Stating the Obvious: The Misuse of Defence Statements under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996

DOI10.1177/0032258X0107400207
Published date01 April 2001
AuthorC.W. Taylor
Date01 April 2001
Subject MatterArticle
C.W.
TAYLOR
Lecturer in Law, University
of
Teesside
STATING THE OBVIOUS: THE
MISUSE OF DEFENCE
STATEMENTS UNDER THE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND
INVESTIGATIONS ACT 1996
Some four years after implementation, criticism of the regime for
advance disclosure introduced by the Criminal Procedure and Inves-
tigations Act 1996 (CPIA) shows no sign of abating, with the collapse
last year of a trial after the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) failed to
disclose some 2,000 pages of unused material 1and surveys by both the
Law Society and the Bar Council which registered high levels of
dissatisfaction with the approach of both police and CPS towards the
handling of unused material. Such criticism has continued the trend
(which has existed since the introduction of CPIA) of concentrating
entirely on the actions of the police and prosecution and allowing the
conduct of the defence in matters of disclosure to pass largely without
comment. Yet it is clear that one of the greatest failures of the Act
stems from the introduction of limited defence disclosure by means of
the defence statement which was to be at the heart of the new
disclosure regime. The tactical use of such statements by solicitors
raise doubts as to whether the concept of defence disclosure can ever
operate as envisaged and this situation is exacerbated by the apparent
attitude of the courts towards defence manipulation of this element of
the disclosure regime. However, to appreciate the difficulties surround-
ing the use of defence statements it is first necessary to recognise their
pivotal role within the framework of the 1996 Act.
It is well known that the origins of CPIA lay in the Royal
Commission on Criminal Justice/ and the disarray following the
successful appeal of Judith Ward.3The case had revealed a catalogue of
deliberate non-disclosure and the effect of the judgment was to stretch
the categories of disclosable material to breaking point. By means of
CPIA the government sought both to refine and restrict the prosecution
duty of disclosure and, for the first time, impose a corresponding (albeit
more limited) duty on the defence. As a consequence the threefold
procedure was introduced, beginning with the 'primary' disclosure
stage, in which the prosecution must:
(a) disclose to the accused any prosecution material which has not
previously been disclosed to the accused and which in the
The Police Journal, Volume 74 (2001) 155

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