SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE UNIONS: A NORMATIVE APPROACH TO CO‐OPERATION AND CONFLICT UNDER INTERDEPENDENCE*
| Published date | 01 November 1977 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.1977.tb01138.x |
| Author | Glenn A. Withers |
| Date | 01 November 1977 |
British Journal
of
Industrial Relations
Vol.
XV
No.
3
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE UNIONS: A NORMATIVE APPROACH
DEPENDENCE*
TO CO-OPERATION AND CONFLICT UNDER INTER-
GLENN
A.
WITHERST
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Industrial conflict emphasises very much the economic interdependence that special-
isation and division of labour has brought to modern society. The nature of the industrial
conflict can vary but its most obvious and dramatic forms are found in strikes, black-lists,
boycotts, bans, go-slow and work-to-rule campaigns. Such conflict
is
invariably
of
public
interest and concern, though the right to such action,
as
distinct from its particular use, is
now widely accepted in Western democracies, where it is directed at conditions
of
employment. What still remains contentious today is the use
of
industrial action (or its
threat) to influence government policy-most notably social and economic policy but
sometimes also other areas.
Conventionally Western society's decisions are seen as being made through the
market place and ballot box. In formal social theory the essence of these processes is
elegantly presented in the competitive general equilibrium models of Debreu and
Arrow and in the democratic voting models of Downs, Buchanan and Tullock.' These
particular formalisations illustrate clearly how in the market and ballot views
of
social
decisions, outcomes are seen as being arrived at by the actions
of
individuals who are
isolated maximising units.
However, if group action by organised labour to influence government policy is of
growing importance, then market and voting processes
of
choice are to that extent being
bypassed and new processes for social decisions are in operation. Under the con-
ventional models the individual maximising behaviour of large numbers of buyers,
sellers and voters produces social outcomes without direct bargaining and conflict. But
as bargaining and conflict are the essence
of
industrial action new models
of
social
decision are therefore required to supplement the market and voting approaches for
those areas where labour-government negotiations on policy become important.
Of course, the body
of
formal market and voting theory has not completely ignored
bargaining and conflict situations. Duopoly theory from Cournot onwards has looked at
conflict situations, and the industrial relations discipline since Hicks incorporates a
range of bargaining models.2 Also voting theory looks at coalition formation, log-
rolling, cycling et~.~ Usually though, these are seen as imperfections in the market or the
voting process and the formal analysis of the bargaining and conflict phenomena is
micro or local rather than macro or global: the bargaining is between several firms, or
between an employer and union, or between political parties or voters within the voting
and democratic representation system.
In this paper a broader perspective is adopted
so
that the determination
of
an
important range
of
government policy as the outcome of union-government bargaining
is the focus. That such a re-orientation may
be
useful has been acknowledged recently in
industrial relations writings. Rothbaum and Dunlop in the U.S. have explicitly indicated
that the major power of the unions may come increasingly to be not in traditional
bargaining but in their power to influence economic p01icy.~ In Britain, Phelps-Brown5
has outlined similar changes in collective bargaining, and in the words of Stephen Hill:
*
This paper has benefited from comments by Braham Dabschek, David Rowan and an
anonymous referee.
t
Research Fellow in Economics, Institute
of
Advanced Studies, Australian National University.
322
SOCIAL
JUSTICE
AND
THE
UNIONS
323
The
widely
held belief that academics should focus
on
the generation
of
rules
within
the
industrial relations ‘system’ at the institutional and workplace levels is partial and possibly
misleading. The British experience of the last decade has made
it
quite
clear that
the
traditional
independence of the industrial relations ‘system’ from
the
rest of the social system has vanished.6
The model advanced in the present paper is further differentiated from other bar-
gaining models by being explicitly normative. There
is
a small normative literature in
game theory dealing with ‘arbitration schemes’ or ‘fair
solution^'.^
But these analyses
tend to ask what solution is required by certain axioms
of
rational choice rather than
what outcome
is
implied by certain moral criteria.
Also
the model
of
this paper draws on
quite recent theory in moral philosophy for the social decision criterion and it develops a
dynamics
of
social conflict to accompany static analysis.
The paper first presents the static or timeless version of the model drawing on Rawls’
theory of justices to examine the benefits of co-operation in society and to determine the
just distribution
of
those benefits.
A
comparison with other major ethical systems
is
made. It is argued that the contractarian view
of
justice establishes the legitimacy of
withdrawal
of
effort, and without any special limitation to purely industrial matters. The
second part
of
the paper then develops the dynamics
of
the model and indicates how the
potential for mutual disadvantage from confrontation
is
present, if the right to withdraw
labour
is
misused. It
is
concluded that there is good reason for constructing ‘social
contract’ and other integrative policies which encourage
a
recognition of the mutual
benefits and responsibilities deriving from co-operation in an interdependent world.
THE
STATIC
MODEL
Rawls
on
Justice
It issignificant that at a time when the interdependenciesin the world are increasingly
evident, moral philosophy should experience a major turn away from individualist
utilitarian philosophy (which
so
readily complements market and voting models)
towards contractarian principles
of
social justice with their emphasis upon society as
a
system
of
conscious co-operation to mutual ad~antage.~
The publication in
1972
of John Rawls’
A
Theory
ofJustice
first drew the attention of
those outside academic philosophy to the contractarian revival. Since then a plethora of
studies discussing, criticising and extending Rawls’ ideas have appeared both in public
discussion and in more specialist literatures such
as
economics and political science
as
well as philosophy itself.’O
Rawls’ theory is fairly well known now. But perhaps a brief summary is still in order.
Its basis is a view
of
society as a scheme
of
co-operation for mutual advantage which to
be just must be regulated by principles which people would choose in an initial situation
that is fair. Social justice then is defined by the rules that would be chosen by free and
reasonable individuals in an ‘original position’ where they are unaware
of
their own
particular natural endowment and social circumstances. They know everything in
general about a society but nothing
of
their own particular position. This ‘veil
of
ignorance’ ensures that the rules chosen will be fair to all and accepted in advance for
that reason, whatever each individual’s actual position turns out to be. Justice is thus
seen as fairness. Rawls concludes that such a situation would lead to the acceptance of
justice as obtaining when liberty and opportunity, income and the bases
of
self-respect
are distributed equally except where unequal distribution is to the benefit of the least
advantaged members of society.
Thus as regards the key question
of
income distribution Rawls says that a situation of
fairness will indicate that we agree to such inequality as will improve the absolute
welfare
of
the least advantaged. The idea is that if they were ignorant
of
their own
position in the income distribution, most people would be concerned to ‘level up’ at the
bottom in case they get consigned there themselves.
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