The Banker's Perspective Lord Millett's Dissent in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12, [2002] 2 AC 164

AuthorChristopher Kirkbride
Pages179-194
CHAPTER 10THE BANKER’S PERSPECTIVE

Lord Millett’s Dissent in

Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12, [2002] 2 AC 164Christopher Kirkbride

10.1 Introduction and background 179
10.2 Facts 182
10.2.1 Course of the litigation 183
10.3 Decision of the majority 184
10.4 Lord Millett’s dissent 186
10.5 Judicial treatment of dishonesty post-Twinsectra 187 10.6 Context, importance and future 189
10.6.1 Obligations imposed on banks 191
10.7 Conclusion 193

10.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Banks expose themselves, as do other entities, to legal risk. Banks, however, endure a more acute exposure to this risk than other entities because of their unique business, i.e. the receipt of deposits, and their role in running the payments system. When a customer opens a bank account,1 a contractual relationship is created,2 this basic idea having received the imprimatur of the

1 This process is, of course, now made subject to the obligations imposed on banks by the Money

Laundering Regulations 2007 (SI 2007/2157), which replaced the Money Laundering Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/3075). The principal obligations respecting the opening of a bank account are contained in Part 2 of the Regulations, regs 5–18, namely Customer Due Diligence (CDD), alternatively ‘Know Your Customer’ (KYC). Banks, among other things, have to ensure that they know who they are dealing with and that they are who they claim to be. Failure to comply with the Regulations exposes banks to civil and criminal liability.

2 Banks also have possible exposure to liability in tort.

180 Part III – Equity and Property Law

House of Lords in the middle of the 19th century.3 A customer’s instruction to its bank, its mandate, would generally be observed by the bank provided conditions are satisfied.4 However, the matter becomes more complex, and the legal risk equally so, when banks’ exposure to third party liability5 is

considered. This third party liability is achieved through the ‘constructive trust’.

Under the artifice6 of the ‘constructive trust’, there are two possible heads of exposure for the bank: (a) knowing receipt; and (b) dishonest assistance. Insofar as ‘knowing receipt’ is concerned, where a bank has knowledge that money paid to it was the result of a breach of trust or fiduciary duty, it will be liable to account for that money so paid.7 However, this chapter is concerned with the latter, namely ‘dishonest assistance’.

3 Foley v Hill (1848) HL Cas 28. The terms of the contract have evolved over time to take account of changes in banking practice, the seminal authorities for the bank’s duties to its customer being Joachimson v Swiss Bank Corporation [1921] 3 KB 110, which sets down the essence of the payment relationship between the parties, and Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461, which outlines the qualified obligation of confidence which a bank owes to its customer.

4 First, the customer’s payment instruction should be clear and unambiguous. Secondly, the customer should have the funds in his or her account, or an agreed overdraft facility, unless the instruction can be treated as an implied request for an overdraft (Lloyds Bank plc v Independent Insurance Co Ltd [2000] QB 110). Thirdly, the customer must not have made an unambiguous countermand (Baines v National Provincial Bank (1927) 96 LJKB 801, Westminster Bank v Hilton (1926) 136 LT 315 and Curtice v London City & Midland Bank [1908] 1 KB 293). Fourthly, there must be no legal bar, i.e. a civil freezing order in place against the customer of which the bank has notice, or an order under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, s 41(1) (restraint orders which prohibit any ‘specified person’ dealing with any realisable property held by him or her).

5 This means liability to non-customers.

6 An artifice because the defendant does not have to have beneficial receipt of funds. Millett LJ (as he then was) described this as an unfortunate description in Paragon Finance plc v DB Thakerar & Co [1999] 1 All ER 400 at 409. ‘Constructive trust’ is, nevertheless, used in this chapter.

7 The conditions for the cause of action in ‘knowing receipt’ were set down by Hoffmann LJ (as he then was) in the case of El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc [1994] 2 All ER 685: (a) there must be a disposal of the claimant’s assets in breach of trust or fiduciary duty; (b) the beneficial receipt of those assets by the defendant; (c) in circumstances where defendant’s knowledge would render it unconscionable for the defendant to retain those assets. These were rehearsed by the Court of Appeal in BCCI v Akindele [2000] 3 WLR 1423, which resolved the ‘knowledge’ element of the third limb by the addition of the word ‘unconscionable’. There is some debate about whether a bank can actually have beneficial receipt of funds, unless the funds are paid into an overdrawn account (and the customer’s indebtedness to the bank is thereby reduced). I would challenge this, but since receipt is not the concern of this chapter, that matter will have to wait.

