Stop and Search: Disproportionality, Discretion and Generalisations
Date | 01 September 2010 |
Author | Darren Ellis |
Published date | 01 September 2010 |
DOI | 10.1350/pojo.2010.83.3.476 |
Subject Matter | Article |
DR DARREN ELLIS
University of East London
STOP AND SEARCH:
DISPROPORTIONALITY,
DISCRETION AND
GENERALISATIONS
It has long been recognised that discretion is vital to good
police work. However, in Britain (and many other countries),
practices of discretion in the stop and search context have
come under much scrutiny as it has widely been linked to
racist practices, i.e. a disproportionate amount of Black and
minority ethnic individuals are stopped and searched compared
to White people. In a bid to counteract the discretionary
practices that are seen to be linked to racist stops and searches,
police officers are required (in stops and searches under section
1 of the PACE code A) to have ‘reasonable grounds for
suspicion’. This article evaluates what has been claimed as the
tension between the required reasonable grounds for suspicion
and the need to draw on generalisations (police discretion) for
effective policing.
Keywords: discretion; intuition; reasonable suspicion; stop
and search; suspicion
Introduction
It has long been recognised that discretion is vital to good police
work (see Kleinig, 1996; Walker, 1993). However, in Britain
(and many other countries), practices of discretion in the stop
and search context have come under much scrutiny as it has
widely been linked to racist practices, i.e. a disproportionate
amount of Black and minority ethnic individuals are stopped and
searched compared with White people. In a bid to counteract the
discretionary practices that are seen to be linked to racist stops
and searches, police officers are required (in stops and searches
under s 1 of the PACE Code A) to have ‘reasonable grounds for
suspicion’ (Home Office, 2005: [1.4]1). This article evaluates
what has been claimed as the tension between the required
reasonable grounds for suspicion and the need to draw on
generalisations (police discretion) for effective policing (Quinton
et al., 2000).
After discussing some of the criticisms of PACE Code A
related to the problems of disproportionality, discretion and
The Police Journal, Volume 83 (2010) 199
DOI: 10.1358/pojo.2010.83.3.476
generalisations, the article looks at evidence from research
conducted in the neurosciences which concludes that intuitive
decision-making processes (allied to generalisations) are often
fundamental to the formation of reasoned judgements. The
article then argues that distinctions between generalisations and
grounded forms of reasoning are often falsely dichotomised and
thus lead to practices likely to affect vital policing skills negat-
ively in the stop and search context. Instead of rooting out
racism, PACE code A has tended to shift the focus to rooting out
subjectivity (for example the development of personalised poli-
cing expertise), which is argued as being at the heart of much
good policing work.
Background
The Home Office states that ‘[S]top and search powers allow the
police to combat street-crime and anti-social behaviour, and
prevent more serious crime’.2The primary purpose of this police
power is ‘to enable officers to allay or confirm suspicions about
individuals without exercising their power of arrest’ (PACE,
Code A [1.4]). They are seen as a means to:
●Prevent crime occurring in the first place
●Detect crime when it has been committed
●Make communities safer
●Increase public confidence and trust in their local police
service
●Provide the police with intelligence to help tackle local
problems.3
Although both the police and a high proportion of the public
believe that stop and search police powers are a valuable tactic to
use against criminals (ACPO, 2005), it remains today one of the
most contentious aspects of British policing. Numerous indi-
vidual experiences, reports, statistics and research suggest that
there is an unsettling level of ethnic disproportionality; that is,
particular ethnic groups are seen as being targeted by the police
across Britain through the stop and search powers.
There is a range of legislation which gives police officers the
power to stop and search; for example: s 1 of the Police and
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE); s 60 of the Criminal
Justice and Public Order Act 1994; and s 44 of the Terrorism Act
2000. This article is concerned with only s 1 of PACE Code A
because the present author’s particular focus is the notion of
‘reasonable grounds for suspicion’ and its continued relationship
with the problem of disproportionality. Section 1 of PACE Code
200 The Police Journal, Volume 83 (2010)
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