The Policy of Neutrality: Official Doctrines of Finland and Sweden
| Published date | 01 March 1968 |
| Author | Christian Lange,Kjell Goldmann,Katarina Brodin |
| Date | 01 March 1968 |
| DOI | 10.1177/001083676800300102 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
The
Policy
of
Neutrality:
Official
Doctrines
of
Finland
and
Sweden
Katarina
Brodin
Kjell
Goldmann
Christian
Lange
1.
Introduction
In
Denmark
and
Norway
as
well
as
Sweden
three
security
policy
alternatives
were
dis-
cussed
in
1948-49;
isolated
neutrality,
a
neutral
Scandinavian
defense
alliance,
and
membership
in
the
Western
Alliance.
Denmark
and
Norway
became
members
of
NATO,
while
Sweden
chose
to
continue
the
policy
of
neutrality
which
the
country
had
endeavored
to
pursue
during
two
world
wars.
One
aim
of
this
study
is
to
show
how
the
Swedish
Government
has
described
and
justified
the
policy
pursued
during
the
last
two
decades,
i.e.
to
describe
what
we
have
chosen
to
call
Sweden’s
‘official
neutrality
policy
doctrine’.
Finland’s
situation
after
the
Second
World
War
was
quite
different
from
that
of
the
Scandinavian
countries.
In
the
war
Finland
had
participated
on
the
losing
side.
True
enough
Finland
had
been
spared
foreign
occupation
as
well
as
uncondi=
tional
surrender,
but
the
peace
terms
were
hard
and
freedom
of
action
severely
re-
stricted.
The
1948
Treaty
of
Friendship
and
Mutual
Assistance
with
the
Soviet
Union
formed
the
basis
of
Finland’s
posi-
tion
in
the
postwar
world.
Gradually
Finnish
foreign
policy
leaders
came
to
describe
the
pursued
policy
as
a
’policy
of
neutrality’.
The
second
aim
of
this
study
is
to
describe
Finland’s
’official
neutrality
policy
doctrine’
and
to
compare
it
system-
atically
with
that
of
Sweden.
By
’official
doctrine’
is
here
meant
pub-
lic
statements
by
heads
of
state
and
mem-
bers
of
governments,
concerning
(a)
the
substance
of
the
conducted
policy
(policy),
(b)
the
reasons
why
this
policy
is
considered
advantageous
(argument),
and
(c)
the
state
of
the
surrounding
world,
to
the
extent
that
this
is
relevant
to
the
policy
and
the
arguments
advanced
in
favor
of
that
policy
(Image
of the
world).
It
is
not
always
easy
to
distinguish
between ’arguments’
and ’images
of
the
world’
in
policy
documents.
The
statements
we
designate
as
’arguments’
refer,
however,
explicitly
to
the
particular
policy
pursued:
’we
pursue
policy
X,
be-
cause...’,
’our
policy
X
has
the
favorable
result...’,
etc.
By
statements
about
’the
image
of
the
world’
we
mean,
in
contrast;
all
kinds
of
pronouncements
on
the
situa-
tion
in
the
world,
both
descriptive.
(’the
world
is
divided
into
two
separate
blocs’)
and
analytical
(’the
cause
of
tension
is
the
mutual
distrust
prevailing
between
the
blocs’;
’better
communications
between
the
Great
Powers
would
reduce
the
risk
of
war) -
i.e.
all
such
statements
not
ex-
plicitly
referring
to
the
particular
policy.
An
example
of
a
’complete’
line
of
reason-
ing
is
the
following:
19
Policy
-
freedom
from
alliances
in
peace,
aiming
at
neutrality
in
war.
Argument
-
by
remaining
outside
the
military
alliances
we
contribute
to
the
decrease
of
tension
between
East
and
West.
Image
of the
World -
the
tension
between
East
and
West
is
due
to
the
existence
of
antag-
onistic
military
alliances.
Why,
then,
are
we
interested
in
official
statements ?