The requirements of the cause of action in ‘dishonest assistance’ come from the case of Baden Delvaux:8

(a) There must be a trust obligation or some other form of fiduciary relationship.

(b) There must be a breach of trust or fiduciary duty.9

(c) The defendant accessory must have assisted in that breach of trust or fiduciary duty.

(d) The defendant accessory must have been dishonest.

Of the elements of the cause of action, the matter which has generated most discussion in the cases is that of dishonesty, and the standard necessary in order to show that a party should be liable as an accessory to a breach of trust. For the purposes of this chapter, since so much of the subsequent authorities, and particularly the majority and minority speeches in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley10

turn on its interpretation, the starting point will be taken as Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead’s advice in the Privy Council case of Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan (Tan).11

The facts of Tan are relatively straightforward. Tan was the Managing Director and principal shareholder of a company (BLT) which was the booking agent for Royal Brunei Airlines (RBA). The arrangement between BLT and RBA was simple. Individuals would book flights through BLT and, periodically, BLT would pay over to RBA the money collected. Thus, BLT held the money on trust for RBA during each period. The relationship began to unravel when, in breach of trust, BLT paid down its own overdraft with the money collected in airline fares, it being assisted in this by Tan. BLT was insolvent with the consequence that RBA pursued Tan as the dishonest accessory to the breach of trust. At first instance, Tan was held liable, a decision which was reversed by the Court of Appeal of Brunei Darussalam. The Privy Council allowed the airline’s appeal.

Lord Nicholls’ advice was seen to provide welcome clarification of the law respecting the dishonesty element of the cause of action. First, the accessory’s knowledge was not to be the key question; knowledge being an ‘inapt’ criterion.

8 Baden Delvaux and Lecuit & Ors v Societe General pour Favoriser le Developpement du
Commerce et de l’Industrie en France SA
[1983] BCLC 325.

9 It is clear from Lord Nicholls’ advice in Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378 that the trustee or fiduciary need not be dishonest (at pp 384E–385C).

10 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12, [2002] 2 AC 164.

11 Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378.

182 Part III – Equity and Property Law

Dishonesty was the necessary and sufficient ingredient of liability,12 and that it was the accessory whose dishonesty was to be assessed. That assessment, Lord Nicholls made clear, is an objective one:

Whatever may be the position in some criminal or other contexts ... in the context of the accessory liability principle acting dishonestly, or with a lack of probity, which is synonymous, means simply not acting as an honest person would in the circumstances. This is an objective standard.13

His Lordship continued:

Further, honesty and its counterpart dishonesty are mostly concerned with advertent conduct, not inadvertent conduct. Carelessness is not dishonesty. Thus for the most part dishonesty is to be equated with conscious impropriety. However, these subjective characteristics of honesty do not mean that individuals are free to set their own standards of honesty in particular circumstances. The standard of what constitutes honest conduct is not subjective. Honesty is not an optional scale, with higher or lower values according to the moral standards of each individual. If a person knowingly appropriates another’s property, he will not escape a finding of dishonesty simply because he sees nothing wrong in such behaviour.14

Thus, the standard against which the accessory is judged is deemed to be an objective one, and though within it there is scope to take account of, ‘personal attributes of the third party, such as his experience and intelligence, and the reason why he acted as he did’,15 this in no way permits the defendant to make an assessment of whether they thought their conduct was right or wrong.

The law rested in a relatively settled state after Tan,16 but this was to be challenged by Twinsectra.

10.2 FACTS

Yardley was purchasing land with the help of a loan from Barclays Bank plc. However, difficulties over this loan caused him to turn to a niche loan provider, Twinsectra Ltd. They were reluctant to loan the money, some £1 million, without receipt of an undertaking that the money would be turned to the sole

12 Ibid, at p 392G.

13 Above, n 11, at p 389B–C.

14 Above, n...

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