Refugees and Shifted Risk: An International Study of Syrian Forced Migration and Smuggling
| Author | Danilo Mandić,Charles M. Simpson |
| Published date | 01 December 2017 |
| Date | 01 December 2017 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12371 |
Refugees and Shifted Risk: An International
Study of Syrian Forced Migration and
Smuggling
Danilo Mandi
c* and Charles M. Simpson**
ABSTRACT
The role of smuggling in forced migration has been a leading policy challenge of the Syrian
refugee crisis in Europe and the Middle East. This study investigates how anti-smuggling gov-
ernment policies have shaped migratory risks for Syrian refugees in five countries: Jordan,
Turkey, Greece, Serbia and Germany. Original evidence from in-depth interviews (n=123),
surveys (n=100), expert interviews (n=75) and ethnography reveal that government anti-smug-
gler policies have: (a) endangered Syrian refugees by shifting risk from smugglers to their cli-
ents; (b) distorted refugees’perceptions of risk, and; (c) decreased refugees’confidence in
government representatives while increasing dependence on smugglers. These data are unique
in scope and topic, expanding the existing literature with an emphasis on understudied experi-
ences during migration. The paper concludes with a policy recommendation that acknowledges
the reality of smugglers’role in forced migrants’decisions, offering a pragmatic alternative of
strategic pre-emption of smugglers.
INTRODUCTION
A United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Omar & Wohlfeld, 2015) report on migrant
smuggling concluded that “the response of European governments to the increasing problems of
human trafficking and smuggling [is] part of the problem, not the solution.”Such a response, it
continued ominously, was “ending the right of asylum in Europe”as such (Morrison and Crosland,
2000, p.1). This was written in 2000.
Fifteen years later, a record wave of refugees deluged the Balkan Route, revealing how robust
migrant smugglers are against attempts to shut them down. Government responses have not only
failed to adapt to evolving migrant-smuggler dynamics, but have seemingly become even more
flawed (Amnesty International, 2015; Guild et al., 2016). While the need to understand smugglers’
role in migration has increased, studies addressing smuggler-migrant dynamics by asking refugees
about their experiences are rare and limited. Particularly, there is limited knowledge on how Syrian
refugees in the migration wave of 2013-6 engaged in risk through smuggling, and specifically what
effect current policies since March 2016 have had on this interaction. Government-funded surveys
and interview-based approaches often avoid the question of smuggling, and are compromised by
the extreme caution Syrians exercise in speaking to officials, especially while still in transit.
Reports such as those by the Missing Migrants Project (IOM, 2014, 2016) addressing the effects of
smuggling networks and anti-smuggler policies on migration outcomes are precious but rare.
* Harvard University
** Boston Consortium for Arab Region Studies
doi: 10.1111/imig.12371
©2017 The Authors
International Migration ©2017 IOM
International Migration Vol. 55 (6) 2017
ISSN 0020-7985Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
This study is a contribution to this urgent research agenda. To shed light on the role of smug-
glers in refugee risk-taking, as well as the effects of anti-smuggler policies, we present original data
from an international sample of Syrian refugees on the Balkan Route. We find that counter-smug-
gling efforts have shifted the risk from smugglers to refugees, heightened misperception among
migrants, and weakened refugee trust in government representatives while increasing refugee
dependence on smugglers. Based on these findings, we propose a policy recommendation of strate-
gic pre-emption that would recognize the reality of smuggler-refugee dynamics. This policy would
reduce risk for refugees, increase states’ability to focus on trafficking, and divert migrant finances
away from smugglers toward state actors.
THE RISKS OF MIGRANT SMUGGLING
Before elucidating research methods, findings and implications, it is worth discussing the existing
theoretical framework surrounding migrant risk, including the on-going debates pertaining to types
of risk, agency, and risk perception. The complexity of decision-making involved in forced migra-
tion and the frequent lack of differentiation between refugee and non-forced migration dynamics in
the literature requires some clarification of terms used in this article, and specification of the point
of interaction between this article and existing thinking on the topic.
Theorizing migrant risk
In their review of six theoretical approaches to risk in migration, Williams and Bal
a
z (2012) find that
risk is under-theorized in general, but especially understudied in forced migration contexts and dur-
ing transit. Most explorations of the topic relate to unforced migration (particularly economic migra-
tion and labour market risk-taking); do not ask about risk en route (but rather about initial migratory
decisions, destination country choices, and differences in post-migration assimilation outcomes); and
study refugees only in the context of “at risk”constituencies (such as youth) or as sources of societal
risk for receiving countries. Much of the debate–concerning how rational or boundedly rational,
individual or collective, objective or socially constructed risk is (Williams and Bal
a
z, 2012; p.23)–
has not extended to en route forced migratory risk. Furthermore, the centrality of trust in mediating
risk decisions (Williams and Bal
a
z, 2012; p.24) has not been explored in relation to smugglers,
arguably the most trusted and formative inducers of risky refugee behaviours. Finally, migrant risk-
taking has not been contextualized regarding smuggler adaptations to anti-smuggler policies.
Contextualizing agency: mid-level actors
Forced migration scholarship has strived to theorize the decision-making and risk-taking processes
of refugees as pro-active agents, not passive objects of macro-level policy (Triandafyllidou, 2017).
This agency has been especially neglected in relation to how migrants perceive, relate to, and react
to smugglers, producing difficult legal and moral dilemmas (Landry, 2016). The level of choice
and consent in refugee smuggling is notoriously ambiguous:
In circumstances in which refugees flee their countries [...] it can be difficult to draw quite such a
clear line between choice and coercion [as with other smuggled migrants]. Refugees may not be
forced to engage smugglers, but if smuggling represents their only route out of harm’s way, it is
hardly a voluntary decision (Koser, 2011, p.258).
We do not pretend to resolve this ambiguity. Instead, we clarify how smugglers and anti-smuggler
policy-enforcers shape the framework within which migrant risk-taking occurs. Regardless of how
74 Mandi
c and Simpson
©2017 The Authors. International Migration ©2017 IOM
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