Swedish Elites and the EEC: Models of the Future
| Author | M. Donald Hancock |
| Date | 01 March 1974 |
| DOI | 10.1177/001083677400900124 |
| Published date | 01 March 1974 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Swedish
Elites
and
the
EEC:
Models
of
the
Future
M.
DONALD
HANCOCK
The
University
of
Texas
at
Austin
Hancock,
M.
Donald.
Swedish
Elites
and
the
EEC:
Models
of
the Future.
Cooperation
and
Conflict,
IX,
1974,
225-242.
Utilizing
principles
of
countersystem
analysis,
derived
from
earlier
co-authored
studies
of
domestic
change
in
advanced
industrial
societies,
the
author
considers
alternative
consequences
of
Sweden’s
1972
free
trade
treaty
with
the
expanded
European
Com-
munity.
On
the
basis
of
interviews
with
a
systematic
sample
of
leading
officials
in
the
government,
parliament,
the
administration,
interest
groups,
and
the
communica-
tion
media
as
well
as
a
qualitative
assessment
of
Swedish
foreign
policy
requirements,
the
author
posits
three
conceivable
patterns
of
policy
choice
in
Sweden’s
future
rela-
tions
with
the
Common
Market:
(1)
expanded
trade
and
technical
cooperation,
(2)
ad
hoc
membership
in
the
EEC,
and
(3)
assertive
neutrality.
Elite
expectations
and
con-
temporary
economic-technological
links
between
Sweden
and
Western
Europe
indi-
cate
that
the
most
probable
course
among
these
alternatives
is
ad
hoc
membership.
M.
Donald
Hancock,
Department
of
Government,
The
University
of
Texas,
Austin,
Texas.
When
Sweden
joined
Switzerland,
Austria,
and
Portugal
on
1
January
1973,
in
form-
ally
entering
into
a
free
trade
agreement
with
the
European
Economic
Community
(EEC),
govcrnment
officials
in
Stockholm
tentatively
resolved
a
major
foreign
policy
dilemma.
That
dilemma
had
faced
the
nation
since
the
EEC-heads-of-govern-
ment
signaled
a
willingness
at
their
Hague
summit
in
December
1969
to
expand
mem-
bership
in
the
Common
Market.
By
raising
the
prospect
that
Britain,
Ireland,
and
one
or
more
of
the
Nordic
states
would
join
the
European
Community,
the
EEC
initia-
tive
had
confronted
Swedish
spokesmen
with
a
potential
choice;
maintaining
the
nation’s
traditional
policy
of
neutrality
at
the
cost
of
regional
cooperation
or
seeking
the
economic
advantages
of
mem-
bership
in
the
EEC
at
the
risk
of
diminish-
ing
the
credibility
of
neutrality.’
The
free
trade
agreement,
which
was
signed
in
Brussels
on
22
July
1972,
ostensibly
re-
conciled
these
opposing
Swedish
interests
by
providing
for
the
successive
abolition
of
industrial
tariffs
between
Sweden
and
the
EEC
without
imposing
the
political
constraints
of
full
membership.
Even
though
it
lacks
the
outward
dra-
matics
displayed
elsewhere
in
Scandinavia
with
the
Norwegian
electorate’s
rejection
of
EEC
membership
in
September
1972
and
the
Danish
decision
to
join,2
2
the
Swedish
response
to
the
expansion
of
the
Common
Market
invites
systematic
assess-
ment
for
theoretical
as
well
as
policy
reasons.
Theoretically,
Sweden’s
choice
illustrates
principles
of
change
in
the
conduct
of
foreign
policy
that
may
have
broader
analytical
significance. Explicitly,
the
Swedish
case
involves
a
dialectical
process
whereby
policy
contradictions
prompted
modifications
in
national
policy
(with
the
choice
of
a
free
trade
agreement)
and
may
compel
additional
policy
depar-
tures
in
the
future.
For
both
explanatory
and
predictive
purposes,
Sweden’s
evolving
relations
with
the
EEC
thus
suggest
the
>:.
For
its
generous
financial
support
I
wish
to
thank
the
Council
on
Foreign
Relations,
Inc.,
under
whose
auspices
I
conducted
research
and
wrote
this
article
as
an
International
Af-
fairs
Fellow
and
a
visiting
scholar
at
the
Uni-
versity
of
Stockholm.
Intellectual
stimulation
in
its
conception
and
execution
was
provided
by
a
number
of
colleagues
and
friends,
in-
cluding
Gideon
Sj6berg,
Francis
A.
Beer,
Olof
Ruin,
Krister
Wahlbick,
Bengt
R6si6,
my
wife,
Kay,
and
the
late
Philip
Mosely.
I
am
especially
grateful
to
Gunilla
Carbonnier
in
the
Department
of
Foreign
Affairs,
who
tire-
lessly
helped
arrange
the
interviews,
and
to
the
60
persons
who
spoke
with
such
candor
about
Swedish
foreign
policy
issues.
