The evolving EU accountability landscape: moving to an ever denser union
| Published date | 01 December 2016 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0020852315589697 |
| Author | Anchrit Wille |
| Date | 01 December 2016 |
| Subject Matter | Special issue: Accountability in the post-Lisbon European UnionSpecial Issue Articles |
International Review of
Administrative Sciences
2016, Vol. 82(4) 694–717
!The Author(s) 2015
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DOI: 10.1177/0020852315589697
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International
Review of
Administrative
Sciences
Article
The evolving EU accountability
landscape: moving to an ever
denser union
Anchrit Wille
Institute of Public Administration, Leiden University, The Netherlands
Abstract
This article aims to bring the accountability of the EU executive out of the shadows by
tracing the development of the current accountability landscape around the main EU’s
executive actors. It looks at the development and the diversification of accountability
forums (and mechanisms) in the EU: what forums and arrangements have come into
being for holding the EU executive powers accountable? Instead of focusing on single
individual accountability branches, this article examines the development of account-
ability in the EU by treating it as a complex landscape. And rather than assuming equi-
librium, a starting point is the evolving nature of this landscape. On the basis of this
exploration, the article seeks to understand the way in which the EU’s institutional
accountability framework has evolved through a patchwork of arrangements, and how
this contributes to the emergence of a complex, multilayered governance landscape in
order to fit within today’s presumptions about how power should be controlled and
accountability achieved.
Points for practitioners
The landscape of accountability institutions in the EU is slowly becoming denser. The
shift from national, state-based policy-making to the EU level and the continuous expan-
sion of the executive sphere in the EU is accompanied by a growing concern about how
to organize democratic accountability in the complex multi-level web of European
governance. The establishment of new watchdog institutions (such as an ombudsman,
an anti-corruption office, ethical committees, auditors, a whistleblower protection act)
and strengthened scrutiny points to the increased relevance of accountability and
control over the EU executive.
Corresponding author:
Anchrit Wille, Institute of Public Administration, Campus The Hague, Leiden University, Schouwburgstraat 2,
2511 VA Den Haag, The Netherlands; PO Box 13228, 2501 EE Den Haag, The Netherlands.
Email: a.c.wille@cdh.LeidenUniv.nl
Keywords
accountability, administration and democracy, administrative organization and struc-
tures, audit, international administration, international organizations (IGOs), multi-level
government
The expansion and proliferation of accountability
in the EU system
‘Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan.’ This passage
from the Schuman Declaration in 1950 indicated the start of an ambitious but
limited venture. Over time though, its institutional structure has grown more
‘mature’ and ‘dense’, evolving into what is today’s EU. A continuous expansion
and fragmentation of the executive sphere resulted in a vast multi-level governance
structure with the capacity to formulate and implement policies at the EU and
national level (Curtin, 2009; Curtin and Egeberg, 2008).
With the rise of these new governance structures, questions about how
European governance should and could be democratically organized, and how it
is accounted for, has become increasingly a topic, both in the literature and in the
discussion on EU governance (Bovens et al., 2010: 5). Accountability has, along
with the concepts of legitimacy, representation and responsiveness, come to be
considered as a hallmark of democratic governance (Bovens, 2007).
The EU, while pursuing closer integration has, through Treaties since the Single
European Act 1986, pursued an agenda of strengthening accountability and dem-
ocratization. Following the Treaty of Lisbon 2007, the role of the directly elected
European Parliament (EP) and national parliaments was expanded to secure
improved accountability within the ordinary legislative process. In parallel with
this political aspiration for organizing democratic accountability, there was a
marked concern for improved administrative and financial accountability. The
establishment of an ombudsman, complaint-handling mechanisms, a whistleblower
protection act, rating agencies, inquiry committees and a host of auditors are
indicators of a distinct proliferation of accountability in the EU system.
Together it has produced a list of procedures, mechanisms, and forums that
have been devised to hold the EU executive to account that has become longer
and equally varied.
This article explores how the accountability landscape in the EU has evolved
over time. It examines the rise of accountability provisions and focuses on the
accountability forums that play a role in holding EU executive actors to account.
Rather than assuming equilibrium, this article takes the fluidity, ambiguities,
inconsistencies and the evolving nature of accountability as a starting point (see
Olsen, 2013: 449). Whereas previous work has often concentrated on a single insti-
tutional arena in isolation, this article will explore accountability in the EU from an
integrated systemic view that emphasizes linkages across all of the major forums
that hold the executive to account. Instead of focusing on one institution, the
Wille 695
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