The New South Wales “Compstat” Process: Its Impact on Crime

Published date01 April 2004
DOI10.1375/acri.37.1.22
Date01 April 2004
22 THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY
VOLUME 37 NUMBER 1 2004 PP.22–48
Address for correspondence: Don Weatherburn, Director, NSW Bureau of Crime
Statistics and Research, GPO Box 6, Sydney, NSW 2001, Australia. Email: don_j_
weatherburn@agd.nsw.gov.au
The New South Wales “Compstat” Process:
Its Impact on Crime
Marilyn Chilvers and Don Weatherburn
NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, Australia
In January 1998 the New South Wales Police Service introduced a new
crime control strategy, modelled on the New York “Compstat”
process.The strategy involved a series of “Operation and Crime Review
(OCR) Panels” in which senior police provided Local Area and Regional
Commanders with information on crime trends and patterns in their
local area and asked them to devise various tactics and strategies to
reduce crime. At a later point in time the same commanders returned
to the OCR panels and their performance in reducing crime was
reviewed by senior management.This paper examines the impact of
OCR Panels on the rate of recorded crime in four offence categories
that fell after their introduction. The results suggest that OCR panels
were temporarily effective in reducing three of these offences. Due to
the suspension of OCR panels in the lead up to the Olympics it is not
clear whether these effects could have been sustained.
In the mid-1990s New South Wales (NSW) began to experience a rapid growth in
most major categories of recorded crime. Between 1995 and 1997, assaults rose
39%, robberies rose 65%, household break-ins rose 30% and motor vehicle thefts
rose 18% (Doak, 2000). These increases generated considerable public concern,
especially as they were much more pronounced in NSW than in any other
Australian State (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1998, 1996). Public concern
about crime in NSW was further exacerbated by the fact that a Royal Commission
of Inquiry during the second half of the 1990s had revealed evidence of police
corruption in NSW (Wood, 1997).
In January 1998, under a new Police Commissioner appointed from Britain, the
NSW Police Service introduced a local version of the well known New York
“Compstat” process, known as Operation and Crime Review (OCR) panels. A full
description of the panel process can be found in Davis (2002). Essentially the panels
involved periodic meetings between senior police management and Local Area
(LA) commanders. In the period covered by this evaluation, police at these
meetings were confronted with data showing the latest crime trends and crime
hotspots in their patrols, and were asked (sometimes fairly aggressively) to provide
an account of the strategies they were employing to reduce crime. Where their
strategies did not appear to be working, LA commanders were urged to develop more
effective strategies. At subsequent meetings, the strategies they employed to reduce
crime were reviewed in the light of fresh evidence about crime in their area. The
OCR process continued, slowly becoming more collegial in tone (Davis, 2002, p.
20) until the early months of 2000, when demands on police in relation to the
Sydney Olympics forced its suspension.
It is important to note that, while the OCR management process was modelled
on the New York Compstat process, NSW police were not encouraged to pursue
“zero tolerance” policing. Three strategies were strongly emphasised by senior
police management. First, police were urged to focus their resources and operations
on “hot times and hot places”. Second, they were encouraged to conduct frequent
searches for illegal weapons among those suspected of carrying them in public
places. Finally, they were urged to employ all available legal avenues to arrest
known repeat offenders. To facilitate this last strategy, LA commanders were given
lists of residents in their area that had three or more convictions or an outstanding
first instance warrant and/or who were thought by police intelligence analysts to be
criminally active. These people then became the focus of local criminal investiga-
tion teams.
It is not possible to obtain reliable data on the extent to which police focused
their resources on hot times and hot places, or the number of searches conducted
for illegal weapons. It is possible to obtain some information on the extent to
which police targeted repeat offenders. In the 2 years following the introduction of
the OCR process, the number of offenders appearing in the NSW Local Courts
who had some kind of prior criminal record increased by almost 30% per annum
(New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 2000). This change
produced a substantial increase in the prison population. In the 12 months June
1998 to June 1999 the NSW prison population rose 13%, following a 5-year period
during which it had been quite stable (Lind, Chilvers, & Weatherburn, 2001).
In the 2 years following the introduction of OCR panels police recorded no
increase in any category of crime. However, several major categories of crime
showed substantial decreases. Reports of robbery with a firearm fell by 24%, robbery
with a weapon other than a firearm fell by 20%, home break-ins fell by 10%, motor
vehicle theft fell by 11%, indecent assault fell by 16% and sexual assault fell by
10% (Doak, 2001). The changes were not uniformly reflected in other states
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2000a). Not surprisingly, therefore, NSW police
argued that they were responsible for producing the dramatic turnaround in crime
(Darcy, 1999).
For obvious reasons the coincidence of OCR panels and falling crime rates
cannot be taken as unequivocal evidence of their success. A number of studies have
found evidence that property crime rates are strongly influenced by economic
factors such as gross domestic product and unemployment (Field, 1999; Belknap,
1989; Chiricos, 1987; Deadman & Pyle, 1997; Fagan & Freeman, 1999;
Kapuscinski, Braithwaite & Chapman, 1998; Pyle & Deadman, 1994). During the
second half of the 1990s, Australia experienced a combination of strong economic
growth and falling unemployment. It is possible then that the shift in crime trends
23
THE IMPACT OF COMPSTAT ON CRIME
THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY

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