The Nordic Countries and European Security
| Author | Karl E. Birnbaum |
| DOI | 10.1177/001083676800300101 |
| Published date | 01 March 1968 |
| Date | 01 March 1968 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
The
Nordic
Countries
and
European
Security
Karl
E.
Birnbaum
The
recent
mellowing
of
the
rigid
East-
West
confrontation
in
Central
Europe
has
removed
many
of
the
inhibitions
to
a
free
debate
of
European
security
problems
among
the
European
nations
themselves.
This
healthy
development
is
very
striking
in
Western
Europe,
but
clearly
discernible
also
in
Eastern
Europe,
even
though
the
process
may
not
be
quite
symmetrical.
In
Northern
Europe
there
prevailed
for
a
long
time
an
atmosphere
of
aloofness
to
Central
European
affairs,
which
all
but
pre-
vented
a
public
discussion
of
European
security
problems
that
might
have
an
im-
pact
on
policy
formulation.
This
was
true
not
only
of
the
two
neutrals-Sweden
and
Finland-but
to
a
significant
extent
also
of
NATO’s
Scandinavian
member
countries,
Denmark
and
Norway.
Recently,
how-
ever,
the
public
debate
of
these
issues
has
become
far
more
articulate
in
the
Nordic
countries,
and
there
are
a
number
of
signs
indicating
a
sense
of involvement
in
Central
European
affairs,
which
may
foreshadow
a
more
active
role
of
these
countries
in
pro-
moting
the
process
of
detente
in Europe.
The
following
study
is
an
attempt
to
map
out
the
views
of
the
Nordic
countries
on
problems
of
European
security
as
they
are
reflected
in
official
government
state-
ments
and
parliamentary
debates.
Obvi-
ously
more
subtle
contrasts
could
have
been
introduced
into
the
analysis
if
press
opinion
had
been
included. The
purpose
of
this
investigation
is,
however,
to
determine
the
basic
motivations
and
primary
argu-
ments
for
official
attitudes
as
well
as
possible
tendencies
toward
shifts
in
these
attitudes.
Therefore,
it
seemed
that
the
probable
re-
sults
of
an
investigation
of
the
press
would
not
be
in
proportion
to
the
considerable
increase
in
effort
which
an
extension
of
this
kind
would
have
demanded.
Since
Norway
and
Denmark,
as
mem-
bers
of NATO,
maintain
a
similar
approach
to
the
problems
treated
here,
they
have
been
analyzed
under
the
same
heading.
Iceland
has
been
omitted
from
the
study
owing
to
her
particular
geopolitical
location.
In
order
to
facilitate
comparisons,
the
presen-
tation
has
been
divided
into
the
following
four
main
aspects:
I)
the
fundamental
approach
to
Central
European
problems;
2)
arms
policies
and
arms
control;
3)
the
policy
of
ditente,
and
4)
relations
with
East
Germany.
The
study
concludes
with
a
summary
of
the
similarities
and
differences
in
the
attitudes
of
the
four
countries.
Sweden
1.
The
Fundamental
Approach
to
Central
European
Problems
The
Nordic
countries’
fundamental
ap-
proach
to
the
complex
of
Central
European
issues
has
been
determined
mainly
by
the
basic
position
which
the
particular
country
has
taken
on
questions
of
security.
For
Sweden
this
has
meant
that
a
considerable
degree
of
restraint
has
been
imposed
on
the
government
through
its
policy
of
non-
2
alliance
aiming
at
neutrality
in
case
of
war.
In
respect
to
the
German
question
and
other
Central
European
problems,
this
re-
straint
may
be
regarded
primarily
as
a
nat-
ural
consequence
of
Sweden’s
position
during
World
War
II;
Sweden
could
hardly
contribute
to
the
shaping
of
a
peace
treaty
which
aimed
to
put
an
end
to
a
war
in
which
she
had
observed
neutrality.
Further-
more,
as
the
controversies
over
Central
Europe
became
a
focal
point
in
East-West
relations,
non-alliance
could
easily
be
com-
promised
if
Sweden
were
to
take
a
more
definitive
position
on
these
questions.
This
situation
has
still
not
prevented
the
Swedish
Government
from
expressing
on
several
occasions
its
anxiety
over
Germany’s
parti-
tion
and
warning
against
the
consequences
of
a
permanent
division.’
In
their
annual
report
to
the
parliament
on
foreign
affairs,
Swedish
foreign
policy
leaders
have
con-
tinually
commented
on
Central
European
problems,
and
these
comments
often
in-
cluded
independent
assessments
of
recent
developments?
On
the
other
hand,
Sweden
has
avoided
taking
a
more
definitive
stand
on
the
border
problems
in
Europe,
on
the
question
of
how
Germany’s
reunification
should
be
attained,
and
on
what
types
of
arms
control
measures
could
possibly
be
imposed
in
Central
Europe
in
connexion
with
reunification.
Early
in
i958,
the
Swedish
Government
had
cause
to
define
more
precisely
the
con-
ditions
under
which
Sweden
would
be
prepared
to
take
part
in
international
dis-
cussions
of,
inter
alia,
the
problems
in
Cen-
tral
Europe.
This
occurred
in
Sweden’s
reply
to
a
Soviet
proposal
to
convoke
a
top
level
conference
to
examine
the
possibilities
of
improving
the
international
situation.3
3
In
Prirne
Minister
Erlander’s
letter
of
3
1
January
1958
to
Premier
Bulganin,
he
stated
that
the
Swedish
Government
was
willing
to
participate
in
the
conference
if
the
major
Powers
were
in
agreement
on
the
composition
and
purpose
of
the
con-
ference
and
on
their
wish
for
Sweden
to
take
part.
It
is
thus
only
under
carefully
defined
conditions
that
the
Swedish
Gov-
ernment
has
been
prepared
to
participate
in
international
negotiations
on
crucial
questions
of East-West
relations,
including
the
Central
European
problems.
Within
the
framework
of
the
United
Nations,
how-
ever,
Sweden
appears
to
have
felt
greater
freedom
of
action,
and
in
ig5i
took
an
initiative
of
her
own
on
the
German
ques-
tion.
On
this
occasion,
Sweden’s
initiative
was
partly
motivated
by
her
concern
to
prevent
the
use
of
UN
machinery
in
actions
which
in
the
opinion
of
Foreign
Minister
Osten
Unden,
could
be
viewed
as
propa-
ganda
maneuvers
in
the
cold
war.4
4
Characteristic
of
the
caution
exercised
by
Sweden
in
bilateral
discussion
of
Central
European
questions
is
the
final
commum*qu6
after
Chancellor
Erhard’s
visit
to
Stock-
holm
in
the
summer
of
1966.
Here
it
was
stated
that ...
The
Prime
Minister
and
his
guest
were
agreed
that
every
chance
for
an
improvement
in
relations
between
East
and
West
must
be
utilised
so
as
to
help
over-
come
the
division
of
Europe
and
to
find,
in
accordance
with
the
objective
of
the
UN
Charter,
a
democratic
solution
of
the
Ger-
man
question
leading
to
peaceful
and
stable
conditions
in
Europe....’5
2.
Arms
Policy
and
Arrns
Control
Since
the
latter
part
of
the
1950’S,
Sweden
has
on
several
occasions
demonstrated
positive
interest
in
the
fundamental
ideas
behind
the
Polish
proposals
for
a
denu-
clearized
zone
in
Central
Europe.
When
in
the
fall
of
1961
Foreign
Minister
Unden
presented
his
plan
for
the
establishment
of
a
’club’
of
countries
not
having
nuclear
weapons
at
their
disposal,
he
explained
that
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