The Arab Position in the Nuclear Field: A Study of Policies up to I967
| DOI | 10.1177/001083677300800102 |
| Author | Yair Evron |
| Published date | 01 March 1973 |
| Date | 01 March 1973 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
The
Arab
Position
in
the
Nuclear
Field:
A
Study
of
Policies
up
to
I967
1
YAIR
EVRON
The
Hebrew
University
of
Jerusalem
Evron,
Y.
The
Arab
Position
in
the
Nuclear
Field:
A
Study
of
Policies
up
to
1967.
Cooperation
and
Conflict,
VIII,
1973,
19-32.
This
article
discusses
Arab
reactions
to
the
development
of
a
nuclear
option
in
Israel.
Various
Arab
positions
on
this
problem
are
identified
and
then
posited
within
the
framework
of
the
different
Arab
politico-strategic
postures
on
the
conflict
with
Israel.
The
main
emphasis
is
put
on
the
Egyptian
position
and
here
three
strategies
directed
at
deterring
Israel
from
’going
nuclear’
are
described
and
analysed:
the
threat
of
preventive
war;
the
threat
that
Egypt
will
’go
nuclear’;
the
search
for
outside
assur-
ances.
The
article
also
analyses
the
effects
of
the
development
of
the
Israeli
option
on
the
conventional
arms
race
between
Israel
and
Egypt.
Thus,
the
article
is
a
case
,
study
in
the
strategic
behaviour
of
pairs
of
enemies
of
which
one
is
a
near-nuclear
weapon
State.
Within
this
context
there
is
also
a
discussion
of
whether
the
Israeli
option
had
forced
the
Egyptian
leadership
to
change
her
basic
posture
on
the
Arab-
Israeli
conflict.
That
this
did
not
take
place,
proves
that
one
of
the
tacit
uses
of
the
Israeli
option,
namely,
to
force
by
its
very
existence,
Egypt
to
modify
her
position
vis-à-vis
Israel,
has
failed.
Finally,
the
article
establishes
that
there
was
no
correla-
tion
between
the
development
of
the
Israeli
option
and
crisis
and
war
of
1967.
This
conclusion
shows
that
at
least
in
the
Middle
East
and
until
1967,
the
notion
that
the
proliferation
of
nuclear
options
might
destabilize
parts
of
the
international
system,
is
not
borne
out.
Yair
Evron,
The
Hebrew
University
of
Jerusalem.
The
article
concentrates
mainly
on
the
Egyptian
position
in
the
nuclear
field
and
the
reaction
of
Egypt
to
nuclear
develop-
ments
in
Israel.
Within
this
framework
it is
concerned
mainly
with
the
following
questions:
(a)
various
strategies
that
Egypt
has
developed
as
a
reaction
to
Israeli
moves
in
the
nuclear
field;
(b)
the
extent
to
which
Israeli
developments
have
af-
fected
the
basic
Egyptian
policy
and
strategy
towards
Israel;
and
(c)
the
question
whether
there
was
a
correlation
between
Israeli
nuclear
developments
and
the
war
of
1967.
All
of
these
subjects
are
related
to
the
question
of
the
uses
of
nuclear
options,
namely,
to
what
extent
the
Israeli
option
affected
Egyptian
behaviour,
and
con-
versely,
to
what
extent
Egyptian
threats
and
moves
were
aimed
at
deterring
Israel
from
’going
nuclear’.
Point
(c)
has
wider
theoretical
implica-
tions.
One
of
the
arguments
mentioned
in
the
literature
on
nuclear
proliferation
refers
to
the
effects
of
the
proliferation
of
nuclear
military
options
on
the
stability
of
the
international
system.
According
to
this
argument,
such
proliferation
may
cause
instability
because
it
would
provide
for
incentives
for
preventive
wars
laun-
ched
by
non-nuclear
powers
against
their
near-nuclear-weapon
neighbours .2
In
the
early
fifties,
an
arms
race
started
in
the
Middle
East3
and
most
of
the
States
of
that
area
are
still
actively
participating
in
it.
In
terms
of
imports
of
quantities
of
conventional
arms,
Egypt
stands
at
the
top
of
the
scale,4
but
several
other
powers
in
the
Middle
East,
notably
Israel,
have
also
well
equipped
themselves
with
highly
sophisticated
weapons.
Egypt
has
been
the
country
most
concerned
with
whatever
capabilities
Israel
has
acquired
or
might
acquire,
and
it
was
the
Egyptian
capability
which
created
most
of
the
anxieties
in
the
minds
of
Israeli
decision-makers
and
which
led
to
an
ever-
increasing
defence
budget
in
Israel.
The
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