The Concept of Foreign Policy Actions in Comparative Analysis
| Author | Walter Carlsnaes |
| DOI | 10.1177/001083678001500102 |
| Date | 01 March 1980 |
| Published date | 01 March 1980 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
The Concept of Foreign Policy Actions
in Comparative Analysis
1
WALTER CARLSNAES
Department of Government, University of Uppsala, and the Swedish Institute of International
Affairs, Stockholm.
Carlsnaes, W. The Concept of Foreign Policy Actions in Comparative Analysis. Cooperation
and Conflict, XV, 1980, 3-20.
The author’s argument is that the unit of analysis in the comparative study of foreign policy
stands in need of closer
taxonomical
examination with reference to certain logical, philosophi-
cal and methodological considerations. He proposes the concept of ’foreign policy actions’ as
the pertinent analytic unit in this area of inquiry, and then proceeds to examine its constituent
elements in order to unfold a delimitation of this concept in terms of its specific denotative and
connotative properties. This involves a discussion of, respectively, the notions of ’action’,
’policy’ and’foreign’, and
pari
passu of the various elements which can be said to characterize
each and which together constitute the formal definition which is proffered at the end of the
article. The purpose of this classificatory exercise is to argue for a unit of analysis which - in
addition to begin philosophically cognizant- seeks to combine definitional inclusiveness with
empirical specificity, that is to say, a concept which fuses the extensional requirements of the
comparative method with differentiae in such a way that it will make the explanation of foreign
policies in the form of empirical generalizations both feasible and meaningful.
I. INTRODUCTION
If the main purpose of the comparative study
taxonomical treatment (hallowed in Latin as
of foreign policy is to generate the establish-
analysis per genus et differentiam); and I fully
ment of empirical generalizations (and I sub-
agree with Sartori (and Harry Eckstein) that
mit that any theoretical ambitions beyond this
its frequent neglect in much of contemporary
are largely chimerical), then the first order of
social science has contributed substantially to
business is to delimit our subject-matter. That
our methodological and disciplinary prob-
is to say, before we can proceed to analyse
lems in the study of politics, including foreign
foreign policies in these terms, it is essential
policy.3
3
to
specify the universe of cases (or
The main reason for the necessity of clas-
phenomena) which we propose to consider in
sification is that only on the basis of a
our research. As an analytic procedure this
taxonomical Ausgangspunkt can we speak
belongs to what F. S. C. Northrop has refer-
about comparability at all. Quite clearly, be-
red to as the ’natural history stage of inquiry’;
fore comparing anything we must know what
and for our purposes it can perhaps best be
we are comparing. Or, as Arthur Kalleberg
pursued in terms of what Giovanni Sartori
has written about the logic of inquiry under-
calls ’definition by analysis’, i.e. ’the process
lying the comparative method, science ’seeks
of defining a term by finding the genus to
to know
what exists, and to know the relation-
which the object designated by the term be-
ships among the innumerable elements of
longs, and then specifying the attributes which
what exists; and for that purpose it must know
distinguish such [an] object from all the other
what is not or what is not this but that - in
species of the same genus.’ This is the es-
short, science must first of all discriminate’ .4 4
sence of classification, or what is also called
In other words, a proper classification con-
4
stitutes the most basic type of conceptualiza-
considerations, we define our basic concep-
tion in the comparative analysis and explana-
tual categories.
tion of whatever concrete phenomena that
Delimitation is a form of classification -
may capture our scholarly interest or fancy.
