The Government of the United States of America v Keith Stuart Ashley Wood
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Mitting,Lord Justice Richards |
| Judgment Date | 10 July 2013 |
| Neutral Citation | [2013] EWHC 1971 (Admin) |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Date | 10 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No: CO/3269/2013 |
[2013] EWHC 1971 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Lord Justice Richards
and
Mr Justice Mitting
Case No: CO/3269/2013
MR JAMES LEWIS QC AND MISS RACHEL KAPILA (instructed by THE CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE) for the Appellant
MR ALUN JONES QC AND MR MARTIN HENLEY (instructed by KAIM TODNER SOLICITORS) for the Respondent
MR JAMES McCLELLAND (instructed by THE TREASURY SOLICITORS) for the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT the Intervenor
Hearing dates: 4 July 2013
Approved Judgment
History
Keith Wood (the respondent) was born on 29 November 1961 in Stourbridge and is therefore now 51. The government of the United States of America (the appellant) seeks his extradition to face prosecution for 14 counts of wire fraud alleged to have been committed between 16 December 2002 and 25 May 2004. It is alleged that the victims were defrauded of $170,000.
The respondent was deported from the United States on 14 December 2001. Different versions of what had happened to him before then were put in evidence at the extradition hearing. The respondent said in an unsigned proof of evidence dated 13 June 2012 that he left England for the United States in 1986, where he married, successively, two women. Both now live in the United States as do the three children of the marriages. In a detailed chronology, which Senior District Judge Riddle accepted as correct, the appellant asserted that the respondent was prosecuted by HM Customs and Excise in England and Wales in 1993 for an unknown offence or offences. He absconded, thereby committing an offence under section 6 of the Bail Act 1976. He pleaded guilty to that offence in 2005 and was sentenced to nine months imprisonment for it on 17 November 2005.
Although there is no reason to doubt that the respondent did marry twice in America and has three children by his first two wives and has spent much of his life in the United States before he was deported, we should proceed, as did Judge Riddle, on the footing that the appellant's chronology is correct.
According to the first affidavit of Michael S Davis, Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, sworn on 21 January 2010, the respondent was convicted of one count of wire fraud in the northern district of New York on 1 August 2000 and of two counts of wire fraud in the northern district of Alabama on 12 January 2001. Mr. Davis did not identify the penalties imposed. He did, however, identify significant features of the offences: the respondent purportedly sold heavy machinery to victims, who, after making initial deposits, did not receive the machinery they had ordered. According to the respondent, he was arrested in July 1999 on six counts of fraud, to which he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. He served 15 months and was then deported.
The respondent states that after his return to England, he bought and sold construction machinery. The appellant alleges that, between 16 December 2002 and 25 May 2004 he obtained 14 deposits, transferred by wire, from seven different individuals or corporations resident in the United States for heavy machinery which he offered for sale but did not intend to deliver.
On 28 April 2005 a federal grand jury in Miami returned an indictment against the respondent. On 9 March 2006 another federal grand jury in Miami returned a superseding indictment charging the 14 counts of wire fraud which is the subject of the appellant's extradition request. An arrest warrant was issued.
On 5 July 2006 the respondent was arrested in England. On 17 August 2006 District Judge Evans sent the case to the Secretary of State for the Home Department. On 12 October 2006 he ordered the extradition of the respondent. He appealed to the High Court. On 12 January 2007, his appeal was dismissed by the Divisional Court. By a letter sent after the dismissal of his appeal, the respondent asked the Divisional Court to certify a point of law of general public importance and sought leave to appeal to the House of Lords. Both applications were refused on 22 March 2007.
No step was then taken to extradite the respondent. On 24 April 2007 he applied to Westminster Magistrates Court to be discharged under Section 118(7) of the Extradition Act 2003 because he had not been extradited within the time limit specified in Section 118(2). The district judge refused his application. He appealed to the Divisional Court. On 30 July 2007 it upheld his appeal.
