The European Union, Russia and the Eastern region: The analytics of government for sustainable cohabitation
| Published date | 01 September 2016 |
| Date | 01 September 2016 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0010836716631778 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Cooperation and Conflict
2016, Vol. 51(3) 365 –383
© The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/0010836716631778
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The European Union, Russia
and the Eastern region:
The analytics of government
for sustainable cohabitation
Elena A Korosteleva
Abstract
This article applies the Foucauldian premise of governmentality and the analytics of government
framework to demonstrate how exclusive modalities of power – of the European Union (EU)
and Russia – and their competing rationalities relate, intersect and become, counter-intuitively,
inextricable in their exercise of governance over the eastern neighbourhood. This particular
approach focuses on power as a process to gauge the prospects for compatibility and cohabitation
between the EU and Russia. Using original primary evidence, this article contends that cohabitation
between these two exclusive power modalities is possible and even inevitable, if they were to
legitimise their influence over the contested eastern region. It also exposes a fundamental flaw in
the existing power systems, as demonstrated so vividly in the case of Ukraine – that is, a neglect
for the essential value of freedom in fostering subjection to one’s authority, and the role of ‘the
other’ in shaping the EU–Russian power relations in the contested region.
Keywords
Analytics of government, eastern neighbourhood, European Union–Russia relations,
governmentality, incompatible rationalities
Introduction: incompatible rationalities?
The past few years have witnessed some unprecedented political events in Eastern
Europe that have the potential to profoundly alter the practice and theories of interna-
tional relations. In one way or another they all centre on Ukraine, which has become a
referent to expose the unstable and reverse nature of power politics and, more specifi-
cally, to interrogate the very essence of the European Union (EU) and Russia’s commit-
ments to the eastern region.
Corresponding author:
Elena A Korosteleva, Professor of International Politics, School of Politics and IR, University of Kent,
Canterbury, Kent CT2 7NX, UK.
Email: E.Korosteleva@kent.ac.uk
631778CAC0010.1177/0010836716631778Cooperation and ConflictKorosteleva
research-article2016
Article
366 Cooperation and Conflict 51(3)
The events in and around Ukraine took many by surprise, especially in terms of the pace
and the depth of the occurring change, within and beyond the country. Domestically, the
regime of President Yanukovich, in power since February 2010, was forcefully swept away,
leaving Ukraine politically divided and enduring substantial human, economic and territo-
rial losses. At a regional level, the EU’s reputation and legitimacy in the eastern neighbour-
hood have been considerably tarnished by its miscalculated pronouncements, retarded
actions and, most crucially, lack of vision for the region (House of Lords, 2015). In contrast,
Russia’s leadership has enjoyed a surge of popularity at home by conducting adventurous
and militaristic foreign policies in Crimea and eastern Ukraine (Haukkala, 2015). These
domestic afflictions, however, may be short-lived, considering the consequences of the dis-
rupted status quo and the progressive effect of sanctions on Russia (Emerson, 2014).
Internationally, some wider corollaries are also emerging. Firstly, one would now
struggle to identify stable ‘macro-security constellations’ (Buzan and Waever, 2009:
264), with an agreed and coherent line of argument on how to manage a new eastern
‘threat’ and a disrupted global order. The EU seems to be perpetually in crisis when it
comes to defining its strategy towards Russia (Liik, 2015); in contrast, global leadership
of the G7, the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) are either stagnant or sabotaged (Friedman, 2014). In a short period
of time Russia, single-handedly, has succeeded in driving a wedge into the heart of the
international system, with long-term implications for its governance and credibility.
Secondly, after recent events, the narrative of contestation between the EU and Russia
for governance and, some would even argue, for purposeful region-building (Delcour
and Wolczuk, 2014; Korosteleva, 2015b) has finally become exposed, following some
years of rhetorical restraint. One would now struggle to envisage a way of reconciling
these apparently exclusive identities,1 especially when applied to the contested eastern
region. The escalation of contestation is simply staggering. If in 2010 the political narra-
tive centred on fostering the EU–Russia ‘partnership’, in an effort to modernise the
region for the benefit of all (Council of the European Union, 2010), three years on, the
language of relations has become that of antagonism and condemnation. Notably, in
2013 both powers entered ‘high politics’ by declaring parts of their respective projects
– the Eastern Partnership Initiative (EaP) on the EU side, and the Eurasian Economic
Union (EEU) on Russia’s side – incompatible (Füle, 2013b). By 2014 relations became
fully securitised, bringing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Russian
troops, Ukrainian belligerent forces and the entire international community into dispute.
As Buzan and Waever would argue, ‘the only way in which an [exclusive] universalist
identity can reach stability is if it succeeds in taking over the whole system’ (2009: 263).
Thirdly, the struggle within and over Ukraine has also revealed a glaring lack of ‘oth-
ering’ not simply between the main protagonists of the war of ‘universalisms’,2 but rather
with third parties, the very ‘objects’ of those wars, whose voice has been neglected and
sometimes even betrayed for the sake of the ‘ever-expanding range and degree of control
over others’ (Buzan and Waever, 2009: 263). Indeed, if anything, the significance of
Ukraine as a referent of the continuing conflict at the heart of Europe is precisely in
demonstrating that the ‘speech-war’ over Ukraine was not at all about Ukraine but rather
about the self-centred ‘clash of the titans’ and their governance ambitions over the region.
The emergence of Ukraine’s crisis demonstrated just how inherently unstable the balance
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