The Making of Foreign Policy in Norway
| DOI | 10.1177/001083676800300103 |
| Date | 01 March 1968 |
| Published date | 01 March 1968 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
The
Making
of
Foreign
Policy
in
Norway
Jens
A.
Christophersen
T .
The
Weight
of
History
It
is
perhaps
significant
that
this
article
on
the
formation
of
Norwegian
foreign
policy
has
been
published
only
subsequent
to
similar
articles
on
Swedish
and
Danish
foreign
policy
in
this
journal.
While
both
Sweden
and
Denmark
have
diplomatic
traditions,
such
a
tradition
is
still
hard
to
identify
in
present-day
Norwegian
policy
making.
Although
the
Norwegian
Army
has
an
unbroken
tradition
as
far
back
as
1628
and
its
Navy
bore
the
impression
of
the
double
kingdom
of Denmark
and
Nor-
way
before
1814,
Norway’s
Foreign
Min-
istry
dates
only
from
1905.
Finland
for
example
has
for
a
relatively
long
time
ac-
cepted
the
fact
that
its
fate
depends
on
re-
lations
between
the
European
Great
Pow-
ers.
It
is
difficult
to
find
a
similar
train
of
thought
in
Norwegian
foreign
policy
debates,
at
any
rate
if
we
limit
ourselves
to
the
period
before
r 940.
Nor
does
1905
appear
as
a
general
turn-
ing-point
for
an
increased
Norwegian
interest
in
foreign
policy.
Prior
to
1814
all
decisions
of
great
significance
for
Norway
were
made
in
Copenhagen.
From
1814
until
1905
similar
decisions
were
made
in
Stockholm.
From
a
Norwegian
point
of
view
the
most
pressing,
almost
the
only
foreign
policy
questions
of
any
importance
before
1903
were
those
arising
out
of
the
union
with
Sweden.
Once
this
problem
had
been
solved,
one
could
almost
speak
of
a
waning
interest
in
foreign
policy
ques-
tions.
Union
policy
had
been
in
the
lime-
light
for
at
least
ten
years
prior
to
1905.
Now
this
was
a
part
of
the
past.
The
young
Norwegian
nation
did
not
give
first
pri-
ority
to
her
relations
with
foreign
powers,
although
capital
investments
from
abroad
soon
became
cause
for
internal
political
strife.
Yet
these
questions
were
seldom
thought
of
as
matters
of
foreign
policy,
even
when
they
involved
foreign
control
of
water
power
in
Norway.
There
was
almost
complete
agreement
that
Norway
could
and
should
remain
outside
of
all
European
alliances
and
conflicts.
There
was
therefore
undoubtedly
broad
support
for
Bjornson’s
maxim
that
the
best
foreign
policy
for
Norway
was
not
to
have
any
foreign
policy
at
all.
In
view
of
the
prevailing
situation
such
a
position
was
perhaps
natural.
The
diffi-
cult
relationship
with
the
country’s
most
important
neighbor,
Sweden,
had
been
solved,
and
even
though
Norway
had
Europe’s
longest
coast
it
was
generally
as-
sumed
that
there
was
little
danger
from
the
sea
as
long
as
Britain
maintained
indisputable
maritime
supremacy.
Nor-
wegians
were
conscious
of
the
privilege
of living
in
the
quiet
corner
of Europe.
Nor
were
there
any
particular
apprehensions
with
regard
to
relations
with
Norway’s
other
land
neighbor,
Russia.
This
was
es-
pecially
true
in
1905
after
Russia’s
defeat
in
the
Far
East
and
the
attempted
revolu-
tion
in
St.
Petersburg.
There
had
been
times
when
rumors
of
Russian
expansionist
53
plans
had
been
alarming,
but
they
had
never
been
more
than
rumors.
The
bound-
ary
between
Norway
and
Russia
had
been
drawn
up
in
1826
without
serious
diffi-
culties.
