Temitope Ojikutu v London Borough of Camden
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Lord Justice Rimer |
| Judgment Date | 27 November 2013 |
| Neutral Citation | [2013] EWCA Civ 1645 |
| Docket Number | A2/2013/1355 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
| Date | 27 November 2013 |
[2013] EWCA Civ 1645
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
(HIS HONOUR JUDGE SEROTA QC)
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2A 2LL
Lord Justice Rimer
A2/2013/1355
Mr David Lemer appeared on behalf of the Applicant, Temitope Ojikutu
The Respondent did not attend and was not represented
This is a renewed application for permission to appeal. Sir David Keene refused permission on the papers on 30 July 2013. The applicant, Ms Temitope Ojikutu, is a solicitor who was formerly employed by the London Borough of Camden, against which, following her dismissal in 2012, she brought a range of employment claims, all of which were dismissed by a judgment and for reasons sent to the parties by the London Central Employment Tribunal on 18 July 2012.
Her notice of appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal was filed in time on 29 August 2012. But the then President, Underhill J (as he then was), ruled under Rule 3(7) of the Employment Appeal Tribunal Rules 1993 that it had no reasonable prospect of success, and that no further step should be taken in respect of it.
That decision was notified to the applicant by a letter dated 25 October 2012. She decided to exercise her right under Rule 3(8) to file an amended notice of appeal, and it is agreed that the 28-day period in which she had to file it expired on 22 November 2012. The applicant, however, miscalculated the end date for filing as being 23 November 2012. She left it until that day to file it, to find that she was out of time, and the Registrar refused to extend time.
The applicant appealed against that decision and her appeal was heard by His Honour Judge Serota QC who, in accordance with what appears to have become something of a practice of the EAT in such cases, which are regrettably extremely common, treated the appeal as a re-hearing of the extension application and heard oral evidence from the applicant, who was cross-examined. He too refused to extend time.
The applicant now seeks permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal against that refusal. She thus joins the long line of applicants who have made similar errors with regard to the filing of notices to appeal to the EAT and have sought to challenge in the Court of Appeal the EAT's refusal to extend time.
The principles are now very clear. They were explained by Mummery J (as he then was) in United Arab Emirates v Abdelghafar [1995] IRLR 243, a decision which I summarised and quoted from in my judgment in this court's decision in Jurkowska v Hlmad Limited [2008] EWCA Civ 231.
The established principles are that the very generous six-week time limit for appeals to the EAT is strictly applied, and I consider it plain that like strict principles apply to 28-day time limit for filing a renewed notice of appeal under Rule 3(8). The rules apply as much to litigants in person as to those who have lawyers to advise them. Ignorance or the overlooking of the time limit is ordinarily no excuse. In my view the miscalculation of the elementary calculation of the last day for filing is another error of the like kind, and leaving the filing of notice until the last day (which in this case unfortunately turned out to be after the last day) is a recipe for disaster. Both errors may well be understandable human errors, but without more their making is no good reason for an extension of time. It is only in...
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