Statutory Interpretation
| DOI | 10.1177/0032258X8405700305 |
| Published date | 01 July 1984 |
| Author | Rob Jerrard |
| Date | 01 July 1984 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
ROB
JERRARD,
LL.B., LL.M., F.I.P.I., M.B.I.M.
City
of
London Police
STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
When we read an Act of Parliament the first and fundamental point
of note is
that
it is not like reading abook or a newspaper. Legislative
text must be read according to the principles and rules as decided
upon by the Judges
and
the statute itself. A special skill is required to
understand the meaning. This article will deal briefly with the
subject, but it is hoped it will provide abetter understanding of how a
Judge approaches the problems.
There are said to be six rules, three statutory aids, and various
presumptions, albeit academic opinion does vary on this subject,
which has been neglected within the legal profession and police
service. We will examine each one briefly.
Literal Rule
Accordingto the literal rule the court must give the words their plain,
ordinaryor literal meaningregardless of whetherthe result is sensible
or not. In R. v, Judge
of
the City
of
London Court [1892] I Q.B. 273,
Lord Esher said:
"If
the words of an Act are clear, you must follow
them, even though they lead to a manifest absurdity. The Court has
nothing to do with the question whether the legislature has
committed an absurdity."
The' literal rule is usually described as the first method of
construction, it is therefore the dominant rule.
An example of a literal interpretation by one Judge can be seen in
the case of Liversidge v. Anderson '[1942] A.C. 206.
The
case
concerned reg. 18b, Defence (General) Regulations 1939, issued
under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1939. The words in
question were:
"If
the Secretary of State has reasonable cause to
believe" (that adetention is necessary).
The
majority of the House of Lords thought the words were
ambiguous since they might mean
that
the Secretary of State has
reasonable cause to believe, or that he thinks
that
he has reasonable
cause to believe.
Lord
Atkin would not agree and in a powerful
dissenting speech, he stated: "After all this long discussion the
question is whether the words,
'if
the man has' can mean
'if
the man
thinks he has'. I am of the opinion
that
they cannot and the case
should be decided accordingly."
He continued: "I know only one authority which might justify the
suggested method of construction;
'When I use a word, Humpty Dumpty said, in rather ascornful
tone it means
just
what Ichoose it to mean, neither more nor less.
The question is, said Alice, whether you can make words mean
differentthings. The question is, said Humpty Dumpty, which is
234 July 1984
To continue reading
Request your trial