The Impact of the Gulf War on Migration and Remittances in Asia and the Middle East
| Published date | 01 December 1991 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2435.1991.tb01037.x |
| Date | 01 December 1991 |
| Author | J. Addleton |
The Impact
of
the
Gulf
War
on Migration and
Remittances
in
Asia and the Middle East
J. ADDLETON
*
On the eve of the Gulf crisis, at least
5.1
million migrant workers lived in the six states
constituting the Gulf Coordinating Council (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab
Emirates, Bahrain and Oman). Accompanying family members
and
children increased
the expatriate presence by at least another two or three million. Migrant workers alone
represented
70
percent of a total workforce estimated at
7.1
million. In some countries
such
as
Kuwait, UAE and Qatar, more than four-fifths of the workforce was from outside
the region.
Migrant populations included hundreds of thousands of workers from Pakistan, India,
Sri
Lanka, Bangladesh, Thailand, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen and other countries. Combined
remittances
-
official as well as unofficial
-
averaged several billion dollars each year.
In some countries such as Yemen and Jordan, the Gulf states had emerged as leading
sources of employment and foreign exchange. Indirectly, the Middle East migration also
had an enormous social and economic impact on labour-exporting countries throughout
Asia and the Middle East during the
1970s
and
1980s.
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August
2,
1990
and the war which followed five
months later produced significant change. One immediate result was the evacuation of
several hundred thousand foreign workers from Kuwait and, shortly later, Iraq to their
home countries. Subsequently, new political alignments produced further population
movements, including the departure of
800,000
Yemenis (workers and family members)
from Saudi Arabia. Smaller numbers of Jordanians and Palestinians living in Saudi
Arabia and elsewhere in the Gulf also returned home. The conclusion
of
the Gulf War,
the ongoing political turmoil in Iraq, and the rebuilding of Kuwait (and eventually Iraq)
are leading to still further change in the migrant worker populations
in
the region.
SlTUATION PRIOR
TO
AUGUST
1990
The
View
from
the
GCC
States
The rise in expatriate populations in the Gulf largely parallels growth in the Middle East
oil industry.' The numbers of foreign workers increased especially dramatically after
*
U.S.
Agency
for
International
Development
(USAID),
Pretoria
(South Africa).
509
rapid increases
in
oil prices in 1973, when the trickle of Arab and Asian foreign workers
turned into a flood. By 1975, the number of foreign workers was estimated at 1.3 million.
Sixty-five percent were from elsewhere in the Arab world, twenty-two percent from
South Asia, and only one percent from East Asia.* By 1985, the number of migrant
workers had climbed to more than five million. The structure of migrant populations also
changed, Arab workers declining to only 30 percent of the total. At the same time, the
relative importance of South Asians (43 percent) and East Asians
(20
percent) increased
dramatically (see Table 1, page
522).’
Several factors contributed to the dramatic rise
in
foreign workers. Local populations
were small, especially in “city-states” such as Kuwait, Bahrain and the UAE, where the
number of citizens did not even exceed one million. Age structures tilted heavily toward
the very young. Low female participation rates reduced still further the number of
workers available domestically. At the same time, the massive investments made by the
oil-rich Gulf states in their own infrastructure required hundreds of thousands of
workers, first to build and then to maintain. Workers from outside the region provided
most of the labor.4
Migrant profiles depended largely on
a
combination of economic demand, historic
relationships, and political concerns. An active debate went on throughout the Gulf over
whether Arab workers were more “desirable” than Asian workers. Similar discussions
tookplace on whether non-Muslim migrants were more or less disruptive than non-Arab
Muslim migrants. Economic forces played an important role, as more expensive
workers from some countries (e.g. Pakistan) began to be replaced by less expensive
workers from other countries (e.g. Bangladesh) in certain employment categories.
Historical relationships were also important. For example, Indian and Pakistani
migrants were proportionately most important in the UAE and Oman, which had always
maintained close ties with the Indian Sub~ontinent.~
Throughout the region, the migrant populations that did develop largely reflected
these kind of political, economic and historical concerns.
The structure of migrant workforces in the region varied considerably. At one
extreme, nearly half the foreign workforce in Kuwait came from other Arab countries.
By contrast, only seven percent of the foreign workers
in
Oman were from the Arab
world (see Table
2,
page
523).
Oil prices and government spending patterns were largely
responsible for short-term fluctuations in regional migrant populations. Declining oil
revenues
in
the early 1980s led to
a
decline in remittances for some countries. By the
middle 1980s, most expatriate communities in the region had begun to stabilize and in
some cases even increase.h
Foreign workers held positions at all levels, from unskilled laborers to highly skilled
doctors and university professors. Virtually the entire construction labor force came
from outside, as did most domestic servants, shopkeepers, and skilled manual tradesmen.
Migrant labor participated heavily
in
both the public and private sectors.
In
Qatar
in
1987, for example, hardly 40 percent of all government employees were Qatari.
In
Oman, only
60
percent of all civil servants were Omani. Throughout the 1980s, at least
half the teaching staff at Saudi universities came from outside the country.’ Foreigners
were well represented
in
local military and police forces
in
countries such
as
Kuwait,
Oman, and the UAE.
Employment patterns varied within sectors
as
well as between countries. For example,
in
Kuwait
in
1985,43 percent of the migrant workforce were employed
in
services, with
another 23 percent
in
construction. Comparable figures
in
Oman were almost reversed:
only 22 percent
in
services,
with
47 percent
in
construction. Saudi Arabia, the trend setter
for the entire region, registered 24 percent
in
services, 29 percent
in
construction,
13
percent
in
trade,
10
percent
in
manufacturing and a surprisingly high
10
percent
in
5
10
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