The Director of the Serious Fraud Office v Nina Jiang
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Turner |
| Judgment Date | 14 July 2023 |
| Neutral Citation | [2023] EWHC 1810 (Admin) |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Docket Number | Case No: KB/2022/004838 |
[2023] EWHC 1810 (Admin)
THE HONOURABLE Mr Justice Turner
Case No: KB/2022/004838
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
David O'Mahony (instructed by Serious Fraud Office) for the Applicant
No representation for the Respondent
Hearing date: 14 July 2023
Judgment Approved by the court for handing down (subject to editorial corrections)
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This is an application for summary judgment on a claim for civil recovery of the proceeds of crime under Chapter 2 of Part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (‘ POCA’). The proceedings have been served on the respondent pursuant to an order granting permission for alternative service made by Master Gidden on 24th January 2023. No response was received from the respondent who is believed to have fled to China.
These proceedings have been commenced under Part 8 of the Civil Procedure Rules under which it is not possible to apply for default judgment. An application for summary judgment is, however, permissible and on 4th April 2023 Master Gidden gave the necessary permission to apply for summary judgment. The respondent was served with the application and all relevant documents and, again, no response has been received.
The respondent has not appeared at court today and so I will proceed in her absence.
Pursuant to CPR 24.2 the court may give summary judgment if: “(a) it considers that…(ii) that defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim or issue; and (b) there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial.”
The authorities relevant to the scope of CPR 24.2 are well known and for the purposes of this application add nothing of relevance to the wording of the rule.
The applicant's case is that one Dr Jiang was part of a business enterprise that relied on corruption for its survival. The monies earned by that business enterprise were used to purchase a house at 2 Fulwood Park Mansions, Chesterwood Drive, Sheffield, S10 5DU the current value of which is estimated to be £202,290. The house purchase transaction was therefore a money laundering transaction. The house and the rental income that was earned from it were thus obtained through unlawful conduct and are recoverable under section 266 of POCA. The rental income is held in an account in the name of Blundells Residential Lettings.
The respondent is the current registered proprietor of the apartment. Her parents Dr Jiang and his wife were the directors and shareholders of a United Kingdom company: Castmasters Limited (‘Castmasters’).
Sarclad Limited (‘Sarclad’) is a United Kingdom company that designs and manufactures technology based products for the metal industry. Under a Deferred Prosecution Agreement dated 6th July 2016, Sarclad agreed that it had conspired with Dr Jiang to commit offences under the provisions of both the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 and the Bribery Act 2010 in relation to its business in China. By that agreement, it also agreed to disgorge £6,201,085 in profits and to pay a financial penalty of £ 352,000.
Dr Jiang was arrested and released on bail on 10th December 2014. On 4th January 2015, he fled to China in breach of his bail conditions. The respondent, in turn, appears to have fled to China on 28th September 2017.
These proceedings are founded upon the statutory framework set out in Part 5 of POCA the scope of which is provided for in Section 240 (2) which states that “the powers conferred by this part are exercisable in relation to any property…whether or not any proceedings have been brought for an offence in connection with the property”.
Under section 243, the applicant, as a relevant enforcement authority, can bring proceedings against any person it thinks holds “recoverable property”.
Under section 266, in so far as is material to this application, if the court is satisfied that any property is recoverable, the court must make a recovery order which must be vested in the trustee for civil recovery. There are a number of statutory limitations and exceptions by way of safeguards against what would otherwise be the consequences the making of such an order but I am satisfied that none are of any application in the circumstances of this case.
Recoverable property is defined by sections 304 to 309 of POCA. In short, property obtained through unlawful conduct is recoverable property but if it has been disposed of (since it was so obtained), it is...
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