This
boundary
remains
today
be-
tween
the
Soviet
Union
and
Norway.
It
is
one
of
Europe’s
oldest
boundaries
and
at
the
same
time
the
only
Russian
boundary
that
has
not
been
revised
in
this
century.
Russian
and
Norwegian
soldiers
have
never
fought,
either
before
or
after
1826.
The
situation
did
not
change
very
much
in
the
inter-war
period.
Norway,
as
well
as
Sweden
and
Denmark,
had
managed
to
maintain
her
neutrality
during
the
First
World
War.
Even
Norway’s
membership
in
the
League
of
Nations
cannot
be
inter-
preted
as
the
beginning
of
an
active
foreign
policy.
Neutrality
was
a
matter
of
course
when
the
war
broke
out
in
1939
and
there
was
relatively
high
confidence
that
a
policy
of
neutrality
would
succeed
this
time
too.
The
German
surprise
attack
on
9
April
r94o,
which
broke
126
years
of
peace,
changed
the
situation
entirely.
There
was
a
short
interim
period
of
’bridge-building
policy’
after
1945,
a
policy
officially
grounded
on
faith
in
the
UN
and
the
belief
that
the
big
Powers
would
continue
to
cooperate.
But
in
r949
Norway
acknowledged
its
first
binding
foreign
policy
commitment
in
peacetime
by
becoming
a
member
of
NATO.
Here
the
important
reservation
was
made,
however,
that
no
foreign
bases
would
be
established
in
Norway
in
peace-
time.
From
a
comparative
point
of vicw,
therc
are
many
similarities
between
Norwegian
and
American
attitudes
to
international
affairs.
Both
countries
are
newcomers
to
the
diplomatic
scene.
Both
countries
have
colonial
pasts
which
have
not
been
easily
forgotten.
In
both
Norway
and
the
United
States
domestic
democracy
had
developed
and
evolved
at
a
relatively
safe
distance
from
international
complications
and
the
governments
of
both
countries,
accustomed
as
they
were
to
provincial
outlook
and
populist
traditions,
had
problems
of
ad-
justment
when
they
were
confronted
with
the
demands
of
foreign
affairs.
But
while
the
American
economy
is
concentrated
on
the
home
market,
Norway
has
long
been
deeply
involved
in
international
trade
and
the
world
market.
Foreign
trade
accounts
for
as
much
as
40
%
of
Norway’s
gross
national
product
while
the
corresponding
figure
for
the
US
is
only
4
%
(and
for
the
Sovict
Union
2
°%).
The
Norwegian
merchant
fleet,
whicl
has
long
been
the
third
largest
in
the
world,
is
chiefly
engaged
in
international
trade.
From
this
point
of
view
there
has
been -
and
perhaps
still
is -
an
imbalance
between
the
markedly
inter-
nationally-oriented
economy
and
govern-
ment
policies
that
often
have been
chiefly
concerned
with
domestic
conditions.
2.
Illtematiollal
and
Natioiial
Factors
In
the
historical
outline
above,
I
have
at-
tempted
to
suggest
that
Norway’s
long
era
of
peace
was
not
exclusively
a
result
of
efforts
made
by
Norwegian
authorities.
It
is
more
true
that
this
long-lasting
peace
was
due
to
the
fact
that
Norway
and
the
Nordic
countries
lay
for
a
long
time
out-
side
the
Great
Powers’
area
of
interest.
I
havc
tried
to
show
in
an
earlier
essay
that
while
for
long
periods
the
Nordic
coun-
tries
have
been
the
quiet
corner
of
Europe,
significant
events
have been
concentrated
into
two
short
’Tilsit-periods’,
1807-1812
and
T939-I941.
The
periods
of
upheaval
were
typically
characterized
by
good
rela-
tions
betw een
Russia
and
whatever
con-
tinental
power
was
in
ascendancy
during
the
respective
criscs.
They
witnessed
the
British
bombardment
of
Copenhagen
in
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