Signals, Decisions, and Strategy: The Submarine Hunt in the Sognefjord I972
| Author | Johan Jørgen Holst |
| DOI | 10.1177/001083677400900128 |
| Published date | 01 March 1974 |
| Date | 01 March 1974 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Signals,
Decisions,
and
Strategy:
The
Submarine
Hunt
in
the
Sognefjord
I972
JOHAN JØRGEN HOLST
Norwegian
Institute
of
International
Affairs,
Oslo
Holst,
Johan
Jørgen.
Signals,
Decisions,
and
Strategy:
The
Submarine
Hunt
in
the
Sognefjord
1972.
Cooperation
and
Conflict,
IX,
1974,
297-311.
The
present
study
describes
the
events
in
the
Norwegian
west-coast
Sognefjord
in
November
1972.
The
possible
presence
of
an
unidentified
submarine
presented
an
inexperienced
government
with
a
complicated
set
of
strategic
assessments.
The
choices
made
appear
to
have been
based
on
an
inadequate
understanding
of
the
chances
of
success
as
the
latter
were
seriously
circumscribed
by
the
physical
characteristics
of
the
waters
involved.
Even
if
Norway
had
possessed
the
means
of
detecting
and
identifying
the
mystical
submarine,
serious
doubts
are
raised
about
the
wisdom
of
pursuing
the
maximalist
objectives
which
the
government
announced.
The
decision-making
in
the
crisis
reflects
little
deliberate
calculation
of
costs
and
risks,
and
did
not
focus
on
how
losses
could
be
cut
when
it
became
clear
that the
submarine
would
escape.
The
informa-
tion
policy
added
to
the
perception
of
loss
and
tended
to
feed
unrealistic
expectations
about
what
could
be
achieved.
Johan
Jørgen
Holst,
Norwegian
Institute
of
International
Affairs,
Oslo.
1.
INTRODUCTION
In
November
1972
Norway
moved
on
to
the
front-page
headlines
only
two
months
after
the
Norwegian
electorate
had
turned
down
membership
in
the
European
Com-
munity
in
an
unprecedented
referendum.
The
cause
of
the
renewed
attention
was
the
presumed
presence
of
an
unidentified
submarine
in
the
west-coast
Sognef jord.
Was
a
U-2
episode
in
reverse
in
the
making?
Was
the
minority
government -
the
’No-government’ -
which
took
over
after
the
referendum
to
be
put
to
an
early
test?
The
facts
are
still
obscure
and
seem
likely
to
be
forever
relegated
to
the
pages
of
history
unrevealed.
The
purpose
of
the
present
article
is
to
record
what
is
publicly
known
about
what
actually
happened,
and
on
the
basis
thereof
to
analyse
the
decision
problems
involved.
II.
CAT
AND
MOUSE
From
the
afternoon
of
Sunday,
12
Novem-
ber
1972,
the
Supreme
Defence
Command
(Forsvarets
Overkommando)
received
in-
formation
from
people
living
along
the
Sognefjord
that
observations
made
seemed
to
indicate
the
presence
of
a
submarine
in
the
fjord.
An
object
resembling
a
periscope
had
been
observed
at
Vangsnes
(see
Fig.
1 ).
A
couple
of
naval
vessels
were
ordered
to
the
spot,
and
from
13
November
a
search
operation
which
included
aircraft
and
helicopters
was
under
way.
On
14
November
the
car
ferry
Uangsnes
re-
portedly
had
radar
contacts
with
an
un-
identified
object
between
Ardalstangen
and
Kaupanger.
On
19
November
the
Norwegian
Telegrams
Bureau
(NTB)
learned
that
since
the
preceding
Sunday
8-10
messages
had
been
received
which
individually
and
in
conjunction
seemed
to
indicate
the
presence
of
a
submarine
in
the
fjord.
The
search
operation
was
led
by
the
Commander
of
the
Norwegian
Naval
Forces,
Southern
Norway.
But
none
of
the
military
aircraft
or
naval
vessels
participating
in
the
operation
had
made
contacts
confirming
the
presence
of
an
unidentified
submarine.
How
many
planes
and
vessels
participated
in
the
search
was
not
made
public.
Through
the
Norwegian
press
it
became
known
on
‘?0
November
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