SALT II: Consequences for Europe and the Nordic Region
| Author | Anders C. Sjaastad |
| DOI | 10.1177/001083678001500404 |
| Published date | 01 November 1980 |
| Date | 01 November 1980 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
SALT
II:
Consequences
for
Europe
and
the
Nordic
Region
ANDERS
C.
SJAASTAD
Norwegian
Institute
of
International
Affairs,
Oslo
Sjaastad,
A.
C.
SALT
II:
Consequences
for
Europe
and
the
Nordic
Region.
Cooperation
and
Conflict,
XV,
1980,
237-248.
As
a
countermove
to
the
Soviet
intervention
in
Afghanistan,
President
Carter
has
asked
the
Senate
to
shelve
the
SALT
II
treaty
and
postpone
its
ratification
process.
Yet
there
seems
to
exist
an
understanding
that
the
signatories
will
respect
the
provisions
of
SALT
II,
even
though
the
treaty
has
not
formally
taken
effect.
In
evaluating
the
consequences
of
SALT
II,
it
is
important
to
distinguish
between,
on
the
one
hand,
consequences
of
the
negotiations
and
treaties
and,
on
the
other,
developments
in
the
military-strategic
field
which
have
come
about
independently
of
the
SALT
process.
In
this
article
conceivable
political
and
strategic-military
consequences
of
SALT
II
for
Europe
in
general,
and
the
Nordic
area
in
particular
are
analysed
in
the
light
of
recent
developments
in
the
East-West
strategic
balance.
It is
concluded
that
SALT
II
contributes
to
the
maintenance
of
a
high
level
of
strategic
arms,
not
the
least
consequence
of
which
is
a
significant
concentration
of
strategic
weapons
systems
in
the
immediate
vicinity
of
the
Nordic
countries.
I.
INTRODU CTION
Since
their
inception
in
the
autumn
of
1969
the
SALT
negotiations
between
the
USA
and
the
Soviet
Union
have
come
to
be
a
cornerstone
of
détente.
Progress
in
SALT -
and
its
lack -
has
been
regarded
as
the
barometer
of
East-West
relations.
Optimism
blossomed
with
the
signing
of
the
SALT
I
and
SALT
II
treaties
and
it
was
believed
that
they
would
lead
to
rapid
progress
in
other
current
East-West
discussions.
As
time
goes
on
it
seems
clear
that
the
SALT
process
has
become
a
symbol
of
detente:
it
may
well
be
asked
whether
SALT
has
not
been
made
to
carry
a
greater
load
than
the
negotiations
can
bear
and
the
results
can
justify.
This
means
also
that
from
being
a
rational
approach
to
the
control
and
prefera-
bly
reduction
of
the
superpowers’
strategic
nuclear
arsenals,
SALT
has
been
trans-
formed
into
a
goal
in
its
own
right.
Every
SALT
agreement
has
been
seen
as
’better
than
nothing’
and
the
voicing
of
demands,
or
behaviour
that
endangers
the
talks,
has
a
priori
been
regarded
as
showing
a
deplora-
ble
indifference
to
the
goal
of
Peace.
So
much
national
and
international
prestige
has
gradually
been
staked
on
the
negotiations
by
both
superpower
governments
that
the
par-
ties
have
felt
themselves
compelled
to
reach
agreement,
literally
’at
any
price’.
In
early
January
1980
President
Carter
asked
the
American
Senate
to
shelve
the
SALT
II
treaty
and
postpone
its
ratification
process.
This
was
one
of
the
many
meas-
ures
Carter
announced
as a
countermove
to
the
Soviet
Union’s
intervention
in
Af-
ghanistan.
There
is
little
reason
to
doubt
that
it
was
only
with
great
reluctance
that
Carter
recommended
this
postponement.
In
contrast
to
many
of
the
other
’punitive
measures’,
the
Carter
Administration
re-
gards
it
as
being
as
much
in
the
American
as
in
the
Soviet
interest
to
bring
the
treaty
to
a
safe
berth.
President
Carter
and
his
closest
advisers
have,
moreover,
invested
consid-
erable
energy
and
prestige
in
cultivating
Congress
since
the
treaty
was
signed
by
Carter
and
Brezhnev
in
Vienna,
June
1979.
That
Carter
should
go
to
the
lengths
of
involving
the
treaty
in
the
present
crisis
of
superpower
relations
is
therefore
more
a
recognition
of
the
Senate’s
mood
than
a
desire
to
frustrate
the
ratification.
As
long
as
Soviet
troops
wage
war
in
Afghanistan,
there
is
in
fact
no
chance
of
securing
the
2/3
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