Sweden and Europe
| Date | 01 March 1975 |
| DOI | 10.1177/001083677501000105 |
| Published date | 01 March 1975 |
| Author | Nils Andren |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Sweden and Europe
NILS ANDREN
The Swedish Defence Research Institute
Andrén, N. Sweden and Europe. Cooperation and Conflict, X, 1975, 51-64.
’Europe’ is not a clear, unambiguous concept. From a Swedish point of view there are
at least four different ’Europes’ to consider. The paper outlines the significance for
Sweden of the EEC-Europe, the Euro-group of NATO, the Council (of) Europe, and
the old or ’whole’ Europe. The importance of various more or less plausible European
developments for the Nordic countries and their mutual relations is illustrated in a
number of scenarios.
Nils Andrén, The Swedish Defence Research Institute.
The point of departure for the following
Sweden). Another is what may be called
speculative analysis of Sweden’s possible
’Little Europe’s’ security brother, that is,
role in the future Europe is the dualism,
the Euro-group of NATO. With the in-
or even inconsistency, which has marked
significant exception of the Republic of
Sweden’s relations with the outside world
Ireland, all the members of the EEC are
during the whole post World War 11
also members of this group. Further, there
period. There has been tension between
is the Europe of the Council of Europe,
two basic goals which, if pursued to their
which includes what is generally, and al-
logical conclusion, are irreconcilable in
most correctly, called the free, or demo-
principle. One has to do with Sweden’s
cratic, section of Europe. Finally, there is
stand on issues in relation to her external
the Whole Europe (or the Europe of the
security: A policy of non-alignment in
late French General), embracing all states
peacetime between power-blocs in order
from the Atlantic to the Urals and ex-
to retain neutrality in war. The other is
tending in the west far enough to include
Sweden’s attitude to the outside world in
also Great Britain (which, perhaps, was
economic, cultural, and practically all
not the idea of General de Gaulle).
issues except those related to security and
As for the future possibilities of the
defence. In this latter respect Sweden’s
Swedish relations with Europe or Sweden’s
posture has always been very open. Sweden
place in Europe, these depend on several
has been a country whose economy is by
factors. One, perhaps not the most im-
and large based on free trade (with the ex-
portant one, is the development in Sweden
ception of agriculture - a consequence,
itself. Another is the development in
among other things, of security policy
Europe (here, without further definition
considerations).
as to which Europe), and, finally, of the
A problem which is not specific for
whole environment in which both Europe
Sweden but may be of special significance
and Sweden will be functioning. One very
is the fact that Europe is not a clear and
important aspect of the development in
unambiguous concept. There are, at least
the external environment concerns ob-
from the Swedish point of view, no less
viously the relations between the old
than four different Europes to consider.
superpowers and the possible emergence
One is Little Europe, the Six which became
of new superpowers and their effect on
the Nine of the Common Market, with a
traditional concepts and established pat-
growing tail of associates and other non-
terns.
member affiliates (such as Norway and
52
1. SWEDEN AND ’LITTLE EUROPE’
after all, join Europe. In view of the sub-
sequent development of the official Swed-
’Little Europe’ constitutes the major prob-
ish attitude concerning Sweden’s relations
lem in Sweden’s relations to the European
with the Common Market, it is interesting
development. It is in this context that
to notice that there were, immediately
the problem of retaining the credibility
after the British declaration of intent,
of Sweden’s nonalignment is the most dif-
some signs of hesitation among the Swedish
ficult one to master. This difficulty has
Social Democratic leadership as to the
been evidenced practically without ex-
Swedish attitude. The first comments could
ception during the whole development of
be interpreted as far more sympathetic
the Common Market. In the 1950’s, after
than the final attitude turned out to be.
the failure of the European Defence Com-
The Prime Minister, Tage Erlander,
munity, Sweden, with Britain and the
expressed the hope that the British initia-
other Scandinavian countries, favoured a
tive could open up new possibilities of
solution within the framework of GATT
achieving the united European market
and OEEC rather than the more closely
’for which we have striven throughout
knit association of states envisaged by the
and which is one of the principal aims of
Messing Conference and subsequently in
EFTA’. Sweden was prepared to partici-
the Treaty of Rome, establishing the EEC.
