Simultaneous and sequential voting under general decision rules
| Author | Friedel Bolle |
| Published date | 01 October 2018 |
| Date | 01 October 2018 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0951629818791041 |
| Subject Matter | Notes |
Notes
Journal of Theoretical Politics
2018, Vol.30(4) 477–488
ÓThe Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/0951629818791041
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Simultaneous and sequential
voting under general decision
rules
Friedel Bolle
Europa-Universita
¨t Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Germany
Abstract
In an economic theory of voting, voters have positive or negative costsof voting in favor of a pro-
posal and positive or negative benefits from an accepted proposal.When votes have equal weight
then simultaneous voting mostly has a unique purestrategy Nash equilibrium which is independent
of benefits. Voting with respect to (arbitrarily small) costs alone, however, often results in voting
against the ‘true majority’ . If voting is sequential as in the roll call votes of the US Senate then, in
the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, the ‘true majority’ prevails. It is shown that the result for
sequential voting holds also with different weights of voters (shareholders), with multiple neces-
sary majorities (European Union decision-making), or even moregeneral rules. Simultaneous vot-
ing in the general model has more differentiatedresults.
Keywords
Binary decisions; free riding; unique pure strategy equilibria; voting
1. Introduction
The decision rules of the European Union (EU) changed substantially with the
growth of the union. According to the 2001 Treaty of Nice, acts by the EU Council
had to be supported by a minimum number of countries with a minimum number
of weighted votes and a minimum total population. In 2017, according to the
Treaty of Lisbon and after a three years transition period, the triple majority was
reduced to a double majority. Now, a successful vote in the EU Council requires a
Corresponding author:
Friedel Bolle, Europa-Universita
¨t Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), D71,Postfach 1786, D - 15207 Frankfurt (Oder),
Germany.
Email: bolle@euv-frankfurt-o.de
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