The Exit vs. Voice Option: Six Cases of Swedish Participation in International Organizations

Date01 March 1976
Published date01 March 1976
DOI10.1177/001083677601100103
AuthorCarl-Einar Stalvant
Subject MatterArticles
The
Exit
vs.
Voice
Option:
Six
Cases
of
Swedish
Participation
in
International
Organizations*
CARL-EINAR
STALVANT
Department
of
Political
Science,
University
of
Stockholm
Stålvant,
C.-E.
The
Exit
vs.
Voice
Option:
Six
Cases
of
Swedish
Participation
in
Inter-
national
Organizations.
Cooperation
and
Conflict,
XI
,
1976,
41-56.
Hirschman’s
well-known
dual
categories
of
reaction
mechanisms,
exit
and
voice,
are
challenging
and
problematic
in
many
ways.
In
politics
one
must
assume
that
the
exit
decision
is
subordinated
to
that
of
voice.
It
corresponds
to
the
rephrased
question:
at
what
point
is
one
more
efficient
in
fighting
mistaken
policies
from
without
than
from
within ?
However,
exit
is
in
itself
a
twofold
phenomenon:
exit
into
and
exit
from.
The
choice
problem
that
arises
when
a
new
international
organization
is
created,
or
when
an
existing
one
deteriorates,
must
take
into
account
the
weighing
of
costs
and
payoffs
associated
with
a
decision
to
enter
or
to
withdraw,
or
whether
not
to
enter
or
not
to
withdraw.
The
arguments
raised
in
six
different
situations
of
Swedish
participation
in
international
organizations
are
elucidated
with
the
help
of
three
patterns
of
responses:
entry,
no-forward
entry
and
no-backward
entry.
The
junctures
chosen
are
the
UN,
the
Council
of
Europe,
the
OECD,
the
EEC,
the
IEA
and
the
IBRD.
Overriding
principles
of
funtional
content
and
geographical
extension
that
seem
to
influence
Swedish
thinking
on
such
occasions
are
identified.
Carl-Einar
Stålvant,
Department
of
Political
Science,
University of
Stockholm.
I.
EXIT
AND
VOICE
In
his
thought-provoking
essay,
Albert
Hirschmanl
1
raises
the
question
of
the
interplay
between
the
exit
and
voice
op-
tions,
and
between
the
possibilities
of
leaving
and
of
articulation in
situ.
These
two
alternatives
are
viewed
as
different
mechanisms
of
recuperation.
The
imme-
diate
issue
at
hand
is
the
case
when
an
economic
enterprise,
actor
or
organiza-
tion
fails
to
live
up
to
its
expectations.
Such
a
situation
has
not
ensued
due
to
any
psychologically
explicable
mistake,
i.e.
a
too
ambitiously
formulated
level
of
aspiration
in
relation
to
a
realistic
assessment
of
prevailing
circumstances.
Rather,
it
is
felt,
although
circumstances
remain
basically
the
same,
that
the
actor
is
unable
to
maintain
earlier
performance
levels.
In
other
words,
an
absolute
or
comparative
deterioration
in
the
quality
and/or
quantity
of
the
product
or
service
produced
can
be observed
and
ac-
cordingly
measured.
The
argument
devel-
oped
in
economic
reasoning
suggests
that
management
will
automatically
become
aware
of
its
failings
via
the
chosen
route
by
its
consumers:
exit
or
voice.
Of
course,
the
impetus
to
Hirsch-
mann’s
work
comes
from
the
economic
theory
of
comparative
advantages.
Never-
theless,
insights
derived
from
this
source
are
explicitly
transferred
to
political
be-
haviour.
Conditions
pertaining
to
each
of
these
alternative
responses
are
sys-
tematically
discussed.
In
the
same
vein,
factors
and
institutions
favouring
the
efficiency
of
either
strategy
to
bring
about
desired
changes,
are
dealt
with.
The
theory
is
also
built
on
a
third
factor,
which
intervenes
between
the
aforemen-
tioned
ones.
This
is
the
loyalty
pheno-
*
This
paper
is
written
within
the
project,
’Neutrality-Integration-Sovereignty:
Some
Pro-
blems
of
International
Political
Cooperation’,
financed
by the
Swedish
Bank
Tercentenary
Fund.
An
earlier
version
was
presented
to
the
fourth
meeting
of
Nordic
Political
Scientists
in
Aarhus,
Denmark,
August
1975.
I
am
thank-
ful
to
members
of
the
group,
and
especially
to
Krister
Wahlbdck,
for
fruitful
comments.
42
menon,
which
affects
the
adjustment
that
an
individual
makes
when
trying
to
cal-
culate
what
would
be
the
best
or
most
efficient
way
to
improve
his
own
situa-
tion
and
thereby
reverse
the
tendency
to
deterioration
in
the
market.
In
some
instances,
definite
judgments
could
be
postponed
and
the
necessity
to
choose
one
way
or
the
other
may
be
blurred,
because
of
the
modifying
strength
of
loyalty.
It
strengthens
the
propensity
to
stay,
all
other
things
being
equal.
Loyalty
operates
in
two
ways:
When
exit
is
less
likely,
it
could
in-
crease
the
scope
for
constructive
voice.
The
simple
threat
of
exit
implies
the
im-
position
of
sanctions
and
thus
strengthens
the
effectiveness
of
voice
used.
However,
loyalty
is
also
associated
with
complacen-
cy,
to
suppress
differences
rather
than
to
protest.
Situations
calling
for
all-or-
nothing
decisions
may
be
dimly
perceived
or
deliberately
misunderstood.
In
the
extreme
case,
too
much
loyalty
can
lead
to
self-deception.
The
definitions
and
characteristics
in
the
exit
and
voice
types
of
reactions,
respectively,
could
be
abstracted
from
different
passages
of
Hirschman’s
text
in
the
manner
shown
in
Table
1.
One
may
doubt
the merits
of
the
characteristics
chosen:
why
is
it
that
ex-
pression
is
more
direct
than
withdrawal?
The
important
thing,
however,
is
not
to
agree
on
attributes,
but
rather
to
iden-
tify
these
categories
as
a
reflection
of
’natural’
biases
on
the
part
of
economic
and
political
reasoning,
respectively.
Furthermore,
a
purist
may
query
the
consistency
of
definitions
and
terminolo-
gy.
But
we
feel
this
would
be
to
miss
the
essence
and
to
push
demands
for
precision
beyond
the
point
of
diminishing
returns.
Himmelstrand’s
advice
could
be
taken
as
a
guide:
to
treat
the
text
as
’a
way
of
reasoning,
of
handling
and
probing
initial
positions
and
results’
rath-
er
than
a
’static
model
yielding
predic-
table
answers’.2
The
catch-word
paradigm
could
also
be
used
as
a
springboard
for
a
fruitful
exploration
of
quite
different
types
of
problems.
In
the
words
of
Stein
Rokkan,
the
exit
and
voice
concepts
offer
a
tool
for
the
study
of
underlying
similarities
in
the
structures
of
decision-making
in
eco-
nomics and
in
politics:
’Once
you
are
caught
in
the
magic
of
the
model,
you
keep
on
discovering
par-
allels
and
analogies
at
all
levels
of
the
sciences
of
life’.3
3
The
transfer
of
these
ideas
to
a
new
level
and
to
a
new
set
of
phenomena
raises
some
problems,
and
also
some
objections.
We
will
therefore
take
a
fresh
view
on
the
exit/voice
relationship,
Table
1.
Definitions
and
characteristics
of
voice
and
exit.
- -
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