Simulation analysis on the effectiveness of missile defense
| Date | 01 May 2021 |
| Author | Woosang Kim,Jaehak Kim |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343319898714 |
| Published date | 01 May 2021 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Simulation analysis on the effectiveness
of missile defense
Jaehak Kim
Woosang Kim
Department of Political Science, Yonsei University
Abstract
Literatures on the influences of missile defense (MD) on the existing nuclear deterrence are divided into negative and
positive perspectives. However, both sides seem to make contradictory arguments. Skeptics argue that it is not
feasible that MD influences deterrence stability but that it causes security dilemma and arms race, while proponents
suggest that MD does not have to be perfect to reinforce deterrence stability but that it does not cause security
dilemma and arms race. To fix this logical inconsistency, we identify an additional variable which is crucial in
understanding the security dilemma mechanism in addition to Jervis’s (1978) two variables. By adding another
variable, a minimum MD effectiveness level required for deterrence success suggested by Quackenbush (2006), to
Jervis’s framework, we develop three hypotheses, two of which are novel on MD and its potential influences on
deterrence stability and arms race. We then introduce a probabilistic model of the MD effectiveness by modifying
Wilkening’s (2000) and conduct simulation analysis to see if MD is more likely to incur security dilemma and arms
race. Our simulation results show that MD influence is likely to be different depending on a potential challenger’s
national capability. Against a great power challenger, MD is least likely to meet the minimum MD effectiveness level
required for deterrence success, so that the challenger is more likely to respond flexibly to the defender’s buildup of
MD. Against a newly nuclear-armed state, however, a defender’s MD is more likely to satisfy the minimum MD
effectiveness level, so that the defender is highly likely to respond flexibly to the potential challenger’s reinforcement
effort of its nuclear force. In either case, our simulation results indicate that arms races concerning MD among them
are not likely to occur.
Keywords
arms race, deterrence, missile defense
Introduction
Does missile defense (MD) do more harm than good for
strategic deterrence stability? Since the advent of nuclear
weapons, which brought about a metamorphosis of
international security, the debates on MD have contin-
ued for more than half a century. The literature on MD
is divided into negative and positive perspectives about
its influences on existing nuclear deterrence.
Skeptics’ arguments on MD boil down to its techno-
logical limitations on the one hand, and its influences on
security dilemma and arms race on the other. They argue
that MD technologies are not sufficient to produce per-
fect and ideal MD (Lebovic, 2002; Lewis & Postol,
2010; Glaser & Fetter, 2016). Therefore, MD cannot
change the existing mutual assured destruction (MAD)
situation between great power rivals (Rathjens & Ruina,
1986; Glaser & Fetter, 2016). At the same time, how-
ever, they suggest that MD undermines the existing
nuclear deterrence stability (Brams & Kilgour, 1988;
Lebovic, 2002; Zhang, 2011) and that MD instigates
security dilemma and, in turn, arms race (Rathjens &
Ruina, 1986; Lewis & Postol, 2010). Proponents also
make two types of arguments. They argue that although
Corresponding author:
kws@yonsei.ac.kr
Journal of Peace Research
2021, Vol. 58(3) 510–522
ªThe Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343319898714
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