The
crucial
problems
may
ap-
pear
to
be
those
concerning
the
’real’
causes
or
motives
underlying
the
pursued
policy.
Can
official
statements
really
indicate
any-
thing
of
interest
about
them ?
From
the
outset,
it
should
be
emphasized
that
the
aim
of
this
study
is
not
in
any
way
to
elucidate
the
’real’
causes
or
motives
of
the
pursued
policy.
We
cannot
ascertain
to
what
degree
the
officially
declared
view-
points
are
identical
with
those
which
the
decision-makers
have
found
to
be
decisive,
even
though
it
is,
of
course,
possible -
per-
haps
even
likely -
that
they
coincide.
In-
stead
we
regard
the
official
doctrines
as
interesting
phenomena
per
se,
interesting
irrespective
of
the
degree
to
which
they
provide
insight
into
the
’true’
motives
of
the
decision-makers.
First,
the
official
doc-
trines
are
elements
of
the
security
policies
of - in
this
case -
Finland
and
Sweden.
The
doctrines
function,
in
part,
as
messages
to
other
countries.
These
countries,
one
as-
sumes,
attempt
to
form
an
opinion
about
Finnish
and
Swedish
attitudes.
On
the
basis
of
this
opinion
measures
relevant
to
Fin-
land’s
and
Sweden’s
security
are
planned
or
adopted.
Second,
and
partially
for
this
reason,
the
official
doctrines
set
certain
limits
on
what
governments
can
undertake
in
the
future
without
taking
the
rather
startling
step,
both
domestically
and
inter-
nationally,
of
breaking
with
their
previous
policy.
For
the
observer
attempting
to
predict
the
future
conduct
of
Finland
and
Sweden,
knowledge
of
the
official
doc-
trines
is
of
value,
regardless
of
the
extent
to
which
they
reflect
what
the
Finnish
and
Swedish
Governments
are
in
actual
fact
thinking.
It
has
not
been
possible
for
us
to
under-
take
a
complete
examination
of
all
state-
ments
on
security
policy
questions
made
by
the
Finnish
President
and
members
of
the
Finnish
and
Swedish
Governments
during
the
last
two
decades.
We
have
chosen
those
statements
which
appear
es-
pecially
authoritative,
statements
which
the
Governments
themselves
seem
to
regard
as’
particularly
representative
and
im-
portant.’
We
cannot
be
certain
to
what
degree
our
conclusions
would
have
to
be
mod-
ified
if
more
extensive
source
material
were
examined
or
selected
according
to
other
criteria.
However,
the
sources
ex-
amined
reveal
a
considerable
amount
of
consistency:
certain
fundamental
lines
of
thought
recur
again
and
again,
contradic-
tions
are
rare,
shifts
in
attitudes
are
excep-
tional.
This
supports
the
assumption
that
a
more
complete
perusal
of
the
material
would
alter
the
picture
only
in
detail.
The
fundamental
elements
of
the
official
neu-
trality
policy
doctrines
are
probably
ade-
quately
presented
below.
II.
Policy
1.
’Policy
of
neutrality’ ?
As
early
as
a
few
months
after
the
end
of
the
Second
World
War,
the
Swedish
Gov-
ernment
made
it
clear
that
Sweden
wished
to
remain
outside
the
Great-Power
blocs
20
which
could
come
into
existence
if
the
alliance
against
the
axis
powers
were
to
be
dissolved.
Sweden
wanted
to
participate
in
the
United
Nations
but
not
in
any
’bloc
formation’ :
z
We
are
willing
to
participate
in
a
joint
secu-
rity
organization
and,
in
the
event
of
a
future
conflict,
to
give
up
neutrality
to
the
extent
that
the
Charter
of the
organization
demands.
If,
however,
against
expectation
a
tendency
to-
wards
a
subdivision
of
the
Great
Powers
in
two
camps
would
appear
within
this
organiza-
tion,
our
policy
must
be
not
to
let
ourselves
be
forced
into
such
a
group
or
bloc
formation.
