The Impossible Case of Japan
| Author | Dag Leonardsen |
| DOI | 10.1375/acri.35.2.203 |
| Published date | 01 August 2002 |
| Date | 01 August 2002 |
Dag Leonardsen
Lillehammer College, Norway
If increasing crime seems to be an unavoidable concomitant of rapid
urbanisation, Japan might be an interesting exception. Both statistics
and research tell us that Japan is a modern, rapidly urbanised society with
little crime.This article raises the question if, and eventually in which way,
one may talk about Japan as a low crime nation. Is there anything of
criminological interest to learn from Japan? After describing the Japanese
society along five analytical dimensions the answer to this question is
that while in the West we can talk about “community lost”, in Japan we
should rather talk about “individual lost”. At the individual level the oblit-
eration of the self is the price to be paid for less crime. However, at the
collective level Japan might teach the West a lesson. If crime is regarded
as actions committed by outsiders, then Japanese society has succeeded
in linking the individual to a group context which most likely functions in
a crime preventive way. Instead of endless crime preventive programs of
“social engineering”, the West should pay more attention to basic socio-
logical insights concerning collective obligations and identities. In this
regard we might look to Japan.
Methodology textbooks tell us to pay extra attention to reports that seem to
contradict established knowledge. These so-called “negative cases” can give us
interesting new information. For a long time Japan has been regarded as such a
negative case. In the period from 1950 to 1990, Western countries (here used as an
“ideal type”) experienced an increase in registered crime, while in Japan crime
decreased/stabilised. In this paper I intend to answer this question: if the figures
concerning registered crime are valid, why is it that Japan (in the mentioned
period) deviated from the general tendency the West?1 Traditionally, rapid social
change and urbanisation has been linked to increasing crime.2 Empirical studies of
the urbanisation process in the West, both from the 1920s and from the 1960s to
the 1980s, have confirmed many of the conclusions in classical sociology: rapid
social change comes at a price, and one of the costs seems to be increasing crime.
However, Japan, having experienced an extremely rapid urbanisation process since
the early 1950s, does not fit in, either with empirical, or with theoretical research.
Consequently, there might be an interesting lesson to be learned from Japan.
An earlier version of this essay was presented at the ANZSOC 2001, The University of
Melbourne, February 2001.
Address for correspondence: Professor Dag Leonardsen, Faculty of Health and Social Studies
2626, Lillehammer College, Lillehammer, Norway. Email: Dag.Leonardsen@hil.no
THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY
203
VOLUME 35 NUMBER 2 2002 PP. 203–229
DAG LEONARDSEN
It is worth noting that the increase in post-war crime in the West started while
the Keynesian, intervensionist welfare state was in its most potent phase. This has
created what I have defined as “the welfare paradox” (Leonardsen, 1993). The
more these welfare states invested in preventive measures to avoid social problems
(like crime, drugs, divorces, abuse) the more problems they seemed to experience.
After at least three decenniums with an active, preventive governmental policy,
most social scientists seem to agree with Fukuyama (1999):
At the ‘end of history’ there is a widespread acknowledgement that in post-industrial
societies further improvement cannot be achieved through ambitious social
engineering. We no longer have realistic hopes that we can create ‘the great society’
through large government programs (p. 4).
We are witnessing what Offe (1984) has labelled “the crisis of crisis management”.
Western democracies, continually striving for realising individual rights and liber-
ties, have sought Rousseau, but have found Hobbes (Dahrendorf, 1985). This situa-
tion explains why Fukuyama has titled his last book The Great Disruption, and by
this referring to the manifold social problems (including crime) that the Western
societies have experienced the last 30 years.
One significant reaction — both scientific and political — to these anomic
tendencies in the West has been the communitarian movement, and its call for more
responsibility and more other-directedness. The communitarians launch a basic
cultural critique against the individualistic preoccupation with rights. In sharp
contrast to Thatcher’s claim that “there is no such thing as society”, they follow the
logic put forward by Hirsch (1976): instead of the liberal argument that the collective
ideal is produced by summing up what is best for every single individual, they offer
the reverse. What is best for the individual is to make the best collective.
