STRIKES: THE ISSUE OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
| Published date | 01 November 1979 |
| Date | 01 November 1979 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.1979.tb00959.x |
| Author | Ran Chermesh |
STRIKES: THE ISSUE OF
SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY
RAN
CHERMESH*
.
.
.
unions and management failed in one aspect
of
their relations to measure up
to
the social
responsibility created by public expectations. That exception was the strike relationship. Cham-
berlain and Schilling,
1954,
p.
VII.
The rules
for
calling a strike demonstrate the seriousness of taking that step. Schneider,
1969,
p.
322.
The relationships between strikes and social responsibility have been examined from
a number
of
different perspectives. In the context
of
industrial relations, social respon-
sibility can
be
understood as the sensitivity
of
unions’ and management to the potential
negative implications
of
their actions on all other parties. Chamberlain2 studied this
issue from the points
of
view
of
public opinion, and reached the critical conclusion
presented at the beginning
of
this article. He continued to investigate this point3 with the
aim
of
‘ascertaining the differing pattern
of
strike effects
in
the various industries
of
the
American economy and for building
a
body of knowledge directly pertinent to the
problem
of
public policy concerning strikes’ (p.
VII).
This time the interpretations were
more complicated. Not all strikes are alike in terms of damage. Damage may be incurred
in
varying degrees to the different categories, according to Chamberlain and Schilling,
to
non-party members, consumers, producers, and suppliers, whether in direct or
indirect relationships with the struck unit. Thus the calculus of strike damage is very
complicated, and the most evident way
of
minimising harm is located at the source, i.e.,
in
the activities and responses
of
unions and management.
The most important feature
of
union-management relationships is their mutual
interdependence. Each side is tied to the other, even
if
only
for the purposes
of
furthering its own interests. In the framework
of
collective agreements management is
dependent upon its workers’ representation
in
hiring and firing, conditions
of
work, and
terms
of
employment.
The
union, on the other hand, owes its existence to the continua-
tion
of
the employment relationships, i.e., to its co-operation with management. This
interdependence is the power basis
of
the two sides.
‘The
labor union.
.
.
may
be
most
conveniently studied
in
the context of p~wer’.~ The same may be argued for manage-
ment in general and for the bilateral union-management relationships in particu1ar.j
The study
of
strikes and strike threats may indicate the degree to which each and both
parties
try
to
avoid, or
at
least minimise, damage
to
third parties. Such minimisation is
needed for the establishment of an industrial relations system characterised by social
responsibility.
THE
MODEL
The analysis
of
the social costs
of
industrial conflict from the viewpoint
of
manage-
ment and union requires the development
of
a model which specifies each
of
these,
along with parties in interaction with them, and the nature
of
the links among them. An
inverse model, focusing at the primary beneficiaries
of
formal organisations, was
developed by Blau and Scott.6
Four
basic categories of
persons
can be distinguished in relation to any given formal organisa-
tion:
(1)
the members
of
rank-and-file participants;
(2)
the owners
or
managers
of
the organisa-
*
Behavioral Sciences Department, Ben Gurion University
of
the Negev.
337
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