‘Shopping for Voice’: Do Pre‐Existing Non‐Union Representation Plans Matter When Employees Unionize?
| Author | A. Tarik Timur,Allen Ponak,Daphne Taras |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.2011.00866.x |
| Date | 01 June 2012 |
| Published date | 01 June 2012 |
‘Shopping for Voice’: Do Pre-Existing
Non-Union Representation Plans Matter
When Employees Unionize?bjir_866214..238
A. Tarik Timur, Daphne Taras and Allen Ponak
Abstract
The transition to unionization in three workplaces with pre-existing non-union
employee representation plans (NERPs) is contrasted to three matched sites,
which had only individual representation. Pre-existing collective voice arrange-
ments had substantial effects on the process and outcomes of unionization.
While the individual representation sites presented a conventional process of
mobilization and attachment to the union, the NERP sites revealed a more
equivocal outcome. The union was used in an instrumental manner to increase
NERP power and to achieve worker demands already articulated by the NERP.
NERP leaders became union leaders. There remained significant attachment to
the NERP and a reluctance to fully embrace unionization.
1. Introduction
Most studies on unionization neglect the notion that workers might have had
considerable experience representing their own collective interests through
non-union vehicles before the union’s arrival. Recent work has documented
that the absence of a union in a workplace does not necessarily render it
devoid of either representation or voice. The question at the core of this
article is whether other forms of collective representation matter in the union-
ization process.
In workplaces without representation, low wages, poor working condi-
tions and unfair treatment by supervisors are conditions that favour unions.
Lack of worker voice exacerbates the situation. Ambitious formulations of
the decision to unionize have been developed (Farber and Saks 1980; Fiorito
and Young 1998; Premack and Hunter 1988; Weikle et al. 1998; Wheeler and
McClendon 1991; Youngblood et al. 1984), but none incorporated the
A. Tarik Timur is at Eastern Mediterranean University. Daphne Taras and Allen Ponak are at
the University of Saskatchewan.
bs_bs_banner
British Journal of Industrial Relations doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8543.2011.00866.x
50:2 June 2012 0007–1080 pp. 214–238
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2011. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd,
9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
impact of formal voice regimes prior to unionization. As Taras and Copping
(1998: 25) stated, ‘contemporary empirical literature on unionization votes is
modeled exclusively on the transformation from no representation to union-
ization’. However, there is ample evidence in the literature that non-union
collective voice regimes raise and often resolve issues of concern to workers
and fill the voice vacuum. Then is it generally fair to say that employees
represented through such non-union plans only become unionized when the
plans are not working well, that is, where voice has been thwarted. Further,
do they cleanly switch from the non-union plan to unionism? This study
teases out the reasons that employees in these workplaces turn to unions and
identifies their aspirations from unionization.
2. Review of the non-union terrain
The ‘representation gap’ (Freeman and Rogers 1999; Freeman et al. 2007) is
being filled by such non-union options as labour-management committees,
shop committees, ‘company unions’ (that are not bona fide arms-length
employee organizations), joint industrial councils, works councils in the
European system, action committees, and professional and staff associations.
The common element of all these non-union employee representation plans
(NERPs) is that employees ‘act in an agency function for other employees in
dealings with management over issues of mutual concern, including the terms
and conditions under which people work’ (Taras and Kaufman 2006: 515;
Gollan 2006a: 428–9; Greenfield and Pleasure 1993; Kaufman and Taras
2000). NERPs are often perceived by both workers and managers as less
adversarial than unions, and hence hold considerable appeal as alternatives
to unions (Freeman and Rogers 1999: 7; Freeman et al. 2007; Hovekamp
1997; Hurd and Bunge 2005; Ichniowski and Zax 1990; Kamm 1997;
McHugh and Bodah 2002; Park et al. 2006).
Non-union plans have long been part of the industrial relations landscape
(for an extensive review, see Wilkinson et al. 2010), regardless of legal regime1
and despite evidence of a growing ‘fracturing of collectivism’ (Bacon and
Storey 1996: 43). The scope of these plans varies considerably (Taras
and Kaufman 2006). In Canada, the United States, Britain, Ireland, Europe,
Japan, South Korea, Australia and other industrialized settings, scholars also
have confirmed the considerable presence of non-union collectives (Ackers
et al. 2005; Benson 2000; Bryson et al. 2006; Gollan et al. 2002; Kim 2009;
Kim and Kim 2004; Lipset and Meltz 2000; Lloyd 2001; Marchington et al.
2001; Morishima and Tsuru 2000; Pyman et al. 2006). There may be a natu-
rally occurring threshold for such activity (Taras and Kaufman 1999: 14) at
between 15 and 25 per cent of the workforce.
Many studies examine the interplay between NERPs and unions,
attempting to address whether they are substitutes or complements
(Douglas 1921; Gollan 2001, 2002; Lloyd 2001; Taras 1998; Watling and
Snook 2003; Weil 1999) or whether NERPs might also be classified as
Non-Union Representation and Unionization 215
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2011.
To continue reading
Request your trial