Surprise1 Signals and Reaction
| Author | Johan Jörgen Holst |
| DOI | 10.1177/001083676600100303 |
| Published date | 01 March 1966 |
| Date | 01 March 1966 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Johan
Ibrgen
Holst
Surprise1Signals and
Reaction
The Attack on Norway April
9th
1940
Some
Observations
The
significant intensification in
the
analytical thinking
about
arms control
which occurred
around
1959/60
is trace-
able in large measure to
the
association
of several outstanding American ex-
perts
with
the
surprise-attack negotia-
tions at Geneva during November 1958.
The
structural characteristics
of
the
strategic balance obtaining at
that
time
had
focused attention on
the
problems
of preemptive instability.
The
new
in-
terest in promoting stabilized deterrence
by means of international verification
arrangements, unilateral measures
and
tacit coordination represented ageneral
recognition
of
the
seriousness
of
the
problem. Preemptive instability was in
many
ways associated
with
certain
generations of weapons technology, viz.
the
vulnerable manned-bombers and
the
liquidfuel missiles.
The
doctrinal, admin-
istrative
and
technological adjustments
which have
been
implemented during
the
last five years have in
many
ways
produced uviable solution to strategic
weapons stability. However,
new
quan-
titative andlor qualitative augmentations
in
the
arms race
may
reintroduce some
of
the
problems of preemptive instabil-
ity.
(It
is beyond
the
scope
of
the
present
article to venture predictions
about
the
future
direction and velocity
of
the
East-West arms race.
Certain
potential defence-offense interactions
may, however, be extrapolated
from
open
sources
about
the
current
direc-
tion
and emphasis
of
the
research
and
development
efforts
of
the
major
powers.
It
will perhaps be necessary to
assess
the
strategic implications
of
alternative BMD [Ballistic Missile
Defence]
deployments" and
of
signif-
icant improvements in strategic offensive
capabilities such as multiple and
manoeuvrable reentry vehicles). Propos-
als
for
reductions or restrictions on
the
number
and characteristics
of
strategic
delivery vehicles
need
also be analysed
in terms of their implications
for
the
incentives affecting
the
stability of
the
strategic relationship.
The
problem of
the
preemptive or
forestalling attack is in
the
current
period associated
with
the
compression
of time
for
decisions due to
the
range
and
speed
of
the
ballistic missile as
well as
the
distillation
of
fire-power
produced by
the
nuclear-weapon. Bas-
ically
the
problem is
not
a
new
one and
astudy
of
the
"slow-motion versions"
of
the
past
may provide some
important
insights into
the
nature
of
the
process
of
preemption.
The
current
interest in
the
outbreak
of
the
First WorId
War
among American strategists is indicative
of such a recognition.
We
would
submit
that
astudy
of
the
Anglo-German race
to
Norway
in 1940
would
provide
many
valuable insights as well.
While
some
light will be shed on
the
preemptive
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