.
RECENT
POSSESSION",
LARCENY
AND
ROBBERY
The case
of
R. v. Fallon (ante, p. 32) is an extension of a rule of
evidence which goes back as early as
1826-that
possession of
goods recently stolen is some evidence
of
theft. In the strangely-
entitled case of R. v.
-(1826)
2 C. &P. 459, followed in R. v. Adams
(1829) 3 C. &P. 600, R. v. Partridge (1836) 7 C. &P. 551, R. v.
Cockin (1836) 2 Lew. C. C. 235, R. v. Hornby (1844) I Car. &Kir.
305, R. v. Hall (1845) I Cox c.c. 231, R. v. Hewlett (1843) 2 Russell
on Crimes (8th Edn.) 1900, R. v. Evans (1847) 2 Cox C.C. 270,
R. v. Cooper (1852) 3 Car. &Kir. 318, R. v. Harris (1860) 8 Cox C.C.
333, R. v. Knight (1864) Le. &Ca. 378, C.C.R., R. v. Langmead
(1864) Le. &Ca. 427, C.C.R., R. v, Smith (1862) 3 F. &F.
123-
all in the last
century-it
has been said that it is not essential for the
prosecution to prove that the defendant was seen to take the goods; it
is sufficient if he was found in possession
of
stolen property
shortly after the theft; the jury are then generally warranted
in concluding that he stole the goods or came by them
dishonestly, unless he satisfactorily explains how he came by
them. The weight of such a presumption depends on the nature
of the thing stolen and the length of time which has elapsed
since the stealing. Cases since 1900, to the same effect, are
R. v. Tideswell [1905] 2K.B. 273, C.C.R., R. v. Kelson (1909)
3 Cr. App. Rep. 230, R. v. Theadorus (1909) 3 Cr. App. Rep.
269, R. v. Schama &Abramovitch (1914) 84L.J.K.B. 396, C.C.A.
(though this appeal was allowed, on the ground
of
misdirection):
and in recent years R. v. Loughlin (1951) 35 Cr. App. Rep. 69 and
indicates that the proper meaning of "satisfactorily explains"
is
not-"
Unless you (the jury) are satisfied that his explanation is
true, you should
convict";
but
rather"
Unless you are satisfied
that his explanation is untrue
",or
"If
you are satisfied that his
explanation might reasonably be true, you should
acquit".
Ifhe
gives
such an explanation, which is consistent with innocence, even though
the
jury
are not convinced
of
its truth, the accused is entitled to be
acquitted (in the absence of other evidence), because the prosecution,
on whom the onus still rests, has then failed to discharge the duty
of
satisfying the jury of the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt
(R. v. Schama, supra, R. v. Norris (1916) 86 L.J.K.B. 810, C.C.A;
May /964 218
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