In this situation, Japan appears to be a case of special interest. It seems to have
very little crime and is — according to crosscultural studies — typically representative
of collectivist and communitarian cultures (see Triandis, 1994, 1995). Could there be
a causal relationship between these two “facts”? Is Braithwaite (1989) correct when he
declares that (concerning crime) Japan should be a model for the West?
In my own research I have (following authors such as Polanyi, 1957, Lockwood,
1964, George & Wilding, 1978) read the Western welfare paradox as an expression
of a value-, or rather a rationality-conflict between the economic and the sociocul-
tural system. Societies that try to base their economic system on unfettered compe-
tition, individualism, egoism, efficiency and rapid change/mobility will
automatically have problems with realising corresponding opposite values, like
cooperation, collectiveness, altruism, time-taking, and stability in the sociocultural
system. No governmental planning, including crime preventive programs, can
abolish the inherent contradictions between these value sets. This is why the social
engineering perspective must be regarded as the impossible task of realising recipro-
cal excluding rationalities. If priority is given to values like individualism, competi-
tion, and rapid change in the economic system, one will not be able to attain the
opposite values (collectivism, solidarity, and, by implication, little crime) in the
sociocultural system.
At first glance, Japan seems to falsify this contention. Perhaps there is a chance
that we might answer like Winnie-the-Pooh, when asked if he wanted milk or
204
THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY
THE IMPOSSIBLE CASE OF JAPAN
honey: “Yes, please, both!” (Read, we can have both rapid social change and little
crime). The question is: was Adam Smith (1976) right when he supposed that one
could counteract the egoistic motivation of the market by way of “moral senti-
ments”? Did Freda Adler (1983) correctly explain low crime rates in Japan with
reference to the “time-honoured traditional codes of social behaviour”? Will a
sociological analysis of Japanese society give us some clues to understand if, and
then how, one set of (altruistic?) values may counteract another set of (egoistic?)
values? If so, does the Japanese “crime wonder” come at an acceptable price? Is
John Braithwaite’s communitaristic defence of the Japanese shame culture the
complete story?
In short, the topic I address is, instead of the assertion that the sociocultural
system is characterised by adaptation and a lag in relation to the economic system,
does Japan represent a case where the relationship and the dependence go the
opposite way? Is there any sense in the argument that “Asian values” permeate the
whole society in ways that even abolish the rationality of the market logic? Does the
Japanese crime pattern prove that economistic and materialistic ways must surrender
to Confucian and Buddhist norms and values? Is Fenwick (1985, p. 76) correct in
saying, “The literature also suggests that cultural traditions/values may be the pivotal
element in understanding Japan’s astonishing post-war record of crime control”?
Does Japan Really Have Less Crime than Western Countries?
Do we have good documentation that suggests the case that Japan was a low crime
nation in the period from 1950 to 1990? This question could invite an extensive
methodological debate. I will have to delimit myself to this comment: we all know
that statistics lie, and that crime statistics lie even more. Not only crime, but also
crime statistics are a social construction. We all know that the definition of crime
will vary from culture to culture, and that the same goes for police discretion
(police have wide discretional power in Japan). We also know that organised crime
complicates the overall picture. It is well documented that the Japanese mafia
(Yakuza) operates as an alternative police force, and that their existence
contributes to security as well as insecurity (see Kaplan & Dubro, 1986, Clifford,
1976, Thornton & Endo, 1992, van Wolferen, 1989, Kuhne, 1994, Kersten, 1993).
Protection money is regularly paid by companies to the Yakuza in return for safety
guarantees. One should also be aware that the borderline between suicide and
murder is sometimes opaque. Kaplan and Dubro (1986) argue that the Yakuza is
responsible for 11% of all suicides in Japan. People who are in debt to the Yakuza
are forced to seek this solution to their problems. One might define these suicides
as a “functional equivalent” to murder. More than 300,000 people institutionalised
in mental hospitals is another illustration of this (more than the amount of people
in ordinary...
To continue reading
Request your trial