pate in negotiations to this end. The often
On the other hand Sweden’s interest in
repeated Swedish reservations in regard
better conditions for foreign trade was
to the EEC were covered very undramati-
always of paramount importance for her
cally in a phrase on ’negotiations in order
foreign policy. A second best possibility
to meet the various legitimate interests of
for Sweden - the best being a general
all the EFTA members, thus making it
European free trade arrangement, in-
possible for them all to participate from
cluding all the European states - was then
the same date in an integrateci European
the European Free Trade Association, of
market’.1
1
However, the hopes that this
which Sweden became an enthusiastic and
cautious declaration may have raised
energetic protagonist. Not illogically, the
among the vociferous band of all out sup-
Stockholm garden suburb of Saltsj6baden
porters of Swedish membership soon
assumed for EFTA the role that Rome
proved futile.
had played for the EEC. At that time the
The arguments supporting the negative
aim, or hope, was eventually to effect a
Swedish position to the idea of a Swedish
rapprochement or some sort of amalgama-
membership in the Common Market were
tion on equal conditions between the two
arrayed in the famous ’Metal Speech’ of
trade blocs. As it turned out, however, the
Prime Minister ErIander. Some of the
EEC was not interested in any such form
twenty points forming Erlander’s long
of negotiation; states outside the Common
statement at the Congress of The Swedish
Market had to negotiate individually for
Steel and Metal Workers Union, on 22
membership, or other relationships, with
August 1961, will be quoted in full. In
the EEC. This meant in fact that the
general, many of the arguments in favour
Common Market did not accept the idea
of membership stated by Britain were not
of having any equals in Europe or, at
applicable for Sweden. Unemployment was
least, in Western Europe.
low, while industrial production and in-
The next time that Sweden was faced
vestments were expanding, along with for-
with a decision related to the dilemma of
eign trade. The Swedish economy showed
reconciling security interests and econom-
no signs of weakness that could force the
’
ic interests was in 1961, when Macmillan
country to make immediate and radical
had made up his mind that Britain should,
changes in her trade policy. Among the
53
considerations which led the Government
form, would not be compatible with the
to a negative decision in relation to mem-
Swedish policy of neutrality.2
bership, ’the central question is of course
An interpretation of the various Ar-
foreign policy’.
ticles of the Treaty of Rome was partly
This policy of ’neutrality’ aimed not
responsible for this conclusion; in some
only at reducing the strategic interests of
cases the provisions are so vague that
the great powers to involve Sweden in a
no clear interpretation of them is pos-
possible war. It was, just as much, to serve
sible in present circumstances.
Sweden’s national interests in peacetime
....................................
and not to increase suspicion and tension
between powers. ’Not least are we con-
However, when
...
making a decision,
scious of that ... Sweden’s attitude ... is
it is at least as important for us to pay
of undiminished importance for Finland
regard to the general aims of the Treaty
in her delicate position’.
of Rome as expressed in various state-
ments and communiques.
13. For us to be able to satisfy as far
There is no reason for us to pro-
as we possibly can our foreign policy
nounce a judgement on the direction the
interests, we need a certain degree of
cooperation of the Six is taking. On the
freedom of movement both in practice
other hand, there is every reason for us
and as laid down by formal agreements.
to point out that those signing the
Freedom from alliances is an important
Treaty, in this and innumerable other
and substantial part of this freedom of
declarations, seem to be taking it for
movement but it must be supplemented
granted that the Treaty of Rome is a
by a persistent effort to avoid any
step on the way towards a real federa-
commitment even outside the sphere of
tion. Nor can we disregard the fact
military policy which would make it
that the Treaty of Rome is often con-
difficult or impossible for Sweden, in
sidcred as being supplementary to the
the event of a conflict, to choose a neu-
Atlantic Pact and as means of strength-
tral course and which would make the
ening it. There is no need for me to
world around us no longer confident
elaborate on this point; if Sweden is
that Sweden really wanted to choose
to maintain a policy of neutrality she
such a course.
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