THE IMPACT OF THE PRICES AND INCOMES BOARD ON THE REFORM OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.1972.tb00596.x |
| Author | W. E. J. McCarthy,R. J. Liddle |
| Date | 01 November 1972 |
| Published date | 01 November 1972 |
THE IMPACT
OF
THE PRICES AND INCOMES BOARD
ON
THE
REFORM
OF
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
A
PRELIMINARY
SURVEY
OF
SPECIFIC
PAY
REFERENCES*
R.
J.
LIDDLEt
AND
w.
E.
J.
MCCARTHY~
INTRODUCTION
DURING the 1950s there arose
a
growing volume of public criticism and
comment directed at the shortcomings of the British system of collective
bargaining. This criticism may be said to be partly responsible for the
appointment of the Donovan Commission, or at least for its terms of
reference.l With the publication of the Donovan Report, in 1968, it has
come to be accepted that there
is
considerable scope for bargaining re-
form-by which is meant the negotiation
of
changes in the form, scope and
nature of existing collective agreements specifically designed to change and
improve the state of industrial relations within a firm or group of firms.a
The Labour Government accepted a large part of the Donovan argu-
ments in favour of reform in terms of a move towards more formal agree-
ments, negotiated at the level of the individual plant or ~ompany.~
As
a
result, in 1969, it established the Commission on Industrial Relations,
charged with the duty of encouraging the reform of collective bargaining
by
so
called ‘voluntary’ means. More recently the present Government’s
1971
Industrial Relations Act, and the related Code of Industrial Practice,
has envisaged an expanded role for the
C.I.R.
within a more legal frame-
work. Yet it is notable that many of the measures proposed in the Act and
the Code have been justified largely in terms of the contribution they will
make to the negotiation
by
employers and trade unions of improved
systems of collective bargaining.4
However, there can be no doubt that
so
far the institution with the
most sustained and far-reaching involvement in promoting bargaining
reform has been the National Board for Prices and Incomes, established by
the Labour Government in 1965 to assist in the implementation of its
*
The authors wish to thank the S.S.R.C. Industrial Relations Research Unit at Warwick
University for assistance in some of the preliminary work for this article.
Research
Officer,
Department
of
Social and Administrative Studies, Oxford
Fellow
of
Nuffield College and the Oxford Centre for Management Studies, University
Lecturer in Industrial Relations
Report
of
the
Royal
Commission
on
Trade
Unions
and
Employers’
Associations,
Crnnd. 3623, H.M.S.O.,
June 1968 (Donovan Report)
a
See W.
E.
J.
McCarthy
et.
a!.,
The
Rcform
of
Collective
Bargaining at Plant and Company
Lcvel,
Department
of
Employment Manpower Paper No.
5,
H.M.S.O.,
November 197
1,
for a discussion
of the alternatives available
to
mana em and unions who initiate collective bargaining reform.
Zn
Place
ofsir$:
A
Polig
for
Zn&drial Relations,
Cmnd. 3888, H.M.S.O., January 1969
See the speech by the Rt. Hon. Robert Carr,
M.P.,
to
the third Annual Forum of the Insti-
tute
of
Group Relations and Collective Bargaining, New York,
25
May, 1971.
412
PRICES
AND
INCOMES
BOARD
ON
COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING
413
prices and incomes policy. Most of the Board’s 107 reports which were
concerned with specific pay issues contain proposals for inducing changes
in an existing framework
of
collective agreements. Many of the changes
proposed were both comprehensive and far-reaching-involving altera-
tions in the level, scope and form of collective agreements, both procedural
and substantive.
For this reason amongst others there appeared
to
us
to be
a
case for
conducting
a
comprehensive inquiry into the general impact of the Board
on the parties involved; to see how far various reports were implemented
and how far bargaining change, when it occurred, was influenced by their
suggestions. This objective is the central focus of
a
three-year research
project now being undertaken in Oxford under the overall supervision
of
W.
E.
J.
McCarthy with financial support from the S.S.R.C. The major
element in the research programme will be
a
series of case studies designed
to discover more about questions of this kind.
It
is
hoped that they will also
throw some light on the problems that arise when attempts are made to
introduce bargaining change, especially when change
is
linked to the
implementation of a prices and incomes policy. Questions will be asked
about the relationship between the work of the Board and the general
acceptability and/or efficacy of the policy. We shall also be investigating
the factors which lead to the choice of references by the Government.
The study is intended to illuminate a number of problem areas, which
involve both theoretical issues and policy questions. On the theoretical
side we hope to throw some light on such controversies as the adequacy of
the Donovan analysis of bargaining structures. On the policy side the case
studies should produce some conclusions
on
the best way of running a pub-
lic institution established to further bargaining reform. It is hoped that
something may also be learnt about the best mix
of
institutions and poli-
cies that are conducive to bargaining reform and the implementation of an
effective prices and incomes policy in different circumstances.
So
far two pieces
of
preliminary work have been completed. First,
a
pilot study of the Board’s reference on the exhibition contracting industry,
to test the feasibility of the project and refine the questions to be answered
in future studies. Second, a general survey of the 107 specific reports con-
cerning pay.6 The aim here was partly to be able to draw some preliminary
conclusions about the range and variety of this part of the Board’s work,
and about how it performed its role both through time and in different
industries and circumstances.
It
was also hoped that
it
might be possible to
draw certain tentative conclusions about the way in which the Govern-
ment used the Board, and say something about the development of the
Board’s own thinking at different stages of the policy.
See also Allan Fels,
The
British
Prices
and
Incomcs
Board,
University
of
Cambridge, Department
ofApplied Economics: Occasional paper 29. Of the Board’s 170 reports, he classifies 79 as being
on pay, 67 on prices and
10
related to
both.
9 were ‘general study’ reports and
5
general reports.
We arrive at the figure
of
107 ‘specific’ pay reports by adding
to
the
79
on pay and
10
on both
pay and prices,
18
price reports which considered wage determination problems.
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