Steven Yannoulidis, Mental state defences in criminal law
| Author | Cary Federman |
| DOI | 10.1177/0004865813504526 |
| Published date | 01 December 2013 |
| Date | 01 December 2013 |
| Subject Matter | Book Reviews |
Australian & New Zealand
Journal of Criminology
46(3) 448–453
!The Author(s) 2013
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0004865813504526
anj.sagepub.com
Book Reviews
Steven Yannoulidis, Mental State Defences in Criminal Law. Ashgate: Surrey, England, 2012; 229 pp.
ISBN 9781409446453, £65 (cloth)
Reviewed by: Cary Federman, Montclair State University, USA
Steven Yannoulidis’s Mental State Defences in Criminal Law is a necessary book for
anyone interested in the law and insanity. His main focus is on Australian law, but he is
not unmindful of the law of insanity in Britain, Canada, and the United States.
Throughout the book, Yannoulidis describes the numerous issues that divide lawyers
and mental health professionals. In his last chapter, he offers a number of reforms.
There is, in the Anglo-American world, a divide between the way lawyers and mental
health professionals regard mental illness and the various mental states that fall below the
concept of illness. This divide has its roots in Daniel M’Naghten’s attempted assassin-
ation of the British Prime Minister Robert Peel, in 1843. For some years, M’Naghten was
convinced that Peel and the Tory party were out to get him. As is well known,
M’Naghten shot Peel’s secretary, Edward Drummond, who subsequently died from gun-
shot wounds. A jury found M’Naghten not guilty by reason of insanity. The House of
Lords subsequently issued a series of rules regarding the treatment of those who commit
crimes but who are declared to be suffering from mental disease or defect. The rules focus
on the cognitive and not the volitional. This means three things: (1) that all persons are
presumed sane; (2) that the burden of proof of insanity rests with the defendant; and (3)
that the ultimate test of insanity – a legal concept, not a medical one – comes down to a
very basic question: did the accused understand what he did to be wrong? As anyone who
follows the news of mass or spree shootings knows, it is not difficult to find such criminals
guilty even though the signs of mental illness are apparent. The logic of punishment
seems more easily graspable than the science of the mind and behavior.
Yannoulidis properly begins with an overview of the M’Naghten rules. ‘The
M’Naghten rules will be satisfied where a disease of the mind causes a defect of
reason’ (p. 13). This is a well-worn path, and Yannoulidis handles it well. He notes
that the rules create a high hurdle for those with diminished mental powers but who are
not mentally ill. He also describes the differences in M’Naghten’s application within
Australia. The different applications (not just in Australia, but in the US as well)
point to a fundamental problem regarding the law of insanity. The problem, in part,
is philosophic, but it has a practical relevance. No one really knows what ‘to reason
about the matter [of killing someone] with a moderate degree of sense and composure’
(p. 20) actually means. What looks like planning to a prosecutor is obsession to a
psychiatrist. The uncertainty regarding the line between individual responsibility and
social responsibility is at the heart of Yanoulidis’s book.
To continue reading
Request your trial