(Si)
The
’bloc
formation’
became
a
reality,
and
it
became
Swedish
policy
not
’by
any
advance
commitments’
to
deprive
itself
’of
the
possibility
of
keeping
out
of
a
new
war’
(S2).
Sweden
should
not
’in
peace-
time
bind
its
freedom
of
action
by
treaties
of
alliance
which
make
neutrality
impos-
sible
in
wartime’.
Her
territory
should
be
kept
‘pacified
in
the
sense
that
it
is
not
put
at
the
disposal
of
any
other
power
for
mili-
tary
preparations’;
nor
should
Sweden
make
agreements
with
one
power
group
which
the
other
power
group
could
inter-
pret
as
Swedish
territory
being
at
the
dis-
posal
of
the
opposite
party
for
advanced
bases
(S3).
’Freedom of
action’
was
a
key
term
in
the
early
declarations
on
Swedish
postwar
policy.
Later
it
was
clarified
that
in
the
event
of
war
this
freedom
of
action
was
only
intended
to
be
used
for
neutrality.
It
was
stated
that
the
label
’non-alliance’
was
incomplete
with
regard
to
Sweden
’if
it is
not
supplemented
by
the
information
that
we
intend
to
use
our
’non-alliance’
position
by
trying
to
avoid
becoming
involved
in
any
dispute
between
other
states’
(Sl2);
’freedom
from
alliances
is
an
incomplete
term
in
that
it
does
not
express
a
resolute
intention
to
pursue
a
policy
of
neutrality
in
the
event
of
war’
(Si7).
The
result
was
the
formulation
’freedom
from
alliances
in
peace
aiming
at
neutrality
in
war’ ;
it
has
become
customary
to
designate
the
Swedish
policy
also
in
peacetime
as
a
’policy
of
neutrality’.
Finland’s
situation
immediately
after
the
Second
World
War
was
quite
different
from
that
of
Sweden.
According
to
the
provisions
of
the
1940
peace
treaty
Finland
had
undertaken
not
to
enter
into
any
al-
liance
nor
participate
in
any
coalition
di-
rected
against
the
other
contracting
party,
i.e.
the
Soviet
Union.
This
obligation
was
reconfirmed
by
the
peace
treaty
in
1947.
Furthermore,
in
the
case
of
Finland
the
primary
task
in
the
field
of
foreign
policy
during
the
first
postwar
decade
was
the
establishment
of
a
firm
foundation
for
re-
lations
with
the
Soviet
Union.
Statements
from
this
period
constantly
refer
to
Fin-
land’s
relations
with
the
East
as
a
’matter
of
destiny’
and
as
’the
all-important
issue’
in
Finnish
foreign
policy
(F2,
F3,
F4,
F7,
Fi3).
In
a
speech
on
6
December
1944,
the
Day
of
Independence,
three
months
after
the
signing
of
the
armistice
treaty,
Prime
Min-
ister
Paasikivi
stated:
In
Finnish
foreign
policy
the
all-important
issue
is
our
country’s
relations
with
the
big
neighbor
to
the
east,
the
Soviet
Union.
This
is
our
real
foreign
policy
problem,
to
which
we
must
find
a
solution
and
upon
which
the
future
of
our
people
depends ...
The
distrust
must
be
eliminated,
and
friendship
established.
It
is,
according
to
my
conviction,
of
funda-
mental.
importance
to
our
people
that
Finnish
foreign
policy
in
the future
is
conducted
so
as
not
to
be
directed
against
the
Soviet
Union.
(F2).
The
main
thing
was
to
dispel
the
distrust
which
had
so
far
prevailed
in
the
relations
between
Finland
and
the
Soviet
Union.
In
1948
the
Treaty
of
Friendship
and
Mutual
Assistance
was
concluded
between
the
two
countries.
In
what
way
did
this
Treaty
affect
Finland’s
international
status ?
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