226
utility
of
applying
a
modified
version
of
countersystem
analysis -
which
is
derived
from
the
work
of
Gideon
Sjoberg
and
collaborative
efforts
to
assess
political
change
in
postindustrial
society3 -
to
prob-
lems
of
international
political
analysis.
The
impetus
for
this
effort
to
elaborate
theory
is
the
policy
significance
of
Swe-
den’s
relations
with
the
Continent
in
the
real
world
of
regional
affairs.
Economical-
ly,
Sweden’s
free
trade
arrangement
will
appreciably
affect
patterns
of
international
trade.
Even
though
the
inclusion
of
Britain
in
the
EEC
weighs
heaviest
on
the
scale
of
European
commerce,
the
Swedish
link
provides
an
important
market
and
source
of
goods
and
services
in
its
own
right.
Sweden
is
one
of the
world’s
most
ad-
vanced
and
affluent
nations,
with
a
per
capita
GNP
of $
3,695
which
is
second
only
to
that
of
the
United
States
among
industrial
states.4
In
1969
Sweden
pur-
chased $
2,012,800
worth
of
products
from
the
EEC
and
exported
goods
worth
S
1,582,200
to
members
of
the
Community
-
in
both
cases
amounts
that
were
double
the
combined
total
of
Danish
and
Nor-
wegian
trade
with
the
Common
Market.3
Within
the
European
Free
Trade
Asso-
ciation
(EFTA)
Sweden
ranked
third
in
1970
after
Britain
and
Switzerland,
re-
spectively,
as
the
EEC’s
major
trading
partner.6
Sweden’s
status
as
one
of
even-
tually
seven
free
trade
affiliates
of
the
European
Community
will
thus
have
greater
economic
consequences
for
the
EEC
than
will
full
membership
by
smaller
and
less
advanced
Denmark
and
Ireland.’
7
Even
more
important
are
the
potential
political
implications
of
Sweden’s
link
with
the
Common
Market
countries.
Throughout
the
postwar
period
Swedish
neutrality
has
helped
insulate
Scandinavia
from
the
ten-
sions
of
the
Cold
War,
thereby
providing
crucial
indirect
support
for
both
Nordic
efforts
to
promote
regional
cooperation
and
neighboring
Finland’s
quest
for
na-
tional
autonomy.
Under
conditions
of
relative
Nordic
tranquility
due
in
part
to
Sweden’s
function
as
a
buffer
between
divergent
East-West
security
interests
in
the
Baltic,
the
Scandinavian
states
have
institutionalized
intergovernmental
co-
operation
in
the
form
of
an
agreement
on
a
regional
labor
market,
the
creation
of
the
Nordic
Council,
and
membership
with
Britain,
Portugal,
and
the
European
neu-
trals
in
EFTA.
In
response
the
Soviet
Union
abandoned
its
naval
base
on
the
Porkkala
peninsula
in
1955,
thereby
re-
laxing
the
overt
pressure
on
Finland
im-
posed
by
the
1944
armistice
and
the
1947
peace
treaty.
Soviet
leaders
subsequently
permitted
Finland
to
join
the
Nordic
Council
and
become
an
associate
member
of
EFTA.8
But
what
of
the
future?
Can
Nordic
cooperation
continue
in
the
face
of
the
regional
discrepancy
between
Denmark’s
membership
in
the
EEC
and
the
more
circumspect
free
trade
arrangement
en-
dorsed
by
Sweden
and
other
Nordic
states?
To
what
extent
can
Sweden
expand
its
relations
with
the
EEC
without
jeopar-
dizing
Finland’s
international
status
and
hence
its
own
security
in
the
Baltic
area?
What
are
the
likely
reciprocal
effects
be-
tween
various
regional
contingencies
and
the
broader
context
of
East-West
rela-
tions ?
In
an
attempt
to
answer
these
questions,
this
article
employs
countersystem
analysis
to
explain
change
in
Swedish
foreign
policy
and
to
explore
alternative
models
of
future
policy
choice.
An
essential
ele-
ment
in
the
construction
of
theoretical
future
policies,
as
I
elaborate
in
the
fol-
lowing
section,
is
knowledge
of
leadership
or
elite
perceptions
of
policy
requirements.
Accordingly,
a
major
portion
of
my
data
is
provided
by
a
series
of
structured
inter-
views
I
conducted
during
1972
with
lead-
ing
officials
in
the
Swedish
government,
parliament,
the
administration,
interest
group,
and
the
communications
media.
The
article
proceeds
from
an
explanation
of
the
theoretical
principles
of
countersystem
analysis
to
a
review
of
the
policy
contra-
diction
underlying
Sweden’s
EEC
dilem-
ma,
a
presentation
of
the
attitudes
of
for-
eign
policy
elites,
and
an
assessment
of
different
future
policies.
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