The Great Powers and the Northern Cap I940-45
| Date | 01 March 1972 |
| Published date | 01 March 1972 |
| DOI | 10.1177/001083677200700101 |
| Author | Olav Riste |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
The
Great
Powers
and
the
Northern
Cap
I940-45
OLAV
RISTE
War
Historical
Department
of
the
Norwegian
Armed
Forces
Riste,
O.
The
Great
Powers
and
the
Northern
Cap
1940-1945.
Cooperation
and
Conflict,
VII,
1972,
1-12.
Against
the
background
of
general
uncertainty
and
suspicion
prevalent
in
the
western
world
of
Russian
intentions in
foreign
policy,
this
article
reviews
the
history
of
the
Northern
Cap -
the
land
mass
between
the
Atlantic
and
the
White
Sea
north
of
the
Arctic
Circle -
during
the
Second
World
War,
and
analyses
the
occasions
when
the
great
powers
were
concerned
with
the
future
place
of
the
Cap
in
international
relations.
Particular
attention
is
devoted
to
the
events
surrounding
Roosevelt’s
suggestions
to
the
Norwegian
Foreign
Minister
for
free
ports
in
north
Norway
to
serve
as
places
of
transit
to
and
from
the
Soviet
Union.
The
evidence
from
the
war
period
is
interpreted
as
confirming
the
defensive
nature
of
Soviet
aims
on
the
Northern
Cap,
and
suggests
in
particular
a
tacit
agreement
which
would
leave
north
Norway
outside
the
spheres
of
direct
influence
of
the
great
powers -
thus
reaffirming
the
long
range
stability
of
border
relations
in
the
area.
Olav
Riste,
War
Historical
Department
of
the
Norwegian
Armed
Forces.
In
the
perspective
of
history,
the
Northern
Cap -
the
land
mass
north
of
the
Arctic
Circle
between
the
Norwegian
Sea
and
the
White
Sea
-
bears
the
mark
of
a
border
area:
a
crossroads
for
the
economic,
strategic,
and
political
interests
of
the
adjoining
States.
More
important
to
this
area,
however,
is
western
Europe’s
ten-
dency
to
regard
one
of
the
interested
States,
Russia,
as
an
alien
colossus
-
a
Prometheus
from
whom
no
one
would
be
safe
should
the
giant
move
and
use
its
strength
freely.
Enigmatic
Russia
has
thus
long
cast
its
shadow
over
the
Northern
Cap,
and
the
recurring
fears
of
the
smaller
States
for
the
sovereignty
over
their
terri-
tories
in
this
area
have
usually
been
con-
nected
with
rumours
of
Russian
plans
for
a
westward
expansion.
The
most
far-reaching
prospects
engen-
dered
by
such
fears
may
be
illustrated
by
a
passage
from
a
British
Admiralty
study
at
the
time
of
the
dissolution
of the
Nor-
wegian-Swedish
union
in
1905:
The
effect
upon
the
maritime
situation
in
Europe
of
a
great
Russian
naval
base
in
the
North
Atlantic
would
in
itself
be
very
inimical
to
British
interests,
and
if -
as
in
the
fullness
of
time
seems
more
than
prob-
able -
a
Russian
incursion
into
Finnmark
should
be
followed
by
a
Muscovite
domi-
nation
of
the
entire
Scandinavian
penin-
sula,
the
balance
of
European
power
would
be
shaken
to
its
foundations.1
Neither
this
more
extreme,
nor
the
more
general,
picture
of
a
Russian
threat
against
the
sovereignty
or
legitimate
inter-
ests
of
other
States
on
the
Northern
Cap
is
founded
on
concrete
historical
facts.
Ex-
amination
of
the
available
evidence
from
the
time
Norway’s
north-eastern
border
was
defined
in
1828
up
to
the
Second
World
War
has
not
revealed
any
Rus-
sian
plans
for
westward
expansion
in
this
area.
On
the
contrary,
the
’need
to
secure
Russia’s
northwest
frontier
and
thereby
to
prevent
the
Scandinavian
countries
being
used
as
a
stepping
stone
against
Russia’
appears
to
be
the
central
motive
of
Russian
policy.
The
source
of
this
state-
ment,
which
also
refers
to
the
situation
in
1905,
is
the
Russian
historian
Pochl-
jobkin.2
The
general
apprehensions
about
Soviet
intentions
nevertheless
form
a
necessary
background
to
the
situation
on
the
North-
ern
Cap
at
the
beginning
of
the
Second
World
War.
Events
in
the
autumn
of
1939 -
beginning
with
the
Molotov-Rih-
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