Strategic Doctrines and the Future of NATO
| DOI | 10.1177/001083676600100301 |
| Published date | 01 March 1966 |
| Date | 01 March 1966 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Kjell Goldmann Strategic Doctrines
and
the
Future
of
NATO
Some
Reflections!
"The Foreign Ministers of the IS NATO
countries have deepened and strengthened
their mutual understanding and their unity
of purpose. NATO, a defense organization,
is now much more than merely a military
alliance. It is becoming a true community
of free nations. Within this community, to
a degree unprecedented in history, countries
are carrying out a policy of close coop-
eration in peacetime without abandoning
their independence. This development is
one of the most significant and promising
events of our time."?
Thus
NATO's
foreign ministers express-
ed themselves in
May
1958. In
the
mid-
1960's such formulations appeared im-
possible in a
NATO
communique.
The
"mutual
understanding" was no longer
so great,
the
desire to
make
NATO
a
"true
community of free nations" no
longer so general,
the
view
that
the
members preserved their "independence"
no longer so uncontroversial.
On
the
eve
of
the
r
oth
anniversary of
the
North
Atlantic Treaty one looked
forward
to
continued
integration;
with
its approach-
ing
zoth
anniversary,
NATO's
dissolu-
tion
was discussed. This development,
of
course, is connected
with
the
completely
changed conditions
for
Atlantic military
cooperation. Europe's
return
to economic
and
industrial prominence,
the
rise of a
Soviet nuclear
threat
against
North
America,
the
growing conception
that
the
threat
from
the
East is small - it
is against this background
that
one
must
see the rich variety
of
divergent view-
points on
the
Western
Alliance's
main
strategic questions.
The
community
of
interest and
the
US dominance are
not
today anywhere near so self-evident as
they originally were. Acommon strategic
doctrine for the
Western
powers does
not
exist.
On
the contrary, side by side
exist a
number
of
different, partially
incompatible conceptions about
how
the
West
ought to act in
order
to preserve
and
strengthen stability, globally
and
in
Europe.
I shall
here
try
to give a composite
picture of these opposing ideas
and
-
without
any claim to completeness -
discuss to
what
degree this diversity
of
opinion can be
thought
to
make
con-
tinued military cooperation
between
the
Western
powers impossible.
I.
The McNamara Strategy
and
NATO
At
the
end of
the
1950'S, it was clear
that
the
pressure of developments made
a crisis unavoidable
for
the
Western
Alliance.
The
question was
how
the
necessary adaptations to
the
new
condi-
tions
for
cooperation should be carried
out.
The
McNamara
strategy implied
everything else except asolution of this
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