THE MANAGER IN THE POLISH ENTERPRISE: A STUDY OF ACCOMMODATION UNDER CONDITIONS OF ROLE CONFLICT1
| Author | Solomon John Rawin |
| Published date | 01 March 1965 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.1965.tb00883.x |
| Date | 01 March 1965 |
THE MANAGER IN THE POLISH ENTERPRISE:
A
STUDY
OF
ACCOMMODATION UNDER CONDITIONS
OF
ROLE CONFLICT1
SOLOMON
JOHN
RAWIN*
THE
subject of this study
is
the manager in the state-owned factory in
Poland. The state-owned sector represents only one-third of all industrial
enterprises of the country, but its weight in the national economy is over-
whelming; it accounts for
89
per cent ofgross industrial output andemploys
86
per cent of factory labour. Virtually all larger enterprises
-
those with
one hundred employees or more
-
belong to this sector. This analysis is
centred on these enterprises; the medium and large size factories that form
the so-called ‘key industries’, and are subject to direct central control.2
In this category the typical manager
is
in charge of
a
factory employing
between two hundred and two thousand workers, which is engaged in
one of the main industries of the country, such
as
heavy machinery, mining,
textiles, and chemicals. The analysis presented in this article may not apply
to the small category
of
managers
-
those in charge of some huge enterprises
of exceptional national importance
-
who enjoy a semi-ministerial status.
The Enterprise
and
the Central Control
System
Two main levels of organization may be distinguished within the
industrial structure
:
the central control system and the enterprise. At the
top of the central control system
is
the national Plan Commission and the
ministerial Economic Committee. Over-all economic planning, with
yearly
and
long-term production targets for each branch of industry,
emanate from there. Production targets are channelled through respective
ministries and ‘Industrial Associations’ to individual enterprises. The task
of the Industrial Associations
is
to provide each enterprise with detailed
production plans and directives, to co-ordinate procurement of raw mater-
ials and equipment, as well
as
the distribution of products. The Industrial
*
Sometime Research Student at the London School of Economics and Political Science.
1
This
article
is
derived from
a
wider study of social structure in post-war Poland. Data were
obtained mainly from Polish sociological and economic publications. The writer
is
indebted to
S.
J.
Gould and
A.
Zauberman for their comments.
2
The over-all industrial structure distinguishes three
types
of ownership: state-owned, co-
operative, and private enterprises. Together, the state-owned and co-operative enterprises form
the socialized sector of the industry, and account for
99.5
per cent of
gross
industrial output.
Another distinction is made between ‘key industries’ and ‘local industries’ within the socialized
sector.
Local
industries comprise mainly small establishments of artisan or semi-artisan character,
and are subject to control of the local People’s Councils (See Zbigniew Madej, ‘Funkcjonowanie
gospodarki narodowej,’ in Czeslaw Bobrowski
ct
al.,
Polityka
gospodarcza
Polski
Ludowcj,
Vol.
11,
2nd ed. revised, Warsaw: Ksiazka i Wiedza,
1962,
pp.
24-33).
For statistical data see
Rocznik Statystyczny
1963,
Warsaw: Glowny Urzad Statystyczny,
1963
p.
103,
Table
6;
p.
130,
Table
28;
p.
150,
Table
42.
I
2
BRITISH JOURNAL
OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
Association represents also the immediate level of control and ~upervision.~
The enterprise’s output, the assortment of goods to be produced, the
input of labour and material, allocation of funds for wage expenditures
and for investment, the programme for technological improvements and,
in general, all essential elements of economic activity are prescribed by
means
of
quantitative specifications known as ‘indicators’. A set of indi-
cators represents the production tasks, and provides also the standards for
evaluating the performance of each enterprise. ‘Economic incentives’
-
monetary rewards for attainment of targets and penalties for under-
achievement
-
are attached to each indicator. Thus the total amount of
pay-roll, and particularly the earnings of the managerial and admini-
strative staff, depend on the degree of fulfilment of the plan.
Within the general framework of the economy the enterprise
is
regarded
as
a closed system. Indicators are allocated, and performance is evaluated
for the enterprise as a whole; units below the enterprise level, production
shops and technical and administrative departments, are considered as an
integral part of the enterprise, and any allocation of tasks and distribution
of rewards as an internal matter.
This special position of the enterprise is reflected in the formal status
accorded to it. Though part and parcel of the state economy, the enterprise
has a legal status of its own, somewhat similar to that of a corporate body
in a capitalist society. It has the right to enter into business agreements
with other legal persons, to acquire and dispose of property, and in financial
matters it is considered as a separate entity with its own accountability.
The internal organization of the enterprise
is
built on the principle of
the personal responsibility of the man in charge. At the top level, the general
manager, an appointee of the ministry, is responsible, both in the admini-
strative and the judicial sense, for all activities in the factory. Delegation
of authority, even when officially provided for, does not reduce this
personal responsibility.
A corollary of the principle of personal responsibility is the formal
position of the manager as the sole source of authority in the factory. His
orders are binding; neither the statutory powers of the workers in regard
to self-government nor the inherent prerogatives of lower-level manage-
ment have comparable authority. The hiring and dismissal of personnel
(with the exception of a few high-level executives who derive their appoint-
ment from the Industrial Association) rests with the manager.4
3
The origin of Industrial Associations is linked with the
19568
decentralization reform of the
industrial structure. Initially, the concept of the Association called for
a
kind of super-enterprise,
grouping together enterprises on the basis
of
branch specialization, and enjoying wide autonomy
in relation to the ministry. With the abandonment of the decentralization experiment, the
Association became an integral part of the central administrationand took the placeof the defunct
Central Board as an intermediate link of bureaucratic control.
4
The internal organization of an enterprise is divided into two operational areas: the technical
division which includes production shops and auxiliary technical departments, and the admini-
strative-commercial division which consists of the offices of general administration and the
procurement and distribution departments. The technical division is headed by the technical
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