The fragility of deterrence in conflicts
| Published date | 01 January 2015 |
| Author | Dana Sisak,Philipp Denter |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629813511712 |
| Date | 01 January 2015 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
The fragility of deterrence in
conflicts
Journal of Theoretical Politics
2015, Vol. 27(1) 43–57
©The Author(s) 2014
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DOI: 10.1177/0951629813511712
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Philipp Denter
University of St Gallen, Switzerland
Dana Sisak
Erasmus University Rotterdam and Tinbergen Institute, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Abstract
We study deterrence in sequential move conflicts, modeled as a contest. We bias the model in
favor of peace by assuming that under complete information deterrence is achieved and peace
prevails. We show that under incomplete information about states’ types (resolve) the chances
of deterrence decrease rapidly. Studying a uniform type distribution, we show that the finer
the type space becomes the more resolve a defending state must have to support deterrence
in equilibrium. In the limit, as types occur on a continuum, deterrence is possible only under
relatively extreme conditions.
Keywords
Conflict; contest; deterrence; information
1. Introduction
In Stanley Kubrick’s famous 1964 film Dr Strangelove the world is close to annihilation
after a confused air-force general ordered a nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union.
The Soviets, in an effort to prevent exactly such a scenario, had developed a doomsday
machine, a device that consisted of 50 nuclear bombs that could not be un-triggered
and were set to detonate should a nuclear attack hit the country. This machine was a
commitment to mutually assured destruction and was planned to function as a deterrent.
President Merkin Muffley: How is it possiblefor this thing to be triggered automatically and
at the same time impossible to untrigger?
Corresponding author:
Philipp Denter, School of Economics and Political Science, University of St Gallen, Varnbüelstrasse 19 CH-
9000, St Gallen 9000, Switzerland.
Email: philipp.denter@unisg.ch
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