Social sanctions and informal accountability: Evidence from a laboratory experiment
| Published date | 01 January 2016 |
| Date | 01 January 2016 |
| Author | Malte Lierl |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629815586885 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Journal of Theoretical Politics
2016, Vol.28(1) 74–104
ÓThe Author(s) 2015
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DOI: 10.1177/0951629815586885
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Social sanctions and informal
accountability: Evidence from
a laboratory experiment
Malte Lierl
Department of PoliticalScience, Yale University,New Haven, CT, USA
Abstract
When public goods are co-producedby citizens and public authorities, problems of free riding and
problems of provider accountability frequently coincide. How are voluntary contributions to a
public good sustained when theyare vulnerable to rent extraction by a third party? In a laboratory
experiment, I test whether contributions in a public goods dilemma can be decentrally enforced
through costly, mutual sanctioning capacity, even if the contributions can be misappropriated by a
third party. Ifind that costly sanctioning capacity among the beneficiaries of a publicgood can sub-
stantially reduce free riding, without increasing the rate at which contributions are misappro-
priated by the provider. However, this effect can be undermined if mutual sanctioning capacity
exists between the third-party provider and the beneficiaries. Contrary to existing predictions,
social sanctioning relationships which both embed the provider and encompass the beneficiaries
of a public good are not associated with greater, but partly with lower public goods provisionthan
sanctioning relationships which are only embedding or encompassing.
Keywords
Agency problems; co-production; decentralized enforcement; public goods
1. Introduction
Research on public goods provision has typically approached the problems of free
riding by the beneficiaries of a public good and rent extraction by the provider of
the public good in isolation from one another. In this article, I examine how public
Corresponding author:
Malte Lierl, Department of Political Science, YaleUniversity, Rosenkranz Hall, 115 Prospect Street, New
Haven, CT 06520-8301,USA.
Email: malte.lierl@yale.edu
goods provision can be sustained when the possibility of free riding coincides with
the risk that contributions are misappropriated by a third party. I focus on one
mechanism that has received attention in both the literature on free riding and in
the literature on public accountability: uncoordinated, decentralized enforcement of
cooperation through voluntary, costly sanctioning among the members of a group
(Fehr and Ga
¨chter, 2000; Ostrom et al., 1992). In a laboratory experiment, I show
that mutual sanctioning capacity among the beneficiaries of a public good can
increase public goods provision, even if an unaccountable provider can misappropri-
ate their contributions. Contrary to existing predictions (Tsai, 2007a,b), however,
the positive effect of mutual sanctioning capacity among the beneficiaries can be
undermined if theprovider is also embedded in mutual sanctioning relationships.
Problems of free riding and provider agency problems frequently coincide when
local-level public goods are co-produced by citizens and public authorities in devel-
oping countries. Ostrom (1996, 1073) defined co-production as a mode of public
goods provision which requires complementary inputs from the beneficiaries and a
third-party provider. Where state capacity is weak, the co-production of local-level
public goods is a widespread phenomenon. In many developing countries, for
example, basic public goods, such as the maintenance of school buildings, water
supply or sanitation infrastructure, routinely require monetary, labor, and in-kind
contributions from the beneficiaries.
Such beneficiary contributions can be hard to enforce. Habyarimana et al.
(2009) illustrate this problem with an anecdote about local leaders in Uganda, who
removed trash from wastewater channels with their own hands, because free-riding
was so extreme that they were unable to elicit any participation or payments from
citizens. Yet, successful co-production of public goods is not impossible. Ostrom
(1996) provides a case study of peri-urban sanitation in Brazil, where citizens
actively supported the construction of wastewater channels and voluntarily agreed
on maintenance contributions.
Provider accountability problems could be an important reason why the co-
production of public goods succeeds in some cases and fails in others. For instance,
Ostrom (1996) contrasts the example of peri-urban sanitation in Brazil with pri-
mary education in Nigeria, where corruption was rampant and undermined public
trust in the providers. In many villages, citizen contributions had stopped and pri-
mary schools were deteriorating (Ostrom, 1996). Interestingly, however, some vil-
lages nevertheless managed to sustain respectable levels of voluntary input
provision, suggesting that even if the providers are formally unaccountable to the
beneficiaries, beneficiary contributions do not inevitably break down.
How can public goods provision be sustained when the possibility of free riding
coincides with the risk of rent extraction by the provider? The experiment I present
in this article evaluates the hypothesis that social norms and voluntary peer sanc-
tioning incentivize the beneficiaries to contribute to the public good and the provi-
ders to limit rent extraction.
Numerous prior experiments have established that free riding in public goods
dilemmas can be overcome if the members of a group can sanction each other (see
Balliet and Van Lange, 2013; Chaudhuri, 2010, for reviews). Seminal to this
Lierl 75
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