Soft Security and the Presidency
| Author | RIKARD BENGTSSON |
| Published date | 01 June 2002 |
| Date | 01 June 2002 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0010836702037002983 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Soft Security and the Presidency
RIKARD BENGTSSON
Introduction
The Council Presidency offered Sweden a possibility to contribute not only
to a number of important issue areas but also to what we may call the ‘for-
eign policy’ side of the EU.A general question was, of course, what sort of
impact Sweden could make in this field, given its background as a non-
aligned and small state — a country generally regarded as hesitant in terms
of supranational policy-making, but with a history of active national foreign
policy.In the work programme of the Swedish Presidency, the enlargement
process stood out as the most important foreign policy objective (see Miles
in this symposium). Indeed, enlargement was the most important issue
overall and was accorded a high profile throughout the Presidency period,
not least in the Göteborg context.
As regards other aspects of EU external relations, Russia and the
Northern Dimension (ND) areas were singled out as significant areas of
interest. The main reason for this was security-related — the work pro-
gramme stated that cooperation between the EU and Russia was ‘of
fundamental significance for the security and development of Europe’
(Cabinet Office, 2000: 23). The ND may be interpreted in similar terms —
in seeking to diminish the boundary between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’
of the Union by engaging Russia in closer cooperation. This brief commen-
tary outlines the main outcomes of the Swedish Presidency as regards the
Russian and ND spheres, and then relates these developments to principal
issues such as the room for presidential influence and the institutional
division of labour (covered by Elgström).
Main Results
Looking first at EU–Russian relations, the ambitions — as specified in the
work programme — were to continue the implementation of the Common
Strategy for Russia.Among the results, we find that the EU started concrete
discussions with Russia over Kaliningrad — which is primarily a Russian
responsibility but one that the Union seems ready to take part in owing to
the effects of enlargement. Moreover, discussions were started concerning
justice and home affairs (at ministerial level) and security policy (including
attempts to engage Russia in crisis management and conflict prevention).
Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association
Vol.37(2): 212–218. Copyright ©2002 NISA
Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)
0010-8367[200206]37:2;212–218;023983
SYMPOSIUM ON THE SWEDISH 2001 EU COUNCIL PRESIDENCY
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