Small states shelter diplomacy: Balancing costs of entrapment and abandonment in the alliance dilemma
| Published date | 01 December 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00108367231164497 |
| Author | Rasmus Pedersen |
| Date | 01 December 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/00108367231164497
Cooperation and Conflict
2023, Vol. 58(4) 441 –459
© The Author(s) 2023
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DOI: 10.1177/00108367231164497
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Small states shelter
diplomacy: Balancing costs of
entrapment and abandonment
in the alliance dilemma
Rasmus Pedersen
Abstract
Shelter theory has emerged as a promising but unrealized alternative to existing theories of
bandwagon and hiding in the literature. It describes how small states can utilize the structural
power of great powers to achieve political aims through the formation of asymmetric alliances.
At present it is not clear exactly what shelter diplomacy aims to achieve, what type of costs
it protects small states against and to what degree asymmetric shelters are useful when the
preferences between the small state and the shelter partner widen. The article addresses these
gaps. It develops a realist inspired model of shelter diplomacy that specifies when, how and with
what effects small states can utilize the structural powers of great powers. It demonstrates how
shelter diplomacy can help small states balance the costs of abandonment and entrapment in the
alliance dilemma through construction of both asymmetric and symmetric shelters. The main
contributions are to bring shelter diplomacy into the International Relations mainstream literature
and develop a new theoretical middle position between the more well-described bandwagon and
hiding strategies. The model is applied to a Danish case that demonstrates how small states have
utilized and adopted dynamic shelter strategies in the European integration process.
Keywords
alliance dilemma, Denmark, diplomacy, realism, shelter theory, small state
Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that small states approach International Relations (IR) from a
position of structural weakness (Handel, 1981). Small states have often been defined as
the weaker part in an asymmetric relationship and are therefore ‘stuck with the power
configuration and its institutional expression’ (Mouritzen and Wivel, 2005: 4). While
recognizing that small states enjoy benefits from international cooperation, the small
Corresponding author:
Rasmus Pedersen, Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, 8000 Aarhus, Denmark.
Email: brun@ps.au.dk
1164497CAC0010.1177/00108367231164497Cooperation and ConflictPedersen
research-article2023
Article
442 Cooperation and Conflict 58(4)
state literature has also identified various ‘costs’ when they become involved in interna-
tional organizations and alliances. The literature has therefore suggested that small states
face a dilemma in international cooperation, where they have to prioritize between the
costs of entrapment and abandonment (Petersen, 1998; Snyder, 1984, 1997). To manage
the costs, it has been suggested that small states can adopt a number of strategies to ease
the consequences of the power asymmetries. Two strategies have gained prominence in
the literature on the so-called alliance dilemma. First, small states can make use of the
strategy of hiding, seeking to maximize autonomy by opting out of specific aspects of the
cooperation or by setting up ‘bastions’ in the cooperation. Second, small states can utilize
‘bandwagon’ strategies, pursuing adaptation strategies to the more powerful actors in the
cooperation (Wivel and Thorhallsson, 2018).1 When hiding, it is often implicitly assumed
that small states prioritize the abandonment cost over the entrapment cost, while in the
second strategy, they prioritize the entrapment cost over the abandonment cost. Until
recently, the small state literature has failed to theorize how small states can utilize strate-
gies to balance between the types of costs and have paid little theoretical attention to the
actual diplomatic strategies that have guided the small states between the Scylla and
Charybdis in the dilemma. This article argues that recent insights from the shelter theory
(Bailes et al., 2016; Thorhallsson, 2011, 2018; Wivel and Thorhallsson, 2018) have the
unexplored potential to explain how small states are able to negotiate from a position of
weakness and, through carefully designed shelter diplomacy, can navigate, balance and
reduce the costs of the dilemma. Shelter theory has been designed to explore the conse-
quences of the inhered relational power asymmetry that exists between great powers and
small states and has been presented as an alternative to the existing theories of band-
wagon and hiding in the IR literature (Wivel and Thorhallsson, 2018). The theory posits
that smaller and weaker states can utilize the asymmetric relations to greater powers to
their own advantage by using carefully designed diplomatic strategies. For small states,
the cost of dependency is considered as a necessary cost that allows small states to enjoy
the benefits from bilateral and multilateral relations with stronger powers. However, in
opposition to bandwagon theories, shelter theory suggests that small states can maintain
a relatively high degree of sovereignty and control in relation to the greater powers as the
benefits from cooperation are not one-sided, as often assumed in defensive realist band-
wagon theory. At present, the concept of alliance shelter is promising, but it is still theo-
retically underdeveloped and still needs to be applied and tested empirically. The
shortcoming relates to both the theory’s overall relation to the IR-inspired alliance and
bargaining theory and European Union (EU) studies (Bailes et al., 2016; Thorhallsson
and Steinsson, 2017; Wivel and Ingebritsen, 2019). At present, the actual application of
the theory at the midrange level is unclear as it is underspecified how shelter diplomacy
works in practice. How can small states utilize the inhered power differences in asym-
metric relations to their own advantage in a manner that separates it from purely free
riding on the structural powers of others? In short, what are the effects of shelter diplo-
macy, what type of costs can shelter diplomacy protect small states against and to what
degree are shelters useful for small states if the distance in preference between the small
state and the larger power widens?
This article addresses these questions and aims to contribute to the further develop-
ment of shelter theory and the literature on small-state diplomacy by integrating shelter
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