The Secretary of State had fallen into a trap created by an anomaly or lacuna in the drafting of Sections 114 and 118 of the 2003 Act. Section 118(2)(a) requires that a person must be extradited to a category 2 territory within 28 days of "the day on which the decision of the relevant court on the appeal becomes final". Section 118(4)(a) and (b) provides that a decision of the High Court on the appeal becomes final in two circumstances: when the period for applying to it for leave to appeal to the House of Lords (now the Supreme Court) ends, if there is no such application, and when the period permitted for applying to the House of Lords for leave to appeal to it ends if the High Court refuses leave to appeal. However, no provision was made for what would happen if the High Court refused to certify a point of law of general public importance as well as leave to appeal. Certification is a precondition of the grant of leave, whether by the High Court or by the House of Lords/Supreme Court: Section 114(4)(a). The district judge had held that when the High Court refused to certify, an application for leave to appeal could still be made under Section 114(6) within 14 days of the refusal of leave to appeal by the High Court. The Divisional Court held that that was wrong. Although it did not say so expressly, the necessary consequence of its decision was that a decision on the appeal by the High Court becomes final when it refuses to certify a point of law of general public importance and refuses leave to appeal. That date was 22 March 2007. Therefore, by 24 April 2007, the 28 day period stipulated in Section 118(2) had expired. Accordingly, his discharge was ordered.
Within, at most, a few weeks of his discharge, the respondent began to commit further offences of fraud. He was later to plead guilty in Bristol Crown Court to 15 offences of fraud by false representation, contrary to Sections 1(2)(a) and 2 of the Fraud Act 2006. The offences were committed between 1 September 2007 and 3 July 2009. In his proof of evidence of 13 June 2012, the respondent suggests that there was "some overlap" between these offences and those for which his extradition is sought. There was no overlap in point of time. There may well have been in method.
The respondent says that he met his third wife on 1 June 2008 on a blind date. They soon started to co-habit. He says that in July 2008 he was arrested for some of the Fraud Act offences and, after interview, released on bail. This did not result in a cessation of his offending: four of the offences to which he later pleaded guilty were committed after his arrest.
On 17 July 2009, he married his third wife. She gave birth to their son on 1 August 2009. In a second unsigned proof of evidence dated 17 September 2012, the respondent says that he was "absolutely certain" that if he had "any inclination that the extradition proceedings would ever have come back" he would not "have got married so hasty, let alone get into another relationship or have another child". Judge Riddle found at the extradition hearing that he had said to the arresting officer on 3 February 2011, referring to the extradition warrant, "Why has it taken so long for them to re-issue it?" He rejected his denial of saying that as a lie. It must therefore follow that Judge Riddle did not accept his protestation that he would not have remarried and fathered a child if he had thought that the extradition proceedings would ever come back, as true.
On 29 August 2009 the respondent was charged with the Fraud Act offences for which he had earlier been arrested and bailed to attend Bristol Magistrates Court on 31 August 2009. On 31 August 2009 he was sent for trial to Bristol Crown Court by the Magistrates Court and remanded in custody. He later pleaded guilty to five offences of fraud by false representation, committed between 15 January 2008 and 3 March 2009. On 12 March 2010, he was sentenced to 45 months imprisonment. All of the offences were noted as having been committed whilst he was on bail.
On 1 April 2010, whilst still serving that sentence, the respondent was arrested for further offences of fraud by representation all committed whilst on bail. He pleaded guilty to 10 such offences in early January 2012. Meanwhile, on 15 July 2011, he was released on licence from the sentence imposed on 12 March 2010. He said in his second proof of evidence that he then returned to live with his third wife and son. On 23 March 2012, he was sentenced at Bristol Crown Court to 18 months imprisonment concurrent for the 10 offences to which he pleaded guilty. He was released on licence from that sentence on 21 December 2012. He had spent all but eight months of the previous three years and four months in prison.
The extradition proceedings
The second request for the extradition of the respondent was not submitted to the United Kingdom until 8 November 2010. In his...
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