Tactics of resistance and post-conflict judicial independence
| Author | Jessica Maves Braithwaite,Joseph M Cox,Margaret Farry |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221076880 |
| Published date | 01 November 2022 |
| Date | 01 November 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
Regular Articles
Tactics of resistance and post-conflict
judicial independence
Jessica Maves Braithwaite
School of Government and Public Policy, University of Arizona
Joseph M Cox
School of Government and Public Policy, University of Arizona
Margaret Farry
Open Technology Institute, New America
Abstract
Scholars have found that nonviolent resistance is more effective than violence at promoting post-campaign demo-
cratization. We explore whether this relationship extends to judicial systems, specifically. Courts have been shown to
be important for promoting and protecting economic development and political rights, yet they have been largely
ignored in quantitative studies of post-conflict democratization. We posit that leaders who hold power after domestic
unrest will be more inclined to use independent courts as a mechanism to prevent future campaigns–but they do so
primarily when fearing a significant mobilization threat and when expecting legal action to be an acceptable channel
for dispute resolution by dissidents. As such, we anticipate that levels of judicial independence are higher following
nonviolent campaigns as compared to violent conflicts. Using quantitative data from violent and nonviolent cam-
paigns globally, we find that judicial independence is indeed higher in the aftermath of nonviolent, as compared to
violent, resistance campaigns. Furthermore, a campaign’s outcome does not matter; post-conflict judicial indepen-
dence appears to be associated with tactics, not dissident success.
Keywords
civil war, courts, democratization, nonviolent civil resistance, post-conflict recovery
South Africa and Zimbabwe exhibited considerably dif-
ferent regime characteristics after emerging from colo-
nial rule. Following the Rhodesian Bush War in the late
1960s and 1970s, Zimbabwe became a highly repres-
sive state in which opposition political detainees were
held without criminal defense attorneys, and officers
were not held accountable for human rights violations
(Amnesty International, 1980). The 1980 constitution
permits the executive to grant amnesty, pardons, or
clemency to convicts, with no legal or judicial limits.
President Mugabe often used this authority to prevent
the prosecution of state security forces who followed
orders that violated domestic or international law (US
Department of State, 2015).
Conversely, following the end of a predominantly
nonviolent resistance movement against apartheid,
South Africa’s courts enjoyed markedly greater freedoms
and protections from executive influence. The 1996 con-
stitution lays out strict guidelines for the appointment,
tenure, remuneration, and authority of judges. While
corruption remains an issue in the South African justice
system, it exhibits a degree of judicial independence that
is far greater than in Zimbabwe (Andrews, 2006; Siyo &
Mubangizi, 2015). Certainly, there are myriad
Corresponding author:
jbraith@arizona.edu
Journal of Peace Research
2022, Vol. 59(6) 779–793
ªThe Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/00223433221076880
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