The Colombo Conference and Communist Insurgency in South and South-East Asia
| Author | J.E. Williams |
| Published date | 01 April 1972 |
| Date | 01 April 1972 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/004711787200400106 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
94
THE
COLOMBO
CONFERENCE
AND
COMMUNIST
INSURGENCY
IN
SOUTH
AND
SOUTH-EAST
ASIA
J.
E.
WILLIAMS
Early
in
January
1950
the
Commonwealth
Foreign
Ministers
met
at
Colombo
to
exchange
views
on
world
affairs
and
to
search
for
areas
of
agreement
and
co-operation.
From
their
deliberations
came
a
proposal
for
a
programme
of
economic
and
technical
aid
to
South
and
South-East
Asia.
The
Colombo
Plan,
as
it
came
to
be
called,
was
inaugurated
in
July
1951
and
in
subsequent
years
it
contributed
in
a
modest
fashion
to
the
economic
and
social
well-being
of
the
region.
It
was
also
intended
to
reinforce
the
political
stability
of the
region
-
a
stability
that
was
threatened
by
Communist
insurgency.
The
purpose
of
this
article
is
to
examine
the
difficulties
which
stood
in
the
way
of
Commonwealth
agreement
on
counteraction
to
the
Communist
challenge
and
the
short-
comings
of
the
politico-economic
strategy
proposed
by
the
Foreign
Secretaries
at
Colombo.
Commonwealth
Reaction
to
Communist
Insurgency
Prior
to
the
Conference.
It
was
in
the
summer
and
autumn
of
1948
that
Communist
insurgency
became
a
matter
of
concern
for
Commonwealth
countries.
Uprisings
in
Burma,
Malaya
and
Indonesia
gave
sub-
stance
to
a
view,
rapidly
acquiring
credence
at
this
time,
that
a
Moscow
directed
conspiracy
was
afoot
in
South
and
South-East
Asia.
It
was
British
interests
which
were
most
directly
threatened
by
these
rebellions.
The
Communist
guerrillas
in
Malaya
endangered
the
very
centre
of
Britain’s
political
and
military
authority
in
the
region
as
well
as
her
own
economic
recovery,
since
the
territory
was
the
Empire’s
most
important
dollar
earner.’
Faced
with
this
challenge
the
United
Kingdom
Government
took
unilateral
military
action.
An
Emergency
was
declared
in
Malaya
on
18
June
1948
and
garrisons
were
strengthened,
thus
bringing
to
an
abrupt
halt
the
run-down
of
British
military
forces
in
the
area,
which
had
proceeded
during
the
previous
six
months.
This
military
build-up
was
accelerated
in
1949
as
the
Communists
won
one
victory
after
another
in
China
and
the
Huk
rebellion
broke
out
in
the
Philippines.
None
of
the
other
Commonwealth
countries
with
interests
in
the
region
reacted
with
the
same
vigour;
although
Nehru
took
stern
action
against
his
local
Communists,
the
Indian
military
budget
remained
virtually
unchanged,
while
in
Australia
defence
expendi-
ture
actually
declined.2
Nevertheless
the
Australian
Government
1
H.C.
Debates,
5s,
Vol.
475,
May
24,
1950,
Col.
2179.
2
L.
J.
Kavic,
India’s
Quest
for
Security,
London,
Cambridge
University
Press,
1967,
p.
226.
T.
B.
Millar,
Australia’s
Defence,
Victoria,
Melbourne
University
Press,
172.
To continue reading
Request your trial