Rewarding Civil Service Performance Through Team Bonuses: Findings, Analysis and Recommendations
| Author | Yves Emery |
| Date | 01 March 2004 |
| Published date | 01 March 2004 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0020852304041237 |
| Subject Matter | Journal Article |
International
Review of
Administrative
Sciences
Rewarding civil service performance through team bonuses:
findings, analysis and recommendations
Yves Emery
Abstract
Performance-related pay within public organizations is continuing to spread.
Although it can help to strengthen an entrepreneurial spirit in civil servants, its imple-
mentation is marred by technical, financial, managerial and cultural problems. This
article identifies an added problem, namely the contradiction that exists between a
managerial discourse that emphasizes the team and collective performance, on the
one hand, and the use of appraisal and reward tools that are above all individual, on
the other. Based on an empirical survey carried out within Swiss public organizations,
the analysis shows that the team is currently rarely taken into account and singles out
the principal routes towards an integrated system for the management and reward-
ing of civil servants.
Introduction
In their search for improved performance, public administrative agencies implement
different strategies that allow them to increase efficiency and effectiveness. Foremost
amongst the steps taken are the modernization of human resources management
and, in particular, the introduction of performance-related pay systems, which have
been in place in the various Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) countries for a good 10 years (OECD, 1993). Several publications in
recent years (Schedler, 1993; Emery, 1994; Chenaux, 1998) show, in particular, that
Yves Emery is a professor at the Swiss Graduate School of Public Administration (IDHEAP), where he
is responsible for the chair of public management and human resources management. He is also a
research director and consultant for a number of public organizations. Translated from the French
article entitled ‘Rémunérer la performance des agents publics par des primes d’équipe: constats,
analyses et recommandations’. CDU: 35.088.87
Copyright © 2004 IIAS, SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)
Vol 70(1):157–168 [DOI:10.1177/0020852304041237]
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158 International Review of Administrative Sciences 70(1)
pay is used as a lever for a change in culture and public management style. However,
the real impact of such systems remains controversial, all the more so because the
conditions in which they are implemented are not ideal, particularly within public
organizations.
In addition to the lack of financial resources and the often insufficient training
given to the managers applying these methods, it seems that performance-related
pay is suffering from a new problem that could hinder the anticipated effects for
some time, namely the emergence of the ‘individual versus team’ paradox. Manage-
ment literature is placing increasing emphasis on the importance of teams in the
success and performance of organizations, whilst human resources management
(HRM) practices within public organizations and, in particular, those linked to pay are
becoming increasingly individualistic (Emery and Giauque, 2001). Certain trends can
be identified in this regard and a number of lessons can be drawn from them.
The growing infatuation in the 1980s and especially the 1990s for the team,
initially called the group in the significant works of the 20th century (see the classic
works by Mayo, Moreno, Lewin and Homans), is still increasing. The team seems to
be the foundation of collective action more than the individual worker, as witnessed
by the numerous publications on the topic (for example, Charrier and Kouliche, 1994;
Katzenbach and Smith, 1994; Mohrman et al., 1995; Petit et al., 1999). According to
various studies, teams make a decisive contribution to innovation, quality of service,
cost reduction and increased productivity.
In contrast, the individualization of pay practices, the assessment of which in the
literature is controversial (Kohn, 1993; Campbell et al., 1998), currently leaves little
room for the promotion of incentive and reward systems that operate at a team level
(for example, Armstrong, 1996; Balkin and Markman, 2000). Whilst individual
performance-related pay can notably reduce cooperation, work against quality
improvement goals and increase competition between individuals (Roussel, 2000), it
has been widely introduced within public organizations, particularly in Switzerland.1
One of the main critics of the rewarding of individual merit, Deming (1986),
emphasizes that the aim of any management system should be to improve the per-
formance of the organization and the quality of service provided to customers (users)
and not to record and reward individual merit. Depending on the options chosen,
payment will tend to unite or divide workers and teams, encourage mutual assistance
and cooperation, the transfer of skills and collective performance or, in contrast, indi-
vidualistic behaviour. In our opinion, the purpose of any management system should
lie in the outcomes produced, that is the degree of efficiency with which it achieves
its goals.
Fundamentally, the reward system implemented is not indifferent and the ques-
tion of pay should be put back into this more general framework, which underlines
the need for harmonization of the systems put in place to influence staff behaviour
(Carestia-Lanciaux, 1990), particularly in terms of cooperation, the conditions under
which they are implemented and the effect they generate, with the focus on inte-
grated management of the public services.
This article first reiterates that the motivational impact of financial reward schemes
has always been varied, particularly in the public services. It then examines the effects
of pay practices on cooperation, followed by a review of the principal points
02_RAS 70_1 articles 2/27/04 1:00 PM Page 159
Emery Rewarding civil service performance 159
established in the literature with regard to the conditions for success in setting
up performance-related pay systems. The principal findings of a survey of team
bonuses are presented and discussed, concluding with some vital recommendations
aimed at the relevant players in the public services, in particular the need to integrate
the management of individual and collective performance.
Motivation and performance of civil servants: the ambiguous
appeal of financial forms of reward
Featuring prominently in most theories on motivation at work (Lévy-Leboyer, 1998),
remuneration, including any form of financial reward (salaries, premiums, bonuses
and various profit-sharing or shareholding schemes in private companies [Sire, 1993]),
is sometimes seen as a central component of motivation, particularly in the works of
the American expert E.E. Lawler (1990), and sometimes as an illusory, or even
misleading, component of motivation that is instrumental and can be detrimental to
intrinsic motivation (Deci et al., 1999). This idea is put forward, in particular, by
R. Sprenger (1994, 1995), who breaks down the ‘myth’ of motivation at work and
demonstrates that more often than not, systems intended to ‘motivate’ staff actually
have the opposite effect.
It must be remembered that according to behaviourism, pay acts as a reinforce-
ment designed to actualize a behaviour or a favourable result for the organization. In
this sense, it operates through a form of external control and generates motivation
that is instrumental or extrinsic and not intrinsic. One author who has studied this
question in depth for almost 30 years (Deci, 1975) states that an intrinsically moti-
vated activity gives the person carrying it out a feeling of satisfaction or achievement
concomitant to the action. The individual finds motivation in the very performance of
his/her tasks and not because s/he has been promised a reward (extrinsic motivation,
such as a salary or a bonus) (Nuttin, 1980).
Within public organizations in particular, financial incentives rarely come first
amongst sources of motivation, in comparison to the private sector, as illustrated, in
particular, by the study carried out by Jurkiewicz et al. (1998): whilst managers in the
private...
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