The Dilemma of “Managing for Results” in China: Won't Let Go
| Date | 01 August 2017 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1002/pad.1799 |
| Author | Ciqi Mei,Margaret M. Pearson |
| Published date | 01 August 2017 |
THE DILEMMA OF “MANAGING FOR RESULTS”IN CHINA:
WON’T LET GO
CIQI MEI
1
AND MARGARET M. PEARSON
2
*
1
School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University, China
2
Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, USA
SUMMARY
While China is not often thought of as a prime location for implementation of “managing for results”mechanisms of New Public
Management, in fact, the reform era leadership—consistent with implementation of many market mechanisms in the economy—
initiated cadre management principles imbued with results-based techniques. This article discusses how dilemmas inherent in
MFR principles play out in China’s institutional context. It examines an understudied “punishing for results”technique employed
in China, the “hold-to-account”system, and demonstrates how this punishment technique reveals inherent dilemmas that also can
be expected if applied in other state-centric developing countries. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
key words—cadre management; bureaucracy; accountability; hold-to-account; China; punishment; managing for results; New
Public Management
INTRODUCTION
1
China’s leaders have long considered that the transition from a developing to a developed country depends on the
capacity of the central government (“center”) in Beijing to manage its cadre organization.
2
Success at mobilizing
officials to carry out policy has been a major focus of the post-Mao government, as it was for Mao. Observers have
increasingly cited the regime’s mobilization tools as evidence of China’s strong state capacity, especially in light of
the country’s spectacular economic development trajectory (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001; Fukuyama, 2013;
Rothstein, 2015). Scholars of China’s post-Mao bureaucratic behavior frequently point to the regime’s expectation
that incentives established by a results-based cadre promotion system updated in the early reform period would
produce positive policy outcomes (Chan, 2004; Guo, 2007; Landry, 2008). Favorable depictions of the cadre system
argue it has produced exceptional performance and entrepreneurship on the part of China’s public officials
(Heilmann, 2008; Rothstein, 2015). At the same time, relatively constant tinkering with specific mechanisms has
helped fixflaws (Manion, 1985; Burns, 1994). From the perspective of comparative public administration
scholarship, reform of China’s cadre organization might provide evidence for the effectiveness of “managing for
results”(MFR) reform, which is often championed by the so-called New Public Management (NPM) movement.
As defined by Moynihan (2006), the core idea of MFR is “using performance information to increase performance
by holding managers accountable for clearly specified goals and providing them with adequate authority to achieve
these goals”(p.78). Through this lens, the Chinese lesson for public management would seem rather
straightforward: backed up by the capacity to hold bureaucrats accountable, the nagging problem of implementation
could be as simple as incentivizing bureaucrats to use discretion to do the right thing (Moynihan, 2005).
*Correspondence to: M. M. Pearson, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park 20742, USA. E-mail:
mpearson@umd.edu
1
For valuable comments on drafts of this article, we thank participants in workshops held at the University of Tubingen,City University of Hong
Kong, and Renmin University, with special thanks to Hon Chan, Yijia Jing, Andrew Kipnis, Genia Kostka, Kaifeng Yang, Tom Christensen,
Evan Berman, Steven Van De Walle, Myung Jae Moon, Elaine Yi Lu, and anonymous reviewers for this journal. Ciqi Mei gratefully
acknowledges the support of research funds from National Science Foundation of China (71403143).
2
The term “cadre organization”is often used interchangeably in China with “bureaucracy.”
public administration and development
Public Admin. Dev. 37, 203–216 (2017)
Published online in Wiley Online Library
(wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/pad.1799
Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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