Signature requirements for initiatives
| Author | Tomoya Tajika |
| Published date | 01 October 2018 |
| Date | 01 October 2018 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0951629818791035 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Journal of Theoretical Politics
2018, Vol.30(4) 451–476
ÓThe Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/0951629818791035
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Signature requirements for
initiatives
Tomoya Tajika
Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan
Abstract
Signature requirements serve as barriers to prevent citizens from overusing initiatives. This study
investigates the properties of optimal signature requirements by proposing a model in which the
initiative process is a game played among citizens, a campaigner, and a legislature. Under the opti-
mal requirement, the campaigner succeeds in collecting the required signatures only when it cre-
ates welfare that exceeds the cost of holding a referendum for the final decision. I specify the
condition that such an optimal requirement is achievable. In addition, I perform comparative sta-
tics analyses to investigate the validity of the differences in signature requirements among coun-
tries and petition types. The results reveal a high optimal requirement when citizens have low
variance regarding their opinions or do not consider the campaigned issue important. Finally, I
evaluate the suggested reforms in the real world, such as imposing an additional cost on the cam-
paigner to initiate a petition anda ban on paid petitioners, and show that while the former reduces
citizen welfare, the latter improvesit.
Keywords
Optimal requirements; direct democracy; signature-gathering campaign
1. Introduction
In addition to traditional representative democracy as a means of social decision-
making, certain sub-national regions and countries (e.g., many countries in
Europe, several states in the United States, and local governments in Japan) adopt
forms of direct democracy such as initiatives and referendums.
1
Under these sys-
tems, citizens can request for the implementation of new laws or the revocation of
Corresponding author:
Tomoya Tajika, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, Naka 2-1, Kunitachi, Tokyo 186-8603,
Japan.
Email: tajika@ier.hit-u.ac.jp
existing ones by gathering signatures from a pre-determined proportion of citizens
for the campaign. The key objective of the signature requirement is to prevent citi-
zens from overusing initiatives (Ellis, 2003: 44). In the case of a low requirement,
campaigns tend to obtain the required signatures, although most of them are
rejected at the referendum or legislature’s decision stage. For example, in
Switzerland, which mandates 100,000 signatures for constitutional initiatives
(about 2% of registered voters), roughly 150 laws accumulated the required signa-
tures during 1893–2003, of which only 15 were accepted during the citizens’ refer-
enda.
2,3
This suggests that many unpopular petitions gather the required signatures
but warrant a referendum, during which it is likely to be rejected, and thus, can be
considered a social cost. On the other hand, high requirements can constrain cam-
paigners in gathering the necessary signatures given the high costs, and thus, initia-
tives remain unused.
4
Therefore, it is important to screen petitions by setting
optimal signature requirements.
This objectives of this study are three-fold. First, I characterize optimal signature
requirements considering the aforementioned trade-off. Second, drawing on the
characterization, I evaluate reforms implemented for signature-gathering processes.
While many reforms have been recommended in the real world
5
, few have been sub-
ject to theoretical evaluations. Finally, I investigate the validity of the differences in
requirements among countries and petition types in respect of social welfare. For
instance, while the requirement is about 2% in Switzerland and Japan, it ranges
from 2% to 15% in the United States. Further, requirements tend to vary by initia-
tive type. In Japan, the requirement to enact bylaws is 2% and that for the recall of
mayors is one-third of citizens. In US states, signature requirements for statutes are
typically lower than those for constitutional amendments.
1.2 Study overview
In this study, I describe the initiative process as a game among citizens, a legisla-
ture, and a campaigner. The campaigner petitions a law and decides the campaign
size, which determines the probability of a given citizen meeting the campaigner.
Citizens can choose to sign the petition only once they have met the campaigner. If
the required signatures are gathered, the petition is subject to a citizens’ referen-
dum, where it is approved or rejected. However, holding a referendum is costly for
citizens. Signature requirements are decided by legislatures before campaigners
initiate their petitions.
A legislature’s objective is to maximize citizens’ welfare. Each citizen assigns a
valuation to the petitioned law. However, the true distribution (or state) of the
valuation is unknown to all players and total welfare can be negative. This moti-
vates the welfare-concerned legislature to screen good petitions from bad ones. The
campaigner’s aim, on the other hand, is to ensure the enactment of the petitioned
law and is highly motivated to collect the required signatures. This motivation to
collect signatures can be treated as a feeling of fulfillment. If the campaigner is an
interest group, collecting the required signatures publicizes their activity, which in
452 Journal of Theoretical Politics 30(4)
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