indeed its first step - and in the comparative
Thus, although it may be a naive belief, as
analysis of foreign policy the basic delimita-
John Gunnell has averred, that there is ’a
tion which must be made before any other
necessary and natural progression in any sci-
classification (and eventually comparison and
ence from taxonomy or description and clas-
explanation) can proceed is that of the unit of
sification to explanatory theory’, it is cer-
analysis: the answer to the question, in our
tainly not simple-minded to maintain that no
case, of what constitutes the class (or uni-
explanations - comparative or otherwise -
verse) of phenomena which we wish to call
can be posited without being grounded in the
’foreign policy’.7
7
most basic form of
concept formation entailed
’The choice of unit’, Johan Galtung has
by the method of definitional classification. 5
written, ’is probably the first decisive choice
And although, as Kalleberg also has noted,
made in most investigations. Once made, it is
concept formation ’as a general problem in
hard to reverse: the procedure will be built up
philosophy ... is extremely complex inas-
around this choice. For that reason it is essen-
much as it covers questions of definition,
tial to have a clear picture of the spectrum of
classification, comparison, measurement,
possible units, so that the choice based on the
and empirical interpretation’, he is surely
research problem may be a fruitful one, and
right when he adds that the basic problem in
not only a traditional one’ . 8 In the contem-
conceptualization is the analysis of ’the ques-
porary literature on foreign policy it is em-
tions of definition and especially of the
barrassingly easy to unearth a surfeit of
criteria of classification to be used in de-
choices which have been made in this matter;
veloping the basic concepts of political sci-
and I am afraid that most of them fall within
ence, concepts of the attributes of political
Galtung’s ’traditional’ rather than ’fruitful’
phenomena’. For not ’only is it necessary to
category (although I fail to perceive the ter-
resolve this question prior to engaging in the
minological basis for his epithets). I espe-
questions of comparison and measurement,
cially have in mind such ’actor’ entities as the
but it is precisely on this most basic level that
’state’ or ‘nation-state’ , the ’decision-making
it is possible to see most clearly the nature of
unit’ (’State Department’, ’Foreign Office’,
the misunderstandings held by antagonists on
’bureaucracy’, ’elites’, etc.), as well as such
both sides of the controversy about a be-
’systemic’ units as ’structures’, ’processes’,
havioural science of politics’ . It is thus not
’effects’ or ’outcomes’, and so forth. Prime
merely due to reasons inhering in the logic of
examples of each are readily available in the
inquiry that the priority and importance of
literature, and thus hardly need to be cited
classificatory conceptualization has to be
here. Nor shall I give individual or particular
stressed, but also, as we shall see shortly,
arguments against these choices (which,
because of the philosophical implications in-
furthermore, are often made subconsciously
volved in opting for certain definitions of
and are thus implicit rather than explicit),
meaning (or class attributes) while rejecting
except to say that although I do not neces-
others. By defining a universe of phenomena
sarily feel that any of these concepts or con-
we
also posit, on the most fundamental level,
structs are a
priori unfruitful or harmful to the
our conceptual view of the nature of politics
field of foreign policy research as such, I
and social life - a view implicating a
reject each one as constituting the unit of
philosophical stance of the first order and one
analysis in this field, i.e. the phenomenon
containing a host of methodological ramifi-
which we wish to describe and to explain.
cations. Hence we do well to pay careful heed
When and if they enter into our analysis of
to how, and on the basis of what philosophical
foreign policy, I submit that they should do so
5
only in some other - however honourable -
concept of action, since given the above
capacity, and only after an explicit and for-
proposition, this is prima facie the obvious
mal, as well as an intentional and extensional,
genus of which ’foreign policy’ is a species. It
definition of this unit has been provided.9
9
is also, I believe, the category most in need of
Thus clearly an ’actor’ (however defined)
elucidation, for reasons which will hopefully
cannot be a ’foreign policy’ , nor can a ’pro-
become evident below.
cess’, a ’structure’ or an ’outcome’ be a
’foreign policy’. Rather, if we weld ’foreign
policy’ to any of these concepts, it is surely to
II. ’ACTION’ AND FOREIGN POLICY
qualify them in one way or another; but in so
doing we have, of course, immediately
Nobody, I believe, would seriously care to
changed our unit of analysis to something
dispute the supposition that ’foreign policy’
other than ’foreign policy’ - that is, in each
constitutes a form of behaviour, and more
case we have then posited a universe of
particularly, a form of behaviour emanating
phenomena in which ’foreign policy’ is used
from, or at least ascribable to, human be-
to
classify either ’actors’, ’processes’,
ings. In other words, just as in any other
’structures’ or ’outcomes’ into a respective
sphere in which we work as social scien-
subclass. In short, it has then become a clas-
tists, we are here concerned primarily with
sificatory criterion and not a unit of analysis.
aspects of human instrumentality. However,
My point is obviously elementary, and thus
if we -...
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